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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
NEOLIBERALISM AND MONOPOLY IN THE
MOTION PICTURE INDUSTRY
by
Michael Wartenbe
Florida International University, 2020
Miami, Florida
Professor Ronald Cox, Major Professor
Monopolies and industry concentra on have returned in our time, as did the ramifications in the
globalized political economy. One of the most impactful in our daily lives are the Mass Media
Conglomerates who not only own the majority of lm, television, and news we access, but increasingly
control the means of accessing it, from cable to digital. While many are familiar with these corpora ons
via their services and products, less known by the public are their poli cal opera ons and close
cooperation with Washington. This is due to the lack of holis c analysis of the industry and cooperation
in the media oligopoly. Especially lacking is the focus on trade associa ons in the poli cal process.
As such, this dissertation analyzes the role of the prominent trade association for the film
industry—the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). The MPAA was formed in the early days of
Hollywood’s film dominance, and today is one of the most prominent and notorious trade associations
in promoting neoliberal development. These changes include transnationalized production and
distribution, Intellectual Property Rights extensions, and invasive trade agreements to name a few. The
influence and power to do so goes beyond lobbying, by instrumentalizing their industry, incorporating
state bureaucracies, and developing an international structure that enhances corporate political power.
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The results have been an ever-growing consolidation that branches into related sectors and industries of
communication and technology. With this such trade associations like the MPAA become more
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representative and hold more political leverage, which is increasingly used on the global arena and
impacting the foreign and domestic policy of many states far beyond Hollywood.
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1. Introduction
In our time, monopoly and oligopoly have become the norm in many industries.
Massive corporations dominate headlines, economics, and even politics. In many
industrial sectors of contemporary capitalism, we can count nearly 100% of an industry
on one hand. Yet, even in this normalization of monopolies and duopolies, a few
industries stand out even in that concentration. Computer technology and
pharmaceuticals are among them, but film and media are especially notable, not only
due to their necessarily public image, but because of the degree of collusion and
partnership within the industry. This level of concentration is such that Hollywood is
nearly synonymous with the Major Studios, which together comprise the Motion Picture
Association of America (MPAA): Walt Disney, Universal, Paramount, Sony, Warner
Bros, and, for the majority of its history, 20th Century Fox. These Major Studios are so
ingrained in our understanding of film that any producer outside of these majors is
automatically "independent”. They have long been an important factor in the culture and
entertainment of effectively all Americans. Indeed, this is true for an incredibly large
portion of the world.
These companies have been able to dominate not only their domestic market,
but the global market for film and related media. However, like most other oligopolistic
industries, the Major Studios could not have won their leadership position without the
help of governments—especially the U.S. government, with whom Hollywood has a very
close relationship. While capitalism has a general propensity toward high levels of
concentration, corporations have also used their political power and influence to facilitate
the domination of global markets. The cohesive and cartel-like MPAA has long been the
political arm of the Major Studios, utilizing modern tactics and old strategies to develop
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the international media oligopoly we have today. These studios are Warner Bros.,
Universal, Sony, Paramount, Walt Disney Studios, and until recently Fox.
This dissertation will look into the connection and integration of monopoly-like
behavior and power of these corporations, who remain competitors with one another in
the market. This will answer the question as to how monopolistic is the film industry,
despite being structured in as a clear oligopoly. This market competition is aligned with
political and institutional cooperation, especially around the MPAA trade association.
This organized and exclusive process allows for behavior similar to a cartel, both in the
market and politically, without contradicting antitrust regulation. As a result, these
corporations are able to increase their economic and political power and influence much
further than they would individually.
As such, I plan to show the relationship between political influence and
monopolization. In doing so, I will juxtapose historical strategies of control within the film
industry with the modernized tactics that increase the leverage and power of the
oligopoly, both internationally and within the industry. This will be done within the context
of a critical framework of capitalism’s structure, which can inherently lead to
concentration of economic power, but the focus will be on the instrumentalization of the
state by the Major Media Corporations. In doing so, I will contribute to the scholarly
literature in several ways. First, I will connect the literature on corporate political power
with the literature on film industry monopolization, which is lacking this theoretical
framework. Second, I will contribute to the literature on cartels and corporate collusion
as tools used by corporations to limit outside competition, rather than solely for price
setting. Third, I will contribute to literature focusing on the instrumentalization of the
state, as opposed to structural explanations for neoliberal policy. Fourth, I will contribute
to literature connecting neoliberalism to the transnationalization of corporations. Finally,
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this dissertation will expand the conception of corporate power beyond lobbying and
regulation to analyze effects on the industry, product, society, politics, international
relations, and the global economic order.
Much literature examining the monopolization and domination of the major
studios that make up the MPAA tend to focus on only two common aspects of
neoliberalism: technology and ideology (Holt, 2011; May, 2000; Prince, 2000; Wasko,
1994). While undoubtedly important variables, the overemphasis on these aspects
simplifies the neoliberal shift as well as the effect of state and global neoliberalization on
the film industry and vice-versa. This is particularly problematic as it under-analyzes the
political activities of the Major Studios and their association in the process. Especially,
the focus on technology in explaining the process of monopolization eliminates an
analysis of both agency and structure in favor of both a natural and inevitable evolution
of society. As such, this limitation is itself highly political as it defends any shift by
claiming it is beyond politics and thus simply a process to understand rather than affect.
This technological evolution explanation has been used in defense of many industry
monopolizations as it carries the same conclusions as a neoliberal analysis. As such,
any study utilizing neoliberal epistemology to study a neoliberal process will garner no
new details. This has been especially evident with the financial sector, where technology
was used to explain the growth of banks, high market share, and risky products. The
creation of new mathematical formulas and financial products was a natural process and
a natural conclusion to the industry. This naturalization defense of the process obviously
removes both the important political factors involved as well as the actual economic
components and outcomes.
By focusing on the political and economic power of the Major Studios, this
dissertation will contribute to a better understanding of both the film industry and the
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general shift toward neoliberalism. Although the film industry may be seen as a relatively
minor actor, especially when compared to larger industries with greater revenue and
capital, it is important in showing how neoliberalism developed as a process, especially
given the interplay between powerful corporate actors, market forces and state policy.
The monopolization that started in the 1980s and continues today is not solely the result
of technology, ideology or individual agents, but instead has been driven by a broad
base of collusion and affiliations of corporations, industries, and governments. The
political activities of the Major Studios can be seen both individually and within larger
lobbying groups such as the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA) and
associations they have been part of, such as the International Intellectual Property
Alliance (IIPA), and the Federation Against Copyright Theft (FACT). Their own activities
to increase market share and protect profits is thus a key component of the global
spread of neoliberal policy.
In the remainder of this chapter I will first introduce the film industry by examining
the history of Major Studio control, which will reveal a strong consistency in the
oligopoly’s strategy up to today. This will be followed by a transition discussing the new
tactics associated with the origins of neoliberalism during the 1980s. Here I will analyze
in more detail the limitations of existing scholarly literature in addressing and explaining
the power of the film oligopoly. I will then examine broader topics of corporate power:
intellectual property, internationalization, and neoliberalism. This is to both inform the
topic of the film oligopoly, but also reveal what lessons can be applied generally from
such an analysis. Finally, I will analyze the theoretical conceptions of cartel power to
show how an oligopoly controls and shapes an industry, both of which are too rarely
deployed in contemporary scholarly accounts. I will conclude with an overview of the
methods used in this dissertation and will provide an outline of the remaining chapters.
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Historical Background
Starting in the late 19th century, film and movies were a relatively new product
and industry. Following traditions of early projection technology, the rudimentary film
industry focused on the novelty of the technology exhibited by traveling showmen
(Bakker, 2003). As situated theaters, nickelodeons (early, cheap theaters), and habitual
audiences were formed the industry structure that was established bore more
resemblance to what we see today. The industry was divided into three sectors:
Production was the actual writing, filming, and editing of scenes; Distribution was the
movement and allocation of film to theaters; and Exhibition was when the film was
shown to an audience. In theory these were separated sectors, but in practice
distribution was usually performed by the largest production companies, which would
give them leverage in dealing with the remaining actors.1 The birth of the industry also
occurred as intellectual property--patents and copyright--became standardized in law in
Western, capitalist states (Johns, 2009; Boldrin and Levine, 2008). As a result, the
leverage coming from leading producers and distributors were exponentially
compounded by their aggressive and overbearingly litigious use of patents, which helped
develop a naturally close relationship with the legal systems and governments.
Due to this dependence on intellectual property, the industry quite quickly
suffered from vertical and horizontal monopolization, a common problem of the
unregulated capitalism of the time. As nickelodeons became dependent on distributors,
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While this is impactful for smaller producers who need their larger competitors to distribute for
them, it was also a major issue for exhibitors. The Nickelodeon owners and projectionists were
commonly from blue-collar class, while producers had more education and money (Seabury,
1926). As will be seen, producers had a much easier time consolidating their influence and
colluding together through cartels, while Nickelodeons and projectionists were divided enough to
never develop a counterbalance.
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and small production companies became dependent on camera manufacturers, this
vertical monopolization (controlling multiple sectors) began butting heads with horizontal
competition (competition within a sector). In this system, producers could not anticipate
the ways various lawsuits and camera patent settlements would go. This problem was
especially compounded as the leading camera manufacturers were also the leading film
producers. Using an “infringing” camera that potentially used a competitor's patent could
lead to a lawsuit not only over its use in production, but also for the distribution and
exhibition of a film filmed with it. Infamously, it was Thomas Edison’s Studio that was
especially problematic due to holding early camera patents, being especially litigious
even compared to other producers, and willing to cause confusion and misinformation in
the industry, such as placing ads that suggest his patent is enforceable despite having
lost the argument in court (see Edison ad). Because of the precarious and difficult
position of all involved in such a cutthroat environment, there was much support for
partnership at the top for stability in the industry.

6

1. Ad from The Moving Picture World (1907, pp. 34). This is after Edison lost a
suit, but still trying to stir up confusion over the use of competitor’s Cameras.

As a result, the leading producers and distributors combined to form a Trust
known as The Motion Picture Patents Company (MPPC) in 1908. Also known as
Edison's Trust, the MPPC was a means to end the fierce and volatile competition, as
entrepreneurs experimented with ways to utilize this new technology in its early years.
By uniting the largest producers and distributors, patent use became clearer and more
stable. But having such a monopoly inevitably began limiting the capacity of new
entrants into the industry. In addition to possessing a horizontal monopoly, this
domination was helped along by Edison’s leadership which continued the aggressive
strategy of rigorous protection of patents (hence “Patents Company” in the name). Now
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with a broader and strengthened set of patents in the Trust--including cameras, film, and
projectors--long and expensive litigation was simply directed toward producers outside
the Trust’s reach, commonly foreign producers and imported film (Puttnam, 1997). By
1918 the U.S. government accepted the MPPC for what it was and ended its reign by
breaking up the trust with a successful antitrust suit. With horizontal monopolization no
longer legally viable, producers turned to control vertical distribution and exhibition to
limit would-be competitors.
The Studios that filled the void were those who fled Edison’s New York
dominance to the other side of the country in Hollywood. This led to what was known as
the Studio era (1915-1948), which was dominated by many of the same Major Studios
we know today. This was when the trade association MPAA was created in 1922.2 While
the horizontal monopolization was ended for these new Major Studios, the vertical
monopolization was still ripe for abuse. As exhibiting theaters tended to be more
independent and smaller than the larger production/distribution companies, the latter had
an advantage. If the exhibitors wished to purchase the more popular films from the large
studios they were given conditions attached known as blind and block booking. To
purchase the desired film for exhibition, theaters had to purchase a “block” of less
desirable films from the producer, commonly unaware of what the block of films were
even made up of (Seabury, 1926; Bakker, 2003). While this was surely a method to
squeeze more revenue from exhibitors it was also designed to limit competition among
producers/distributors. With a block of films purchased for exhibition, screen time for
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Paramount, Fox, Universal, Warner Bros. and Columbia were founding members. Disney joined
later, and MGM, UA, and RKO were founders who eventually were purchased or went bankrupt.
More recently Fox was also purchased by Disney, but played a much larger role in all eras of the
MPAA and Major Studio dominance.
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films by other producers became scarcer. This placed small, independent studios in a
secondary tier, used to fill gaps in block booking.
While exhibitors had little recourse during the MPPC's reign, after the breakup
exhibitors began fighting back against the relatively larger producers by forming “theater
circuits.” These were collectives of theater owners that banded together for more power
during negotiation and film purchases. This was an attempt to limit unfair practices, such
as blind and block booking, but was fairly unsuccessful (Seabury, 1926; Balio, 1995).
Some distributors responded with their own form of horizontal consolidation with so
called “film clubs,” which, just as theater circuits, was used to increase negotiation
power. More importantly, however, was that larger distributors found they could simply
purchase theaters until they had a controlling share of the circuit. While falling short of
the horizontal monopoly practices of the MPPC and therefore deflecting attention from
antitrust regulators, this vertical consolidation nonetheless unified the “functions of
production, distribution and exhibition to the inevitable injury of every other producer,
distributor and exhibitor” (Seabury, 1926 p. 65).
These practices continued in the following decades until all three sectors of
production, distribution, and exhibition were united, resulting in a surprisingly “Fordist”
method of film production. Movies were churned out with an assembly line of sets,
writers, and directors. This was possible thanks to the assured profits from control of
theaters. Even stars were contractually tied to particular studios. However, this came to
an end as the regulatory environment of the New Deal finally caught up to the film
industry after WWII.3 In 1948, the exhibiting portion of the industry was delinked from
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It is important to emphasize that the Decree came about after WWII, unlike other industries that
faced stronger antitrust prior. Film and media have long had a strong relationship to Washington
and even the military as a means for ideological influence. As will be discussed in later chapters,
this relationship is even stronger today as the Major Studios are global and not just influencing
American ideology.
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production and exhibition by the “Paramount Decree,” forcing studios to divest their
interest in theaters. The spirit of this vertical separation was continued in 1970 with
Financial Interest and Syndication Rules (Fin-Syn), which stopped broadcast television
and content producers from overlapping in ownership. As the major Studios declined in
size and profit due to this stronger antitrust legislation, independent producers were able
to fill in the gap and achieve better deals with the Majors. While the enforcement of both
regulations would end in the 1980s, this interim period saw a rise of artistic and directordriven films as opposed to financially driven production.

Kirshner4 considers this time the “second Golden Age,” following the first golden
age of the Studio Era. Biskind (1999) has termed this “New Hollywood” as the industry
became less hierarchical, not only around board meetings and producers, but also within
the production as all crew members were afforded more creative freedom on set. This
allowed for novel and boundary-pushing films like 2001: A Space Odyssey and The
Exorcist to dominate the box office. However, Easy Rider (1969) is most commonly used
to epitomize the era. With drug use, sex, and counterculture in the foreground, the small
budget film was distributed by Columbia, grossing over 100 times its cost. The success
of Easy Rider helped open other indie and micro-budget films to better distribution deals
as the Major Studios looked for high-profit ratio films that would spark a cultural interest
in society.5 Easy Rider was especially notable for its social commentary and
idiosyncratic relation to American culture following the 1960s youth movement. While

4

Kirshner puts a strong emphasis on the decline of censorship for contributing to the artistic
surge. It is interesting to note that the MPAA was supportive of loosening censorship rules at the
time. In more recent years as the oligopoly has strengthened, the MPAA has returned to a
conservative interpretation of ratings and censorship, though not as harsh as the Hays Code and
focused on self-censorship.
5

This is in contrast to today. While there are more indie productions today than ever before in
history, Major Studios are not dependent on these indie releases, and are usually to supplement
Blockbuster revenue (Epstein, 2006).
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subsequent successes into the 1970s--The Godfather, The Sting, Rocky--continued the
director-driven nature of film, both the experimental and idiosyncratic nature were giving
way to the blockbuster style (Jaws 1975 and Star Wars 1977), which helped restore
Major Studio dominance just in time for sweeping changes under Ronald Reagan and
Neoliberalism.

Neoliberalism
This transition toward deregulation and the return of oligopoly power under the
Reagan administration were part of a broader shift toward neoliberalism. While this has
a variety of definitions related to diverse aspects such as ideology and globalization, in
relation to the power consolidation among the Major Studios of the MPAA, three defining
concepts of neoliberalism are paramount: 1) A return of capitalist class hegemony in the
social order, which in the film sector takes shape in the formation of large-scale media
oligopolies that exercise power through financial ownership of high-value added
activities within the industry (Duménil and Levy, 2013). While Duménil and Levy
emphasize a class-based analysis, the return of such power configurations is heavily
done through, and dependent on, the centrality of corporate oligopolies, such as media
conglomerates. 2) As opposed to direct monopolization, control under neoliberalism is
done in a diffuse manner around flexible specialization (Christopherson and Stroper,
1986), which allows leading corporations to bottleneck key sectors of an industry, such
as finance and distribution for film, while other sectors are disintegrated and open to
competition. In this system, smaller production studios exist in a competitive
environment, where they remain dependent on leading corporations for financing,
marketing, and distribution to market their products to wider audiences. 3) Finally, the
neoliberal era is defined by the transition into financialization (Foster, 2006). This is

11

manifested through ownership of Intellectual Property Rights, which is then leveraged as
a financial asset by dominant media conglomerates.6
By comparing the distinct historical eras of film oligopoly, we can see as many
structural consistencies of control, as well as the uniqueness of the neoliberal form
outlined above. The early film industry's aggressive business tactics reveal key aspects
of neoliberalism and the film industry during modern and early periods with little
regulation. These include market control and consolidation, utilizing cartels to limit
competition, and aggressive use of copyright to maintain market reach. The
consolidation mentioned above reflects both horizontal and vertical monopolization of
the product. As the chart below shows, even for an industry with a lot of natural
propensity for concentration, corporations that own high-value activities under
neoliberalism (ownership of intellectual property rights over film production and
distribution, for example) have been able to broaden the power of their oligopoly.
Corporate power under neoliberalism has been used to reduce regulatory oversight and
to allow for a greater concentration of ownership of high-value activities within the film
industry both nationally and globally.

2. Aspects of Motion Picture Eras

Manner of Control

Sector Focus

Early Film Industry

Studio

Decree

Neoliberalism

( -1915)

(1915-1948)

(1948-1980s)

(1980s- )

Horizontal

Vertical

Horizontal

Vertical

Monopolization

Monopolization

Cohesion

Monopolization

Patents

Theater Ownership

Production

Distribution Stream
Control

6

See Zeller (2008) for the relation between finance and Intellectual Property.
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Manner of

Studio Fordism

Studio Fordism

Production

Smaller Studio

Finance

Partnerships

Management/
Blockbusters

Major Association

Edison Trust

MPAA

MPAA

MPAA

Industry

No

Few Major

Greater Indie

Few Major

Competition

Major Competitors

Competitors

Competition

Competitors

Relation to

Foreign Film

Little

Foreign Market

Foreign

Foreign

Protectionism

Foreign Threat/

Access

Market Access

Production
Legal Focus

Domestic Focus
Patent
Control/Litigation

Blind and Block Copyright Extension Copyright Control
Booking

The largest changes within the industry’s hierarchy have been tactical, rather
than strategic. These major tactical changes are represented by the first three rows in
the chart. Manner of Control is how the oligopoly is delineating itself through barriers of
sector ownership. This is directly related to antitrust enforcement, with no regulation
leading to full monopolization and weak enforcement resulting in vertical monopolization,
which defines both Neoliberalism and the Studio era. Only post-Decree did the Major
Studios have trouble with cohesion of the oligopoly due to lack of sector ownership. The
sector focus itself has probably seen the greatest variance, as this is more related to
distribution and exhibition technology, rather than solely on politics and law. With so
many distribution platforms these days,7 rather than only theaters and television, the
Major Studios and their parent companies need to be very dispersed with their Vertical

7

While the largest and best known are Netflix, Hulu, and Amazon Videos, individual studios have
increasingly focused on developing their own platform for exclusive content, such a Disney+ and
HBO Go.
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Monopolization. To limit costs associated with these multiple distribution platforms, the
Major Studios focus on controlling and expanding Intellectual Property Rights, which are
financialized within neoliberalism. This allows for specialization in “must-see” blockbuster
franchises released around the world, which have a relatively assured market that can
be released through multiple streams. This also keeps the most profitable films out of
reach of indie studios due to costly productions, unsecured distribution, prohibitively
expensive acquisition of franchise intellectual property or development through costly
advertisement campaigns.
In turn, the largest consistencies of the industry revolve around the number of
major competitors and the degree of association of those members. Once again, only
during the Decree period under strong antitrust enforcement did the industry see a
decline in oligopoly. This was the largest decline of market share for the Majors until its
culmination, which saw the largest change within the MPAA organization (covered in
chapter 2). The associations themselves are the most consistent element of the
oligopoly. Edison’s MPPC trust had no major competitors, but itself was formed out of
the major studios of the time--largely Edison Studios and Biograph. The demise of the
MPPC was immediately replaced with the MPAA. Though the Paramount Decree
weakened the oligopoly, it did nothing to the trade association, which allowed the
organization to recoup its political influence and help usher in neoliberalism and
deregulation. As the Major Studios grew, they increasingly looked to foreign markets to
reinforce influence and offset production costs, and subsequently copyright extensions
needed to be expanded globally.
As a result of deregulation, corporate concentration, and new media
technologies, the studios became firmly incorporated in Mass Media Conglomerates
(MMC) that control major film production, distribution, exhibition in theaters, television,

14

cable, pay on demand, and other media forms such as newspapers, magazines, book
publishing, and even toys and theme parks. This control limits independent studios in
distribution terms, as they now need to distribute through a Media Conglomerate stream.
Like the previous eras, any room for independent films will be limited and help feed the
profits of the Major competitors. The result is a secure position for the Majors as any
lower competition will likely feed into their distribution. This additionally makes it
extremely unlikely for changes in the hierarchy of the film industry. Any large
independent studios, or “mini-majors,” that begin to compete with the majors are
purchased and incorporated into a Mass Media Conglomerate. This lack of competition
allows assurances of profit for the Majors, which in turn allows further hierarchization
through blockbuster finance, foreign markets, and copyright control.
As the Mass Media Conglomerates have concentrated and dominated the
domestic market, they have also expanded their international reach, with over 50
percent of revenue coming from overseas. The distribution size and control, financial
security, and political backing allow the Mass Media Conglomerates to expand their
market power well beyond the capacity of smaller studios. Thus, international copyright
rules, such as incorporated in the World Trade Organization and other regional and
bilateral trade agreements, and the support from Washington are essential to the global
success of the Majors. This domination of foreign markets, in turn, allows for larger
conglomerates in the home market, again crowding out smaller competition. What we
are left with is the perpetual domination of the industry by the Major Studios and their
parent Mass Media Conglomerates, with little hope of growing competition at any point
of the distribution stream.
Central to this internationalization and monopolization is the change in production
and film style. As the Fordist production of films limited smaller studios without the funds
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to replicate the process, “Blockbuster” profits exclude all independent studios unable to
raise the massive funds required. As the restructuring of the film industry during the ‘80s
was financed by Wall Street, the end products of Mass Media Conglomerates were
required to have a secure profit to ensure repayment on the investment. This assured
profit comes from both the distribution and the size of the conglomerate, which allows
access to finance in the hundreds of millions of dollars to produce a film. With the
necessity of high advertising expenditures, the extensive deployment of financial capital
is required to turn a film into a Blockbuster. With independents unable to compete at
such a high level, Blockbuster films from the Majors dominate their own distribution
steams, crowding out lesser known intellectual properties. This assures a home market
and revenue stream for the Majors, from which they extend to foreign markets, which are
again out of reach for most independents.
Vertical integration has created a synergy between the products, distribution, and
exhibition. As Prince has argued, the new Media Conglomerates making up the major
film studios no longer made films, but “filmed entertainment” (2000, pg. xi) which would
be repurposed into the old and new distribution mediums, but also into new ancillary
markets such as toys, print media, and even theme parks. Thus, film was no longer a
product of its own, but just one iteration of an intellectual property chain. Films
themselves could be shown in theater, cable, pay-per view, and television, while the
characters and story could be refashioned into television shows, books, comics, and
toys. It was argued that these various means of distribution needed to be combined to
gain the synergy and efficiency necessary to market Intellectual Property Rights. Added
to this were the complications of having multiple means of distribution beyond only film
and television. Washington no longer saw it necessary to regulate such a diverse
industry. If one means of distribution is not perfect for the consumer there are many
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others. With these arguments in hand, industry lobbyists were able to successfully
remove anti-trust regulation from the industry.

The Evolution of the Neoliberal Era: Contemporary Scholarship
The scholarly literature explains the trends associated with the neoliberal era in
film from a variety of angles. For example, Wasko (1994) takes up the importance of
technological innovation to explain the consolidation in media and film. The new
mediums of cable and home video extended the market of filmed entertainment, but
were also used as a reason to liberalize the market. With so many growing distribution
streams for film and television there was no reason to bar producers from theater
ownership (Paramount Decree) or broadcast (Fin-Syn). However, the end result was that
the majors would enter and largely dominate all these distribution streams
simultaneously. Rather than grow competition, this allowed for a growth in the size of the
majors and their economies of scale to produce expensive blockbusters. The varied
distribution and expensive production thus support one another, and also limit the
distribution option of indie producers. Films from the Majors fill the majority of their
distribution, but independents are also heavily reliant on their distribution system, making
competition outside of the Major’s supply chain quite small.
Wasko also argues that the move into various distribution sectors is directly tied
to the development of Mass Media Conglomerates and the focus on vertical
monopolization. While this provides a very strong examination as well as foundation to
future strategies within the Majors, such as moving into digital distribution, it places too
much emphasis on technology as the reason for monopolization, resulting in a
deterministic conclusion. As a result, it diminishes other factors in politics, the economy,
as well as within the industry and corporations, and largely considers monopolization as
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an inevitable consequence of technological advancement. New distribution sectors and
a larger industry were undoubtedly used to push liberalization, but it is also likely that the
Majors would have reconsolidated their position regardless of that development.
Holt (2011) has a better account for this problem by accepting the change in
technology as a variable, but also including neoliberal ideology as another independent
variable. In this way, Holt argues that the introduction of new means of distribution in the
1980s reduced the need for regulation against vertical integration. Horizontal
monopolization would continue to be forbidden, but now distribution streams could be
synergized. Efficiency would be increased as the Mass Media Conglomerates came into
existence, uniting production, distribution, exhibition and, increasingly, Wall Street.
However, Holt argues that this deregulatory environment would have never come about
if neoliberal principles did not contribute to its legitimacy. She especially emphasizes the
inauguration of Ronald Reagan and his placement of William Baxter as assistant
attorney general in charge of antitrust, and Mark Fowler as chairman of the FCC. Armed
with an ideological goal of deregulation and legitimation for their decisions by
technological change, these individuals drastically changed the corporate landscape of
the economy.
By focusing on the ideology of leading individuals, Holt provides much needed
political and human agency elements to the literature. Even without new distribution
technology, the monopolization can be explained by neoliberal ideology endorsed and
advanced by the President and the executive branch. Unlike the reliance on the
technology variable, which can only explain monopolization in industries that likewise
had transformative innovations, the ideology variable can be used for all industry
transitions. As a result, the technology variable is more descriptive specifically to the
motion picture industry, while ideology has more general explanatory power. Where Holt
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has trouble in her analysis is in explaining how and why the ideology shift took place.
Rather than focusing on literature critiquing neoliberalism as an ideology, Holt turns to
an individual analysis. Thus, it is in Reagan's presidency that neoliberalism as a variable
is found. More specifically this is done in the embodiment of Reagan, Fowler and Baxter.
This method is flawed in individualizing the variable well past its utility. If Baxter, and
especially Reagan, were not in power, would neoliberalism have spread? This variable
would be unable to answer this question as it is too devoid of structural and systemic
considerations.
Miller et al. (2005) are able to avoid limiting themselves to overly specific
explanatory variables by mixing critiques from political economy and cultural studies.
The authors argue that “Hollywood” no longer exists. Rather, “Hollywood” in reference to
the film industry explains both the internationalized production of film as well as the
global distribution, none of which are limited to Hollywood or even the US. As such, the
film industry is also part of the global production chain, which seeks out the cheapest
production, pits workers’ interests against each other, and distributes in a different
location from production. In this way, the scholars are able to offer rich detail on the
Motion Picture industry, with a theoretical framework applicable to other industries. On
the political economy side, Miller et al. agree substantially with Wasko's argument that
the economic power of the major studios lies heavily with distribution, especially in the
global market. However, Miller et al. also incorporates production, showing how film
conforms to the general trend of internationalized production. This is done by showing
how the term “Hollywood” no longer applies to the industry, with filming, special effects,
and other components done around the world where the cheapest labor can be found.
On the sociological side Miller et al. take methods such as “domestic effects
model” (DEM), which assumes a psychological effect of film on the viewer, and the
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“Global Effects Model” (GEM), which focuses on the national, patriotic, and cultural
reaction to foreign films. By combining these methods the authors are able to show how
large flows of American films have a “cultural imperialism” effect, which in turns creates
more demand for American film and thus greater market share. This focus leads to an
approach that is heavily reflexivist and normative in scope. While initially providing much
detail to the material power of the Major Studios, the initial concern of the authors is
“...Yanqi [Yankee] domination and wholesale commodification at the expense of the
marginal and the oppressed.” (Miller et al., 2005, pg 48). As a result, the level of analysis
here tends to move back and forth. The focus is both on individuals, in the form of
foreign viewership, and cultural imperialism, which can take the form of corporations or
America as a whole. Where the analysis is weak is in explaining why foreign states will
accept this cultural imperialism, and the political power of the corporations themselves,
especially in relation to the domestic population.
Epstein (2006), like Miller et al., provides a heavy use of statistics and details
about the economics of the motion picture industry. Like Prince, he focuses on how film
has transformed into intellectual property, and thus has multiple means of distribution in
different forms of media. Epstein, however, takes this one step further with greater
acknowledgment of the power of the Mass Media Conglomerates, which the major
studios exist within. As a result, he is able to reveal the amount of collusion that takes
place among these media conglomerates, both among the six majors and studios
outside and all to the disadvantage of competitors. While Epstein provides a strong
foundation to understand the operations of the Majors and collusion within the MPAA,
his journalistic focus on details lacks a systemic understanding of oligopolies and
associations that can easily be applied to other industries with similar structures.
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Steinbock (1995), likewise, takes a historical and detail-oriented approach in his
examination of the general media and entertainment industries. In this way he also
provides rich data, details, and statistics, but also lacks theoretical explanations. As his
goal is to provide students within a multitude of fields with historical information about
the patterns of consolidation, his approach is understandable. However, unlike Epstein,
Steinbock largely ignores the political and cartel-like actions of the Majors. In this way
Steinbock makes little effort to explain any elements contributing to corporate power in
the broader economy, much less the spread of neoliberalism.
Puttnam (1997) also examines the early history of the industry, starting even
before the 1900's. What he is able to reveal is that, from the very birth of film technology,
economic, political, and international conflict has existed in the industry. Offensive use of
costly litigation has been a hallmark of combating competitors, which fostered a great
need for political associations by studios. Political connections were especially
necessary when creating Edison’s Trust, the Motion Picture Patent Company, which
monopolized the industry through protective patents on film technology. Especially
important in defense of this monopoly was the need to keep out foreign imports. Within
the Trust, two French film companies joined a majority American coalition, which
combated domestic competition and offered no room for other imports.
However, Puttnam is following a much more politically neutral, historical analysis.
As a result, his strong example of the Motion Picture Patent Company's political, legal,
and economic power is largely left as a result of Thomas Edison's personal style of
business. As such, if it was not for Edison the collusion, monopolization, political
affiliation, and foreign aggression would not have occurred. This reliance on the
individual limits Puttman’s analysis to a historical particularity. As a result, there is little
possibility of generalization or explanation of how these same trends continue on, except
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in the nature of other leading individuals. While later leaders, such as Jack Valenti, head
of the MPAA (1966-2004,) were undoubtedly important in shaping the industry, this
analysis misses not only structural and systemic conditions, but also the nature of class
and corporate interests.

Internationalization, Intellectual Property, and Corporate Power
To examine the causes of the 1980s shift to neoliberal policy it is important to
develop a strong understanding of neoliberalism. As it is a very broad term,
neoliberalism can relate to many topics, such as a policy orientation. At the same time
neoliberalism can mean the laissez-faire ideology that it purports itself to be, but also
particular contradictions of capitalism, such as monopolization, that directly contradict
the laissez-faire assumptions. Harvey (2005) is able to bridge this gap by focusing on
neoliberalism as an ideology. By utilizing multiple levels of analysis, rather than focusing
on individuals as done in previously mentioned work, Harvey shows how such a large
economy-wide shift in policy could occur in a relatively brief period of time. In this way,
the monopolization of the film industry was not simply the result of dictates by regulators,
such as William Baxter or Mark Fowler, but the result of a broad shift of political
consensus, not only by the elites but also the general population. Harvey reveals the
gradual indoctrination of universities, corporations, and even local politics to neoliberal
policies that benefit the elite. This is a cultural and political shift that the media industry
has a particular stake and influence in.
In lobbying and association terms, the film industry was not an isolated industry,
but part of a much broader movement to affect this change. Within this, the utilization of
the technology argument for deregulation, or the need to gain new synergy between
multiple intellectual property products, provides assistance to other industries and

22

corporations that are fighting for similar deregulation. As such, one industry would not
have been able to alter regulation on its own. Each industry or corporation operated
tacitly toward a general beneficial goal. For the film industry, this required deregulation in
all copyright industries that became part of the new Mass Media Conglomerates, but
also, more generally, with other intellectual property industries such as pharmaceutical
or technology corporations.
As mentioned, the nature of the major's political influence, monopolization, and
market control relate heavily to its use of intellectual property law, and especially the
internationalization of these laws. Starting from the use of patent protection to intimidate
or financially ruin competition, under neoliberalism copyright has become an important
tool for both opening foreign markets and maintaining intellectual property control. In
opening up foreign markets the WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property
Rights (TRIPS) and U.S. support in Section 301 of U.S. Trade Law has been essential.
The extension of length, scope, and geography of copyright and intellectual property has
likewise been essential for maintaining profit of intellectual property from film into other
arenas such as television, books, music, and toys.
Boldrin and Levine (2008) attack the concept of intellectual property directly by
analyzing the intended purpose of the laws. The notion that intellectual property is
required for growth and technical innovation is repudiated with an historical analysis of
what came first, as well as under what legal regime innovation heavily occurs. This is
done by showing that IP rights, or monopolies as the authors describe them, are
increased only after the majority of the innovation had already occurred. In this manner,
IP rights either follow bursts of technological innovation after they occur and slow on
their own, or they actually slow down the innovation themselves. The ownership of
patents works to stifle competition and slow the spread of knowledge and technology. As
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a result, the authors argue the burst of innovation is stopped by IP laws rather than
protected and encouraged by them.
While this nature of IP may be most obvious during the aggressive patent
protection of Edison’s time, today’s use of IP by Mass Media Conglomerates shares
many similarities. As mentioned, film has shifted from an isolated medium to one of
intellectual property designed to exist in a multi-media format. Boldrin and Levine argue
that this expansion of IP ownership eliminates public and creative control of popular
icons and assets, reduces culture, and thus consumption, to the Mass Media
Corporations that control the IP. This also reinforces the monopoly on distribution, as the
Majors control the leading streams and revenue. For IP outside of the Majors, this
means relatively limited profit on IP as well as weak negotiating power over the term of
distribution. Finally, the multiple streams of revenue reserved for the Mass Media
Conglomerates allows the possibility to fund the outrageously expensive Blockbusters
that allow the multiple streams of distribution. Without this financial revenue independent
studios have little hope to compete on the screen, which cyclically limits other revenue
streams (books, TV, toys), again limiting film budgets.
Sell (2003), however, properly accounts for the influence of actions of
corporations and individual CEOs in the creation of TRIPS. In this way she is able to
escape the structural determination that emphasized TRIPS as an agreement for the
benefit of developed states, conceptualized as a unitary actor. Instead Sell shows how
the interest of the state was instrumentalized to push forward the interest of IP
corporations into international law. By this level of analysis, Sell can more clearly define
whose interests are promoted and why, rather than generalizing entire states and
structures.
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Sell does this by showing the effect that lobbying and trade associations had on
US policy positions in the Uruguay round of GATT and how it changed the system of
international Intellectual Property Rights (IPR). Initially international IPR relied on the
World Intellectual Property Organization. However, an institutional change occurred with
the creation of TRIPS within the WTO. This shift was brought about by the creation of
the Intellectual Property Committee, composed of 13 CEOs from IP related corporations,
and its efforts to direct US policy goals in the WTO negotiations to reflect maximalist IP
laws. Perhaps most important to Sell’s argument is her counterfactual for alternative IPR
measures, such as maintaining the importance of the WIPO. As such, she argues there
was no structural necessity for the outcome. This is in contention with arguments that
developed states will inevitably push for rules to maintain their relative position. Instead,
the creation of TRIPS was a direct result of specific actors, corporate power, and
lobbying influence by the elite.
Although Sell focuses on the actions of the IPC, PhRMA, and other IP related
trade associations, this analysis of corporate power can easily be generalized to the
larger economy as is done by Cox (2012). Similar to Sell, this is done to show the
process of neoliberalism and internationalization of production is not an inevitable
position of developed states. Indeed, many of the neoliberal policies are quite harmful as
they lead to decreased productivity, over-consumption, and financial crises. As such, the
level of analysis must be directed at corporate power, elites, and powerful individuals.
Ultimately, the international agreements and policies pursued are not simply due to the
national interests of a state, but a general class and oligopolized corporate interest. Just
as production has been internationalized under neoliberalism, the lobbying power and
corporate associations become transnational in their reach. Much as both PhRMA and
Media Conglomerates lobby the government on complementary topics, the general
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corporate push for neoliberalism appropriates state power across borders. The success
of such policies depends on the effectiveness of transnational corporate collusion, while
failures are commonly the result of divided corporate interests.
This conceptualization and method is complemented by McChesney (2001), who
views the spread of neoliberalism merely as the most recent iteration of class struggle
within capitalism. As such, neoliberalism conflicts with the notion of small government
and deregulation. Instead what is pushed is “re-regulation and larger government to
assist corporations and minimize “any activities that might undermine the rule of
business and the wealthy” (McChesney, 2001, pg 2). Under this conception, the power
of the corporate cartels has a strong structural element. The structure of capitalism will
naturally lead to monopolization of industries, which in turn will lead to appropriation of
government to develop political support. This view tends to discredit the possibility of
alternative counterfactuals as well as the uniqueness of this particular iteration of class
struggle. Although McChesney argues that neoliberalism reduces democratic influence,
and thus implicitly accepts the possibility of democratic control, by focusing on economic
monopolization prior to political influence McChesney lacks the proper emphasis of how
specific details of neoliberal policies affect and interact with the monopolized market,
society, and international relations.
May (2000) also focuses on the conception of neoliberalism in his analysis of the
spread of IP regime. Unlike McChesney, who focuses on economic power, May is
almost entirely concerned with neoliberalism and IP rights as an ideology. May does
argue for a “dual-dialectic approach,” in which one analyzes the structure in relation to
people and ideas. However, he almost entirely focuses on ideas in what he calls the
knowledge structure. In this he does very well in showing that IPR is not a natural
phenomenon, but crafted over time. May agrees with Boldrin and Levine that IP was
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created by corporations and individuals who will benefit from it, at the cost of others. May
is able to take this understanding and show how IP itself is a core and essential aspect
of the neoliberal ideology in a similar form to McChesney's understanding: government
support of corporate interests. However, May lacks an explanation of how this change in
IP came about. He simply claims that corporations spread this ideology, but does not
explain how or why their corporate power is so immense.
This understanding of a global economy and changing interests of class and
state is immensely important to delineate the shift to neoliberal policies as well as
discovering the role of the film industry within the neoliberal period. As foreign markets
became increasingly essential for the Hollywood Majors for both sales and production,
Washington has acted as a transnationally powerful state to defend these interests. By
leading trade negotiations, free trade agreements, and defining and enforcing
international Intellectual Property Rights, the U.S. has adopted corporate interests as its
own. By allowing monopolization, market control, and political support the U.S. has
assured success in the global film industry. However, this need for support is a result of
the globalized economy, which was heavily shaped by the U.S. and allies at the behest
of corporate interests. This ostensibly ties corporate and government interests together
for the success of the domestic market, but reduces labor benefits, increases
government cost, and increases corporate profit and power. This analysis thus requires
a theoretical conception that will emphasize how both state and industry collude
together, as well as how industry colluded itself to recreate cartel structures.

Associationalism
For neoliberalism and the film Industry in particular, trade associations have been
used to promote cartel structures. In this section, I will develop an expanded
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understanding of trade associations, before examining the mechanism through which
they expand their influence into other actors and systems. Historically, trade
associations were more interconnected to promoting the interests of competitive
businesses in free market capitalism, especially during the period of early
industrialization (Galabos, 1966). Today much of the academic focus on trade
associations revolves around their role in lobbying and member representation.
Scholarship often fails to analyze the way that trade associations have promoted a
concentration of corporate power within neoliberal capitalism. Especially for oligopolies,
trade associations tend to look and act more like cartels. As such, the roles of trade
associations in facilitating neoliberal policies and monopolization extends much farther
than is commonly understood, including the following areas of influence:

● Price controls
● Relations to labor
● Governmental reach/regulation
● Distribution control, including networks and platforms
● Opening foreign markets/developing export markets
● Competing against foreign competitors
● Protectionism
● Developing and enforcing laws
● Lobbying and other governmental influences
● Public relations
● Agenda setting8
● Statistics and research

8

See Fuchs (2007) for more.
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● Shared facilities
● Standardization/compatibility
● Patent pooling
● Joint ventures
● Delineate territory
● Subsumed smaller business/potential competitors
● Self-governance
● Influence laws and set legal precedents
● Influence norms, international and domestic
I use the term “associationalism” to describe the ways in which trade
associations provide a vehicle for promoting the political and economic interests of their
members through cartel-like functions. This means that trade associations have
increasingly been used by corporate oligopolies to promote political and economic
cooperation within the market and the political arena. In the area of media consolidation,
the MPAA has emerged as a vital link between a range of corporate actors that seek to
acquire more control over the highest value-added activities in corporate ownership and
production. As will be explained in detail below, corporate trade associations do not just
promote the interests of their corporate members, but their activities are closely bundled
with powerful corporate actors in related sectors to produce a mutually reinforcing
corporate power network. In order to fully appreciate the way that modern-day
associationalism operates, I borrow from the work of Robert Brady, who articulated the
concept of Control Pyramids to illustrate the overlapping corporate power relationships
that are embedded within associational structures.
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Robert Brady used the term Control Pyramids (1943) to explain a particular
manner of associationism9 generated by corporate alliances. Brady was examining
fascist economies and noted that the corporatist method was not so distinct from
Western economies. The major difference was that the businesses structures in the
West were more dispersed, less absolute, and not as directed by and for the state. Yet,
what was similar was a clear hierarchy being directed by leading corporations. These
corporations would work together to unite industry dependence--including smaller
businesses, but especially labor--and then use this larger industry-wide leverage against
the state, thus forming a hierarchical pyramid structure. These dispersed relationships
can be benign, especially in comparison with fascism, but constituted what one might
consider “corporatism-light.”10 With fewer firms making partnership and collusion easier,
power dynamics can be shaped into disproportionately powerful coalitions. With clear
industry leaders and megacorporations, the “controller” of such Control Pyramids is
clear.
Illustrative of such Control Pyramids is the graphic below, revealing a central
point for an institution such as the MPAA. The actor that can best direct one pyramid will
have bounding power and influence to direct broader ones in a particular way, resulting

9

The idea of associationalism itself came about around when Trade Associations and trusts were
being institutionalized in the 19th century. The idea was that industry and businesses needed to
work together to limit any negatives of competition, such as depressed wages or volatile prices.
While Keynesianism, with a more socially oriented macroeconomic management, diminished
associationalism as a theory, the practice of industry partnerships continued.
It is important to differentiate a concept like corporatism-light with the “Neo-corporatism” which
is still in use in many Germanic economies (See Schmitter and Grote, 1997). Corporatism as
conceptualized by Mussolini was a social structure whereby individuals were to have no say
outside of their economic sector, which was represented by industry leaders (going so far as to
replace parliament with the “Chamber of Fasci and Corporations”). While this was done top-down
and directly by the state, corporatism-light can be seen as such influence generated outwards by
the leading corporations and tacitly accepted and then supported by the state. Neo-corporatism,
by contrast, retained mild state management of corporations, but with the intention of focusing on
labor interest, opposed to corporate interests.
10
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in a drastically hierarchical structure. The structures that result, both within film and
nearly all other industries, are important improvements over traditional analysis of
corporate power. The concept of Control Pyramids helps explain how agency shapes the
system and structure through overlapping associations, interests, and partnerships. This
reveals a structure that allows members, even those not especially powerful, to have a
larger influence, making the sum of corporate power, at least those integrated into such
a system, larger than its parts. This also allows for the inclusion of more actors than
simply the direct relationship between corporations, governments, or politicians.
3. Control Pyramid Graphic

MPAA and Associationalism: The graphic above is a conceptualization of the
bounding power of corporate associations and coalitions. As leading corporations
develop their own industry hierarchies, they can then participate in generating broader
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means of control, usually in related industries. As the MPAA nominally represents the
film oligopoly, its most immediate natural partners are other copyright industries.
However, as the major studios are already part of Mass Media Conglomerates, many of
these are already inherently represented by the MPAA or one of the sister organizations,
such as the Recording Industry Association of America.11 With this the Mass Media
Conglomerates will have strong leverage in directing the influence of the broader
copyright industry. One such organization is the International Intellectual Property
Alliance (IIPA), which is, in effect, a trade association of trade associations. The IIPA
works to extend copyright internationally, with a focus on bilateral and FTA treaties. This
greatly expands leverage as several industries use one voice, however with the MPAA
(and its members) as a member and an independent partner in such activities.
As each pyramid is bounded into a larger structure overlapping coalitions are
formed upward. Unlike traditional corporatism, this upward association tends to be more
dispersed as actors become more numerous and diverse interests are more difficult to
reconcile. However, while the peak association is less cohesive, the pyramid itself is
larger, as is its base. Also, as the larger pyramids are less organized, this allows more
room for the most active and consolidated association to have a larger influence in
directing and representing larger coalitions. The MPAA, being one of the more politically
and publicly engaged, as well as most cohesive, is one such organization. As such, as
will be seen in later chapters, media and the MPAA play an important role in shaping IP
law and trade agreements. This is particularly true with the pharmaceutical oligopoly’s
association, PhRMA, which partners with the MPAA, both tacitly and directly, in shaping
many aspects of intellectual property. While this explains the upward bounds of the
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The RIAA also has Universal, Warner Bros, and Sony as members.
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control pyramids, important to their size and leverage is the foundation composed of
actors dependent on the “controlling” corporations.

4. Overlapping Trade Association example: FACT, IIPA, and DCA

Labor For the leading corporations to leverage the entire industry (and appear as
its representative) its primary foundational need is labor, which is also typically the most
dependent. Typically, labor is either seen as victim to asymmetric corporate power, or,
when properly organized, a leading balance against it. However, with union membership
declining since the 1950s, a dependent, and thus supportive, relationship has
developed. As labor became weaker, production became mobile, and jobs became more
precarious, the rhetoric of structuring the economy around job production and market
efficiency became the norm, opposed to higher wages and greater stability for workers.
Around this, a dependent and vulnerable labor will be more likely to support corporate
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power and comparable state support. In film this can be seen as far back as the 1940s,
but especially developed with the increased mobility and internationalization of film
production (more in chapter 4). As opposed to negotiating for job quality, unions
increasingly support corporate subsidies from states, and film friendly and supportive
state policies. While places like the EU retain greater union membership, they too have
been directed toward using their membership to support subsidization, corporate
empowerment, and jobs and competitiveness, which has increasingly become a global
trend.
Small businesses tied to major corporations have also seen a dependent
relationship develop over time. Indie producers and studios operate on a fine line of
being competitors to the major studios, but also viewing them as necessary partners to
access much of the industry. Beyond distribution and access to exhibition sectors, this
also includes working on co-productions with major studios for financing and larger
budget productions. As a result, many of the mid-tier production companies around the
world actively work with local governments in attracting blockbuster productions to bring
in jobs and investment. Because indie films are unlikely to get broad releases,
advertisement campaigns, or large funding, without partnership with a major studio,
many of the leading indie studios are supportive of the two-tier studio system, opposed
to a generally competitive environment. This also leads indie studios to partner with
majors and unions in supporting and expanding local subsidies, not only to attract
blockbuster production, but to also get a small piece of a larger subsidy pie.
The State With the inclusion of labor, consumers, and smaller competitors in the
Control Pyramid structure, where and how the state fits in is especially important. This is
because the state has a large hand in directing the system and the structure, and also is
theoretically the central bridge between citizens (labor and consumers) and leading
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corporations. As seen in figure Control Pyramid Graphic, the state can ultimately have a
varied position, depending on the goals and the relationship to the existing corporate
structure. No doubt, as corporate power has grown over time and many states have
adopted a role of facilitating corporate friendly markets, as well as direct corporate
support, the state has generally moved down the pyramid, increasingly becoming a
dependent of the system as opposed to an organizer or moderator thereof. This results
in the rhetorical and ideological promotion of “competitiveness,” of which market
efficiency around oligopolies is only one part. The need for the state to actively and
directly support corporations and defer to their interests has resulted in the
quintessential uniqueness of neoliberalism--that peak corporations utilize neoliberalism,
but do not conform to the free market ideology. Despite the neoliberal rhetoric of free
market, free trade, and laissez-faire policies, we see today that state support,
oligopolies, and corporate collusion are as strong as ever before.
As a result, states become captured by the structure and leading actors, rather
than pursuing the more difficult goal of generating rules, laws, norms, and a system that
balances the structures of market power. Under neoliberalism, leading corporations are
supported by states in numerous ways. States liberalize antitrust laws to develop
globally competitive multinational corporations or global oligopolies that become
essential for jobs, investment, and trade. States also create institutions and international
organizations that will normalize and entrench leading corporations. In addition, states
liberalize and open foreign markets when domestic corporations are strong or otherwise
protect or support corporations when they are weak. They directly or indirectly subsidize
industries to improve competitiveness or to attract investments. They protect and expand
international investment, property, and Intellectual Property Rights. Finally, they develop
an environment where leading corporations have free range to develop international
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associations, pursue corporate diplomacy, or develop corporate-state coalitions to
reshape the existing rules and norms.
The effect of the bounding power of control pyramids is that the tacit cartels, such
as the MPAA, have much greater power and influence than they otherwise would have.
Their power comes not only from monopolization and sector control within the industry,
but with developing coalitions and associations with a variety of actors, either with similar
interests or with a dependent relationship with the leading firms. This puts the MPAA at
the center of not only film and media, but copyright, intellectual property, and other
neoliberal policy issues. This is also essential to understanding how and why many
states end up playing a supportive role for leading corporations, rather than labor or
consumers. Due to the intersecting nature of this manner of analysis, it will be important
to examine the qualitative methods that will play a part in my analytical framework.

Methods
This examination of monopolization and political power of the Motion Picture
Industry will be analyzed as a case study, which will reveal broader implications of
neoliberalization. I will do this with a combination of process tracing, utilizing theoretical
framing, and substantiating my argument with statistics and economic data. By utilizing a
detailed process tracing, this study will expand on the current scholarly literature, which
heavily limits itself by focusing on variables outside of the industry. According to many
scholarly accounts, both technology and ideology are imposed upon the film industry,
excluding the agency of the corporations in their restructuring. Incorporating corporate
power as a variable will reveal this role of corporate agency, as well as exposing
corporate, class, and government relationships within neoliberalism.
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Much of the literature covering the neoliberal and monopolization process of the
Motion Picture Industry tends to rely on fairly selective independent variables. Because
much of the literature comes from Film Studies, Business, and Communication, it largely
accepts the neoliberal narrative of natural progression to a global economy. This leads
to a heavy emphasis on new technology in the 1980s being the primary variable for the
shift. This explanation brings the invention of new means of distribution and exhibition,
such as VHS and cable, to explain the development of the Mass Media Conglomerates.
This has been done by showing how the new technology increased the level of
complexity, decreased the importance of older exhibition, and created the potential for
new means of synergizing movies with other forms of media and intellectual property.
The problem with this emphasis on technology is the lack of analysis of human
agency. This scholarly emphasis on the impact of technology reinforces the assertions
by neoliberal proponents about what led to the 1980s transition. This technology
narrative views the monopolization that occurred in the motion picture industry, and most
industries in general, as natural and inevitable. The lack of human agency in the analysis
leaves, at best, a historical narrative that describes some of the events that took place,
but is poor in explaining why it occurred and in analyzing the outcome. At worst, this
limited emphasis simply reinforces and reiterates the ideological change it attempts to
explain and lacks a sociological variable due to the inevitability of the technology
progression.
In other scholarly literature, human agency is equated with the spread of
neoliberal ideology, rather than corporate power and influence. Often in these
arguments, the presidency of Ronald Reagan is used as a transition point to demarcate
the triumph of a particular neoliberal ideological orientation. In this way a primary driving
factor for the transition to neoliberalism is simply Reagan's personal belief in lack of
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regulation. This perspective is used to explain the preponderance of anti-regulators in
the Department of Justice and the Antitrust Division. Ultimately, this variable places too
much emphasis on the static policy of the presidency and is thus weak at explaining
change in policy within the presidency as well as explaining how and why any change
took place, other than the election of Reagan himself.
To better account for human agency, I will use corporate power as the
independent variable. This will include three elements. The first is the direct lobbying
power of corporations and their ability to shape government policies. The second is
corporate collusion both within the industry and without. Within the industry, this is
heavily done with the MPAA and its cartel-like activity. Outside the industry there are
various levels of trade associations active in copyright and IP industries as well as the
general corporate push for neoliberal policy across a wide range of sectors. Finally,
there is the development of a global economy that granted corporate mobility. This was
done by a transnational coalition of corporations and states that used a combination of
market and political power to expand their global reach.
To help account for the problems mentioned, I will primarily use a process tracing
method. While still focusing on the independent variable of corporate power, this method
will allow me to better understand and explain the level of complexity inherent to such a
large shift in the economic system. The need to understand the nuances and details of
this shift is also the reason for using this one case study as opposed to a broader
approach, which would cover the entire economy.
The motion picture industry is a relatively small political player when compared to
the economy as a whole, as well as in comparison to the much larger tech and
pharmaceutical companies. Despite this the film industry went through the same general
process of monopolization in the 1980's. The reasons for choosing a detailed study on
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this specific industry are two-fold. First, much has already been written on the general
shift of the economy. This broad examination of neoliberalism is quite over-saturated,
and thus more difficult to draw out new theories. Second, by taking such a macro
approach this method requires a large degree of generalization in order to examine an
entire economic trend at once. While this can help explain and detail some of the major
aspects of the neoliberal shift, it is poor at revealing unique details and inherently limits
the role of specific actors.
Examining a specific case study will not only reveal more details of how
neoliberalism affects the industry in question, but it will also offer more details and
analysis pertaining to neoliberalism itself. The generalizations required to examine an
entire economy or process would inherently exclude relationships which are unique to
specific industries. While these are arguably the most important components, they are
not the only ones. Causal variables that are only related to some industries are still
inherent components to the broader topic of neoliberalism. An example of this is the
increased protection of IP after the 1980's. While not all industries rely on these new
related laws, it can still be argued that not only are they an outcome of the neoliberal
shift, but a required and inherent causal mechanism as well. More specifically to the
motion picture industry are copyright laws, which are a smaller subsection of IP. This
case study will examine the role of political power in the Motion Picture Industry,
including the political factors contributing to monopolization in that industry. Examined
as a case study in the context of broader trends, I will reveal how this process has
evolved nationwide and how the motion picture industry itself was one of many
instrumental actors to spread neoliberal policies.
As a result, the method of process tracing and historical narrative becomes
exceptionally important. The case study is capable of being a single case in both a
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small-N and Large-N generalized study. In addition, the case itself can reveal details
unique to itself, those generalizable to similar cases, and finally those generalizable to a
broad, Large-N study. While analysis of specific variable relationships assists in
structuring the research design, process tracing and narrative methods will bring the
specific causal relationship to a broader understanding of theory and the real world. As
mentioned the literature tends to focus too closely on specific independent variables of
technology and ideology. As a result, the conclusions are limited to the specific industry
or generally weak or overemphasized in causation. A deductive process tracing method,
however, can better reveal both the applicability of findings to other cases as well as the
relationship that the specific variable has to the broader generalizable cases, which in
this case are the economy and neoliberalism (George & Bennett, 2005).
Utilization of process tracing and individual case studies thus allows for “finegrained description,” but also more generalizable “concept formation” (Della Porta,

2008, pp. 211). By allowing for a more complex understanding of causation, process
tracing and case studies can take a more deductive approach, which allows for
developing and testing theories (Della Porta, 2008, pp. 211). This is the opposite of
Large-N approaches, whose research design may be informed by theory, but has trouble
explaining the complex details that allow for a more complex understanding of causation.
The utility of this can be seen in Bachelard's first epistemological acts (Della

Porta, 2008, pp. 229). The first act, “the rupture with conventional wisdom,” relates to
differing methods and variables from the existing literature discussed above (Della

Porta, 2008, pp.229). This step relates to the deductive utilization of existing theories.
The second act, “theory construction,” is what turns a historical narrative into process
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tracing, “converting historical information into a suitable analytical vocabulary that can be
applied to other cases” (Della Porta, 2008, pp. 230).
As a result of details and general theory that can be derived, process tracing will
provide a clearer understanding of the causes and outcomes of the film industry
restructuring. As opposed to relying on structural variables such as technology and
ideology, this approach will properly examine the relationship between actors and the
structure, and how the structure is altered. More specifically, it will examine how the
Major Studios were instrumental in shaping politics, policy, and the market.
Politically, this will show how the Majors were politically active, both individually
and through multiple and overlapping trade associations. The success of this lobbying
will be shown by referencing policy outcomes beneficial to the Majors, as well as direct
political connections. This in turn contributes to the change in the market, whereby the
Majors are legally allowed to dominate distribution by vertical monopolization. The
nature of both studios and film are altered as production, advertising, and amortization
time of profits increase. The economic and political power of the Majors were mutually
reinforcing and allowed influence into the national arena by promoting and protecting a
transnational reach in political influence and market dominance.

Chapter outline
This dissertation will be organized along the following lines. Chapter 2 will
expand on the historical foundations mentioned above and the re-development of the
film industry oligopoly into the 1980s. While similar to the foundations of the historical
monopoly and oligopoly, the modern form will be examined within the neoliberal system.
During this time period, corporate power becomes more dispersed around multiple
avenues of vertical monopolization. For the Major Studios this means being incorporated
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into Mass Media Conglomerates (Holt, 2011), which make film one iteration of media
intellectual property. The industry itself becomes centralized around several competitive
areas, whose reach becomes exclusive to the Major studios of the oligopoly: 1)
financialization of the industry, around blockbuster budget inflation, advertisement costs,
and financing of smaller co-productions; 2) a centralization of intellectual property, which
assures consumer familiarity and thus likeliness of viewership, allows for integration into
other forms of media (television, video games, toys, etc.), and allows for longer
amortization of production budget investments; 3) a wider control of distribution, away
from theaters and to broadcast, cable, and online streaming.
Chapter 3 will then examine how corporate power of the Majors expanded
internationally, which resulted in the creation of a multinational oligopoly. Internationally
the Majors have a history of stronger cartel-like collusion, which has only been
exacerbated with industry concentration, globalization, and more avenues to affect
policies, such as through trade agreements. This chapter will also examine the political
effect the MPAA has had on societies and the international system, which is especially
important for the Majors as media companies.
With the neoliberalization of the industry complete and oligopoly cartel
redeveloped, chapter 4 will examine a major effect of concentrated political and
economic power. Beyond allowance of monopolization, this will reveal the development
of active state support to corporations in the style of a subsidization system. While this is
done in numerous industries, the Major Studios provide a more blatant and egregious
example, compared to others that are more complex or hidden. This chapter will
examine how the Majors utilized early transnationalization with the Canadian market for
US states and Canadian provinces to compete for film production through direct and
indirect subsidization. Once this norm was set it was expanded first to the European
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market to today comprising numerous states all around the globe. These states compete
for the Majors’ productions for domestic jobs and investment by subsidizing blockbusters
up to 30% of budget costs, or even more.
Chapter 5 will examine the next iteration and effect of power concentration
through less-often examined issues. This will focus on how a cartel like the MPAA is
about to develop strong international coalitions, which assist in developing the
international neoliberal system, described in the preceding chapters. These coalitions
are a mixture of trade associations, corporations, politicians, and governments that
participate in shaping regulation, laws, norms, and ultimately society. The focus of this
chapter will be on the well-known, but poorly analyzed Federation Against Copyright
Theft (FACT) organizations and corresponding networks. These organizations were
transnational coalitions between the MPAA and local partner studios and corporations,
to influence foreign governments, set copyright enforcement, and legal norms, and use
the broader coalition to push them to neighboring states and regions. These
organizations started with markets first dominated by the Majors in the Anglo world: the
US, Canada, the UK, and Australia. The Majors used their power within these countries
as a base from which to shape broader European legal norms. Now the Majors are
currently attempting to expand their political and economic power to the broader Asian
market.
Finally, I will conclude by relating the film industry to broader trends in the
economy and society. This will first focus on the continuation of concentration within the
industry, as well as the growth and overlap of media conglomerates into other industries
and sectors. This will mean larger oligopolies and competition focused around
monopolization of sectors and industries, especially as growing competition for the
Majors is coming from tech giants, such as Google and Amazon. I will then examine the
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political implications, as well as foreign policy issues, as the Majors continue to
monopolize and dominate new markets with the support of Washington. I will then
examine solutions that go beyond simply antitrust regulation, that will end collusion
between private interest and state capture, while necessarily reshaping international
rules and institutions to re-empower democratic societies over corporate monopolies.
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2. Development of Mass Media Conglomerates
This chapter will examine how common tools of corporate and cartel power are
adopted and expanded into the neoliberal economy. I will first look at the development
and structure of the Mass Media Conglomerates, of which film production comprises
only one sector, but of which the MPAA--nominally only for film--acts as an essential
institution for cartel cohesion of the media industry generally. With Mass Media
Conglomerates covering industries such as television, music, news, print, and other
entertainment, including film, traditional barriers of entry to competing with the oligopoly
are modernized and extended. These are financial, intellectual property, and distribution
control, all of which had been utilized in some manner as early as the MPPC in 1908.
This chapter will cover how these barriers are applied today, to the benefit of the
oligopoly, focusing on the numerous forms of distribution and exhibition along with the
centrality of the Blockbuster form of film, with high-return, high-budget, expensivepromotion, and increasing reliance on Intellectual property for risk reduction. The
important point that will be emphasized is that competition exists between the major
studios utilizing sector control and Blockbuster production, but this manner of
competition reinforces the oligopoly rather than combats it. Producers and studios
outside of the oligopoly’s barrier find themselves dependent on the whims of the Majors.
Finally, this chapter will examine the political relations and effects of this cartel.

Mass Media Conglomerates
Although the MPAA and its members took advantage of the deregulatory
environment in the 1980s to restore their oligopoly, they also played a key role in tandem
with other leading corporations in pursuing and determining how that deregulation would
unfold. The corporate-state relationship that would develop out of this would form the
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foundation of the neoliberal system under Reagan. Far from the simple claim of
deregulation, under neoliberalism corporations would find state support for extending
market share through internationalization, extending intellectual property protection, and
subduing labor power. Such an environment tended to benefit specific industries as well
as specific corporations, which were large enough to rely on political ties, overcome
growing barriers to entry, and specialize in products whose value was immaterial, easily
internationalizable, and liquid and financializable. With film and copyright meeting these
requirements, the MPAA successfully leveraged their growing political influence to shore
up their industry barriers. New and old media were concentrated into single corporations,
bringing film and other entertainment together. The new Mass Media Conglomerates
increasingly focused on intellectual property (Prince, 2000) rather than film, music, or
novels as their own artistic medium. Increasingly representing media at large, rather
than only film, the political influence of the MPAA would grow exponentially, as the state
looked to depoliticize and tacitly corporatize the growing complex questions over
technology.
Importantly, the return of monopolization was not the result of a major change in
law, but rather a change in the relationship between government and corporation. While
a single company may not dominate one industry or sector, under neoliberalism they are
able to operate in numerous sectors simultaneously. For the film industry, this was a
direct reversal of the Paramount Decree. Like the 1930s, studios could now own
theaters, along with new exhibition sectors that had been developed since then, such as
broadcast, cable, and video. Also like the 1930s, no single company monopolized a
sector, but influence, or even dominance, of one sector would have large effects on
another. However, unlike the 1930s and ‘40s lead up to the Paramount Decree with
clear delineation of production, distribution and exhibition (theaters), the multitude of
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interconnected sectors and technologies under neoliberalism adds greater complexity. In
fact, the growing complexity provided much of the pretext to depoliticize and tacitly
corporatize, by leaving the existing oligopolies to manage many growing technological
issues.
The consolidation of media sectors and vertical monopolization are analogous to
the incorporation of the Major Studios into Mass Media Conglomerates (MMC). MMCs
are media corporations that take heavy advantage of the ability to invest in all, or nearly
all, media sectors. Today these include broadcast TV, cable, satellite, home video (today
Blu-Ray), and streaming services but also semi-related industries such as print, music,
toys, and even theme parks (Prince, 2000). The reason for such media concentration is
about synergy of a product, as many of the sectors are simply exhibition points of film
and television, while others offer different iterations of the product, such as Harry Potter
World at Universal Studios. While synergy implies an efficiency from concentrating the
industry, it ignores the power and control this affords the MMC by expanding the
centrality of intellectual property. It is the strength and extension of intellectual property
that synergizes the product through its iterations. In other words, smaller studios which
cannot produce toys from their film will have difficulty competing with those who do, even
only in film.
The MMCs themselves were first formed starting in the 1980s, with loosened
antitrust and a purchase of a Major Studio (see parent company chart). While the film
studios are the official members to the MPAA, rather than the conglomerate parent
company, it still functions as a centralizing institution for the MMC oligopoly, if not
copyright and intellectual property industries generally.12 This is due to the MPAA

12

While there are numerous organizations playing a role for such interests, few are so
international, publicly engaged, and exclusive in membership as the MPAA.
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having a long history and institutional culture, but also thanks to film playing a central
role in intellectual property as a media product. The MMCs use ownership of blockbuster
films to provide initial cultural impact, as well as gauge how much investment to put into
other sectors, such as producing television, video games, or theme parks. As sector
investment plays a major role not only in the structure of MMCs, but the utility of
blockbusters, the next section will focus on that consolidation, followed by blockbuster
financialization.

5. Parent Companies
Film Studio

Parent Media Conglomerate

Year Conglomerate
Formed

20th Century Fox

21st Century Fox (News Corporation)

198513

Universal

Comcast

201114

Columbia Pictures

Sony

1989

Paramount

Viacom

1994

Warner Bros

Time Warner

199015

13

Recently purchased by industry leader, The Walt Disney Company. This narrows competition
within the oligopoly to five, with Disney taking a strong market share in many sectors.
14

Although one of the latter purchases, Universal Studios was purchased by Japanese
technology company Matsushita in 1990, following Sony’s example. It was then passed to
Seagram, Vivendi, and General Electric, before ending up under Comcast, thus bringing Internet
Service Providers into Media Conglomerates.
15

Following Comcast, Time Warner (now Warner Media) was purchased by AT&T in 2018,
increasing concerns of the incorporation of home and mobile internet will be incorporated into
media conglomerates.
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Walt Disney

The Walt Disney Company

198616

Studios

Sectors
Most telling of the neoliberal approach to antitrust for film was the end of the
Paramount Decree in the 1980s. As covered in the previous chapter, the Paramount
Decree was a means to limit Major Studios’ hold of the industry by ending their control
on the exhibition of films--deciding which films are shown in theaters. The Decree had
done this by barring ownership of production companies and theaters,17 and was the
single largest blow to the film oligopoly. The clear end came when TriStar Pictures18
purchased Loews Theaters in 1985 and MCA Universal purchased Cineplex in 1986.
While these initial purchases were expected considering the shock to the oligopoly in
1948, the interest in theater ownership did not last for the Major Studios. In part this is
due to the decline in theater importance to film revenue. In 1948 theaters naturally made
up 100% of film revenue, while by 1985 it was only 25% (Vogel, 2014; see chart).
Nonetheless, success in theaters was still essential to revenue from other sectors as
well, such as from cable or broadcast release. While the dispersal of revenue explains

16

Walt Disney Studios was renamed The Walt Disney Company in 1986, but was already
effectively a Mass Media Conglomerate long before the others were formed, with a focus on
production, theme parks and toys. The change of name from “Studios” to “Company” is in line
with its further conglomerization, such as purchasing broadcast and cable networks. Disney only
joined the MPAA in 1979.
17

Though Production and Distribution (how film made its way to theaters) was retained in many
of the same Studios.
18

TriStar Pictures, founded in 1982, was already an indication for loosening regulation. Owned by
Columbia Pictures, HBO, and CBS the studio was already blurring the lines between production
and exhibition.
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part of the disinterest in repurchasing studios, it can thus not explain it all. Rather,
control of a sector no longer requires outright ownership, as can be seen in how theater
control is managed.
6. Film Industry Revenue Sources: 1948-2007

Vogel (2014, pp. 98)

Theater Control
Even during the so-called “Golden Age” of film studios in the 1930s and ‘40s,
major studios that leveraged control over theaters did not monopolize the entire sector
through outright ownership. Rather than owning a majority of theaters, the Majors
focused on first-run theaters. As the name implies, these were theaters to first run a film
stock, after which it would be transported to second-run theaters and so forth, rather
than printing costly film for each theater. First-run theaters were thus able to heavily
determine not only which films started the circuit, but also which films caught notoriety
and piqued consumer’s interest. Independent theaters, which were the majority, needed
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to fulfill demand and show the films set by the first run theaters19 (Seabury, 1926). This
is true today as well, but even more dispersed through technology and an increased
number of exhibition sectors. This retains control and the barriers oligopolies need, but
also provides the flexibility neoliberalism and globalization demand. As will be seen,
indie production operates on a similar junior partnership relation as well, filling in space
that the Majors cannot (especially for less limited exhibition such as home video and
streaming). In all cases, the Majors, rather than looking at literal monopoly, looked
toward creating and exploiting bottlenecked sectors.20
To counter this, theaters have also attempted their own concentration to offset
the leverage of powerful studios. Two of the major chains are AMC Theaters and Regal
Entertainment, who together have created their own production studio called Open Road
Films (now Global Road Entertainment). Also illustrative of this is that Cineplex and
Loews were eventually merged to stave off losses, before going bankrupt in 2001. Much
of the difficulty for theaters is specifically the leverage that Major Studios have on profit
sharing terms, driving many theaters to focus on profits from concessions rather than
exhibiting film.21 Today studio behemoth Disney is pushing even more onerous terms on
theaters than already existed, in order to leverage the power of film IP owned by the
company. This is increasing the revenue split, the minimum length of showing the film,
and requiring films such as Star Wars to be shown in the best theaters. By 2007, the

19

This is on top of other controlling practices, such as blind and block booking, which were also
largely barred in the Paramount Decree.
20

Thurman Arnold, Assistant Attorney General for Antitrust under Franklin Roosevelt, lamented
that antitrust was not as extensive as he wished, worrying about areas that leading corporations
can still create these industry “bottlenecks” (Arnold, 2000).
21

This is especially true for the initial release of blockbusters where the profit share is heavily in
favor of the studio (Epstein, 2006), with up to 90% of box office proceeds going to Major Studios
for initial release.
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Majors’ revenue was $42 Billion. Only 10% came from American theaters (Epstein,
2012).
This is, however, not due to absolute shrinkage of the sector, with revenue
recently recovering to its high point (See figure above). Nonetheless, theaters are now
only one sector of one iteration of the Major Studio’s IP, which helps explain why they
have not been reincorporated. Nonetheless, the monopolization of the sector continues
on its own. Epstein (2012) says 80% of Major’s box office share came from a few
megaplexes. Of the 40,000 screens in the U.S., half are owned by the three largest
theater chains: AMC, Regal, and Cinemark (National Association of Theatre

Owners). While this oligopolization is a trend within neoliberalism, it also may be part of
dealing with the more powerful Major Studios, whose blockbusters are essential to a
theater’s success. Studios cannot demand screen access from theaters on the condition
of future films, but “they have considerable tacit leverage, since the theater chains
depend on them to favor them with major blockbusters. As a result, the big studios
almost always get the screens they need for their openings” (Epstein, 2006, pp. 189). As
studios were incorporated through film and IP “throw weight,” the remaining exhibition
sectors have been much more integrated directly into the MMCs.
Blockbusters
Blockbusters are commonly thought to have started with the 1975 film Jaws. The
term blockbuster was taken from films that bring so many customers to the cinema that
the line will exceed the block. Although having a budget of $8 million, Jaws brought in
$250 million domestically and half a billion worldwide.22 Studios that were able to
replicate this model boosted the production value of their films. This helped the Majors

22

This makes Jaws one of the highest grossing films of all time, when considering inflation.
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reclaim much of their market share by the end of the 1970s (see chart below), and
evolved into a requirement to compete on the Majors’ level. The decline in absolute
number of releases of the Majors since the 1990s reveals this greater concentration and
focus on fewer, but larger, more expensive, and more advertised blockbusters. As this
practice inflated film budgets to ever higher numbers, the political economy of the Major
Studios has coalesced around reducing risk23. For Blockbusters directly, this risk
reduction comes in the form of intellectual property, franchising, advertisements, and
financialization.

7. Major Studios’ Domestic Market Share (Cook, 2000, pp. 492)

This interrelated change in the product, and corresponding need for longer
copyright, relates to the structure of longer amortization and new ancillary markets. This

23

This risk/requirement can be seen in one of the earlier attempts at a blockbuster. Released in
1980 Heaven’s Gate effectively ended United Artists, rather than potentially elevate them out of
the “Mini-Major” status. Bridging director autonomy and high production, Heaven’s Gate went
over budget several fold, without corresponding box office success. While Jaws marked the birth
of the blockbuster, Heaven’s Gate marked the end of what Biskind (1999) called New Hollywood-director and art driven films missing corporate hierarchy, and the potential for compatibility of the
two.
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was, as Prince (2000) argues, the transition from film as a product, to just one iteration
of an intellectual property. This change came with the high cost (budget inflation) of
blockbusters and the corresponding need for cultural saturation, helped along by
growing advertising campaigns. These campaigns also increased in costs, as a
blockbuster success could lead to new iterations to profit off their intellectual property-be it a story, a character, a created universe, or simply a sequel that will be more likely
to be a blockbuster itself. As a result, antitrust relaxation, sector monopolization, and
blockbuster focus all become interrelated. The iteration and reiteration to reach all
ancillary markets became the norm as all profitable films focused on franchising, or at
least cashing out a sequel. This has even resulted in the sequel to the classic Disney
film Bambi, with Bambi II profiting on the cultural importance of the original, coming out
in a record 64 years later, in 2006. Thanks to more markets, a greater role for indies (as
majors focus on IP distribution and finance), and more funding from Wall Street, the
number of films produced exploded in the 1980s (Holt, 2011), contributing to the
reshaping of the industry.
The result is that in today's film culture, the most popular and thus highest
grossing films are usually from existing franchises or have been developed into
iterations. For the highest grossing films of all times one can view three general
categories: 1) produced and released prior to the 1970s, which is the strongest antibiotic
against reiterations; 2) produced and released in the decades from the 1970s to the
1990s, which are commonly utilized for iterations or franchising; and 3) made since the
2000s, which are commonly iteration or part of a franchise. Of the 100 highest grossing
films (accounting for inflation) 24 were made after the year 2000. Of this 24, 22 were not
original, either being a sequel, episodic (such as Lord of the Rings), or part of a larger IP
“universe” (such as the Spiderman films). Of the two films that were original one was
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Finding Nemo (2003), which had a sequel released in 2016 (which was itself the 72rd
highest grossing film of all time: Finding Dory) and was franchised by Disney. The only
other modern film with an original story to be a top grosser is The Passion of the Christ
(2004), whose original material luckily predates copyright.
The centrality of blockbusters to operate as tent poles (primary revenue
generators) for Majors is only one element that heightens the barrier to entry for Major
competition. They also play an essential role that helps necessitate and reinforce the
other means of power. While size of media conglomerates, market reach, and ownership
of exhibition sectors are in themselves empowering, the particularities of a cultural
product require what has become dominant film brands/franchises. Film is a highly
replaceable good, not only in the sense of replacing one movie with another, but also as
replacing viewership with another form of entertainment. As such, to avoid the
fragmentation of the industry into, intuitively one might assume, numerous small-end
niche films, the Majors have inundated society to a normalization of a product they can
better control. Like other industries entering neoliberalism, this meant a move away from
control of physical production (such as camera patents or “Fordist” factory style of films)
to more intangible additions of value.
As reiterated throughout these chapters, this growth of neoliberal forms of
competition compounds what has already been a very centralized industry. Robert Brady
has said that there is "probably no other commodity or service sold in America that lends
itself so easily to the exercise of monopoly control as do the products of the movie
industry" (1947, pp.131). This change, as well as general adoption of neoliberalism,
increases all six of the natural advantages Brady lists for the Majors: 1) movie stars who
offer a unique drawing and whom the major studios can dominate via employment. 2)
uniqueness of individual film narratives. 3) quality that requires heavy capital
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investments. 4) perishability of the film in order to create high turn-over—a quality
heavily controlled by the major studios. 5) copyright protection, and 6) ownership of
theaters (multiple exhibition streams for modern industry).
Balancing expensive, star-studded films, which also had to be differentiated and
“perishable” to consistently bring in viewers, brought in greater reliance on the exhibition
streams and copyright protection. As a result, the evolution of the film industry within
neoliberalism has attained the best means of providing these seemingly contradictory
but necessary elements. This is the need for high turnover and ability for films to become
“stale” and thus constantly generate demand for new films, while also retaining the
popularity that directs moviegoers away from other films. Connected to this is the
extension of intellectual property, both for direct film value, as well as ability to amortize
the film into other revenue streams and products. The reliance on franchises, sequels,
and episodic films is what has allowed for this modern utilization of blockbusters, which
itself is dependent on the growth of intellectual property, to become a core trend in the
broader neoliberal political economy.
As a result, the elements that are increasing the cost of production budgets are
the same that are creating a barrier to compete at the Majors’ level. The high costs of
sets, location shooting, stars, franchises, intellectual property, and advertisement is
outside the means of most indie studios, leaving competition largely between the Major
studios themselves. The means of amortizing the growing cost of film and associated
intellectual property are additional means of barrier and dependency--the international
control of distribution and exhibition. As a result, the higher cost of blockbuster films that
should increase risk due to being a larger investment, is mitigated by reshaping the
industry around MMCs, intellectual property, and numerous ancillary markets. That is to
say, the higher risk in inflated budgets of blockbusters is mitigated by the very oligarchic
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structure it reinforces. In the end, the Major studios ultimately compete only amongst
themselves and a single “Mini-Major.”24
The industry was also reshaped by its internationalization of both production and
distribution, which was required to decrease labor costs and location shooting as well as
provide a larger market for revenue (See Chart Below). For example, the purchase of
Lucasfilm by Disney for $4 billion, on top of the cost for individual films in the hundreds
of millions, needs to be offset by a large, international market. On top of affecting the
industry structure, the increasing focus on international markets has also changed how
narratives are presented in leading films. Contrary to the dialogue-laden films of the
Golden Age, today films’ focus on teenagers, foreign markets, and a broad audience,
which makes competition about creating a spectacle (called lowest common
denominator by some) and familiarity. Because films are highly replaceable with one
another, having the same ticket prices, films need to bring in viewers away from other
films, rather than trying to generate a larger market. As a result, on top of the spectacle
of expensive CGI and action, the increasingly multi-generational aspect of intellectual
property makes these films cultural and even socially important for people to view. In
contrast to idiosyncratic interests, one “keeps up with the Skywalkers” to fit in socially.25

24

Lionsgate. See more below.

25

Star Wars was able to generate a large, if semi-niche fan base immediately, another popular
franchise, Star Trek, has seen recent film remakes that drive more to the spectacle. The Studio in
charge (Paramount/Viacom) has a history of focusing on story and character simplification in
favor of CGI and action. While this may appeal to some, usually teenagers according to the target
audience, it has a diminutive effect on those with idiosyncratic and niche interests. The result is
seemingly hyperbolic or melodramatic claims of “betrayal” of the fans, who themselves help
shape the franchise into a cultural icon.
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8. Domestic and International Box Office Revenue for Major Studios

Follows (May 15, 2017)

All of these elements result in a compounding need for Majors to focus on
purchasing or developing lasting IP franchises. This is based off a formula of culture,
cost, amortize, and spectacle: 1) the need to compete based on the well-known and
familiar rather than price, artistic merit, and lesser reliance on expensive advertising
campaigns. This includes utilizing popular IP as a barrier to entry; 2) the inflation of
blockbuster budgets that allow “major” competition that requires assured ticket sales; 3)
the need to utilize and fill the numerous exhibition streams, which are used to amortize
the high budgets of the previous point; 4) generate a uniqueness to a film to attract
moviegoers from other films and concurrently provide a “common denominator”
attraction, not only for the largest audience possible, but also for an international
audience with differing languages, cultures, and histories. Thus, franchises allow for a
“value-added” spectacle, making a film that is at the same time unique and standardized,
perishable and amortizable, and expensive and safe.
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As a result, to compete at the Major level studios are required to either create or
purchase leading intellectual property. While there has always been a utilization of
existing IP, such as from books to create the plot of films, the important components
here are the exclusivity through copyright and trademark, and the franchisability. This
results not only in consistent modern reproductions--reboots, remakes, sequels, and
prequels-- of past popular films, but a serialization through leading franchises. While
one-off remakes usually of popular movies in the studio’s library can reduce the risk of
production costs, it is the popular franchises that assure a continuous and stable profit
for the blockbuster risks of the majors. This is again due to the amortization of these
franchises through the numerous sectors that the Majors own, but also due to the
cultural popularity of these franchises. As a result, many of the most successful
franchises of the Majors are not created, but acquired either from other film studios (Star
Wars and Shrek) or from popular literature (Harry Potter and Marvel and DC
Superheroes).
While Finding Nemo found its franchise all within the new millennium, this trend
is also seen in a new generation of remakes. With a record 64 years following the
release of the original, Bambi II (2006) is probably the most absurd example. While
Bambi may remain a cultural icon, it is still the culturally inundating and franchisable
films that are needed. These are able to assure viewership due to episodic releases and
can easily be extended into the numerous exhibition sectors. This effectively takes the
risk associated with high budget films, but encases them in the continuity and security of
television episodes.26 Again, while remakes can be released from the IP of an existing

26

Interestingly, television shows themselves have changed thanks to the technology of online
streaming. Rather than consistent and narratively independent episodes, seasons are now
commonly released at once and with a season-long story arc. Especially on streaming platforms
like Netflix, this is to generate immediate and constant viewership, rather than loyal and returning.
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film library, blockbuster franchises are more difficult to attain. Rather, franchises tend to
follow and reinforce the cultural zeitgeist, and have greater trouble creating it. One can
see this clearly in one of the largest blockbuster flops, Disney’s John Carter. Despite
being based on a semi-popular novel series and a massive budget of $300 million it
failed to reach its expected audience. Part of this failure is likely that it was not already a
household name that held a place in culture--being a “must see” in which people expect
one another to see the film. Instead, Disney found much greater success in purchasing
already proven and culturally significant franchises of Marvel and Star Wars.
Universal has also faced trouble in creating a “new” franchise, as it attempts to
revamp very old IP (and arguably one of the first film franchises) to create a Universal
Monster “Dark Universe,” with such early films such as Dracula and Frankenstein. While
well known, and foundational to the very horror genre, these films do not tap into any
current cultural zeitgeist as Star Wars or superheroes do. As such, the creation
continuously faces setbacks as Universal faces the same high expectations, and,
indeed, high success the existing barrier to entry requires. As such, reinforcing and
rebooting existing successful and culturally relevant IP has seen more success. This is,
in fact, the very reason that Lionsgate has been able to compete as a Mini-Major. Its
franchises had been acquired through its purchase of Summit Entertainment. As a
result, when Lionsgate does take in high percentages of international box office revenue
it is with the three IP franchises that it relies on: Twilight, Hunger Games, and to a lesser
degree Divergent.

Even traditional television has adopted this new structure (Bank et al. October 23, 2014), while
film is adopting the traditional episodic structure, with reboots functioning as series.

60

Advertisement
Along with budget inflation, advertisement has been an extremely important
element that generates a barrier to blockbuster and “Major” levels of competition. Due to
the relatively inelastic nature of film admissions the competition is less on the price at the
box office, compared to which movie is seen. As such, films do compete with other
recreation activities, but are heavily competing with what film one sees over another
film. This high replaceability combined with the blockbuster budget and high cost of
either purchasing or creating a film franchise, makes advertisement an essential
component to the Major Studio structure. In this, blockbuster films need to be accessible,
yet culturally dominant. This cultural inundation goes beyond advertising that a product
exists, convincing a consumer of its superiority, or even preying upon psychological
susceptibility that is prevalent within modern ads. Modern mass media advertising
means creating a lasting and persistent inundation of a product that is deeply
embedded in social relations--the expectation that one is familiar with certain media
commodities, such as Star Wars. Thus, while blockbuster budget inflation and the cost of
franchise IP increase the need for costly advertising to ensure a lasting impact on the
society and customer base, they also demand increased international reach, copyright
protection, and barriers against potential competition from non-Majors. With these
compounding issues, it should then not be surprising that the massive growth in film
budgets were not only matched, but surpassed by advertising costs as a percent of total
film cost.
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9. Advertisement Figure (Rainey, March 8 2016)

In 1997, $19 million was the average cost per American film for advertisement
campaigns (Epstein, 2012, pp. 26). In 2007 it was $35 million on average per film
(Epstein, 2012, pp. 42). According to Variety Magazine in Ad Figure, the expanded costs
on TV spots for Motion Picture expanded by 39% in just one year from 2014 to 2015.
Already by 2002, the Majors were investing “ ... nearly as much in world-wide advertising
and prints as they did in making the movies themselves” (Epstein, 2006, pp. 178). This
year amounted to 39% of costs were ads compared to the negatives of production
(“2006 U.S. Theatrical Market Statistics”). Although this was a high period, for the period
up to 2007, when the MPAA decided to stop publishing film costs as well as
advertisement spending, the cost of advertisements ran from 33-37% of total film cost
(advertising plus the physical roll of film) (“2006 U.S. Theatrical Market Statistics”). As
such, this heavy advertising has been unavailable to the indie studios, not only as
advertising at least keeps up with general film inflation, but also the increasing reliance
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and funding of blockbusters reaching the hundreds of millions of dollars.27 As such, the
cultural relevance becomes greatly expanded, not only crowding out the limited theater
admission to favor the Majors and blockbusters, but also a broader cultural crowding out,
as franchises enter other distribution sectors. For indies, the ability to overcome such
barriers is not only unlikely, but impossible to equally compete.
For an oligopolistic industry like Hollywood, the increase in advertisement works
in the same manner. While each Mass Media Conglomerate has assured exhibition
platforms, competition in audience for each sector exists, but largely among the twotiered industry. That is, the Majors tend to compete only with each other for the highest
position amongst blockbusters, while leading indie studios compete with “indie
subsidiaries” of the Majors, and then, finally, small producers filling up the rest. As such,
as Domestic Box Office Share for MPAA films shows, the percentage the majors take in
the box office is relatively stable, totaling between 90%-95% of leading Box Office. By
contrast, the following figure shows strong change among the major studios, with Disney
picking up much of Viacom’s revenue. Outside of the majors, Lionsgate is again the only
“indie” studio to reach a comparable market share. Including Lionsgate as the sole MiniMajor routinely leaving as little as 5% of the yearly box office to the hundreds of other
films released.

27

39% for 2001; 33% for 1995; 28% for 1985 ( “2005 U.S. Theatrical Market Statistics”)
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10. Domestic Box Office Share for MPAA films28

11. Domestic Box Office Share by Major Studio

28

Data from Boxofficemojo.com
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Interestingly, the use of inflated advertising campaigns as a barrier to entry can
also be seen in the file-sharing issue, which adds another dimension to the MPAA’s fight
against piracy. For producers who cannot afford advertising campaigns, the illegal
sharing of the film online can have the same effect of publicizing the film through worldof-mouth, giving smaller and relatively unknown movies more attention and, as a result,
customers than if they remained without any publicity. As such, Peukert et al. (2017)
found that the shutdown of popular file-sharing sites, such as Megaupload, actually led
to a boxoffice decrease in smaller films, and a corresponding increase in blockbuster
revenue. Blockbuster films each have their own ad campaigns, while indie films can
benefit from the word-of-mouth initiated by those illegally downloading the film.
Interestingly, the authors suggest sequels were largely unaffected, being already familiar
to the potential audience. Again, while there has been much debate on the cost of direct
film piracy there is also an undiscussed issue of how piracy affects the two-tier system
within the film industry itself, with only the majors able to provide massive advertisement
campaigns to direct audiences to their films and thus away from others. This relationship
between advertisement, Intellectual Property, and piracy (file sharing) will be an
important connection when examining the extension of copyright law and enforcement in
chapter 5.
Finance
Tied to the increasing cost of advertisement has been the longer-term problem of
heavily inflated budgets. These core aspects of intellectual property and blockbusterstyle films directly tie into the general financialization of the industry. As blockbuster and
“tentpole” films (using fewer leading films to generate larger revenue) became an
increasingly important strategy to the oligopoly, both the cost of the films and
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popularizing them has consistently increased. As these costs soared studios could no
longer simply rely on bank loans or self-financing (Holt, 2011, pp. 51), which set the
ground for more complex deals from numerous actors to spread risk, which is a core
corporate management strategy within financialization. Within the new production
structure, it is only the Major studios (and sole Mini-Major Lionsgate) that have the ability
to attract enough finance to produce such expensive films. In tandem with utilizing
budget inflation to legitimize the need for concentration, sector control, and even
subsidization, within the industry the Majors have been restructuring their operations to
reduce cost and risk to themselves. Over time the Majors have increasingly taken on the
role of “financial managers” (Cook, 2000, pp. 353 check quote) rather than direct
producers and financiers. This financialized system utilized outside financing, coproduction, indie production, pre-sales to ancillary markets, distribution guarantees, and
merchandising to reduce risk and centralize their position within the system (Cook,
2000).
The need for owning franchisable intellectual property and massive
advertisement campaigns fits well within the argument that monopoly capital tends to
compete on aspects other than price (which is quite standardized when buying or renting
a film). The necessity of expensive IP accumulation and development helps drive the
dividing line between the oligopoly lead firms, and the smaller indie studios, which
require some degree of partnership and dependency on the majors when dealing with
these greater costs. While this makes a clear delineation between major and indie film
competition, it fits also well into the argument that monopoly capital has become
increasingly financialized during the period of neoliberalism. This is the centralization of
finance and financial products in numerous industries, as well as the dominance of
financial institutions, such as Wall Street, in many industries. For the major studios,
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purchasing and developing IP, inflating production costs for blockbusters, international
distribution, and advertising campaigns all constitute the financialization of the industry
as well as the flexible manner of control by the majors.
Indie Producers and Control
Outside the main focus of Blockbuster productions, the Majors have set up
subsidiaries to compete with lower-budget and indie films. This utilization of subsidiaries
has been a tactic of the Majors since their oligopoly resurgence in the ‘80s up to the late
2000s, whereby the strength of the oligopoly has been moving to dispense with direct
ownership of mid-tier productions. Subsidiary studios, such as New Line Cinema and
Focus Features (and in some cases subsidiaries of subsidiaries, such as Picturehouse
and Rogue Pictures) are designed to produce less expensive films, but many times this
is in an effort to reach the most profitable films (opposed to highest grossing), which are
not the primary revenue generators for the Majors, but whose profits greatly exceed the
cost of the film.29 While this generally did not produce a large portion of the Majors’ total
revenue, subsidiary studios also played an intermediate role between indies and the
Majors (Scott, 2004). This created a cushion between any growing indies that could
reach into the Major’s market, especially early for the oligopoly resurgence, such as in
the ‘90s. As seen in the Figure below, the mid-position of subsidiaries operated between
the Majors and indies, overlapping on both ends, both in production cost, but also in box
office revenue. When indie studios grew in revenue and budget, they would typically
compete for the mid-tier market with the subsidiary productions, rather than the Majors’

29

The most notable being Paranormal Activity which had a micro budget of $15,000 and brought
in $193 million worldwide, giving it a return on investment rate over 1,000 times. With the cost to
Paramount to acquire the rights for $350,000, it still possessed a massive return. Despite relying
on a gimmick of tiny budget, “realistic” found footage, and nothing much happening, Paranormal
Activity has spawned a successful franchise in its own right. With distributor Paramount spending
upwards of $17 million for marketing for the sequel, making the ad costs multiple times the cost of
the small budget film (Hampp, October 18, 2010).
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blockbusters. At times when mini-major studios became too large and began competing
with the Majors, they were typically purchased by a Major studio and thus turned into a
subsidiary. Two notable purchases of would-be mini-majors were Disney’s purchase of
Miramax in 1993, and Turner Broadcasting (which merged with Warner in 1996)
purchase of New Line Cinema in 1994, which has since produced blockbusters of its
own with The Lord of the Rings franchise.

12. Box Office Revenue by Studio Class (Scott, 2004, pp. 49)

Some studios, largely Fox and Sony, have focused more on broadening their film
production and having stronger competition in low-budget productions. However, in
general the Majors have increasingly sought to strengthen, pursue, and occasionally
create new franchises to focus on as profit “tentpoles” to stabilize profits. The Majors
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continue to operate subsidiaries to find and distribute, create, and compete with indies
(See Figure below for a high point in subsidiary market share), but the Box Office gross
of the subsidiaries continues to fall as a percentage of total gross, indicating the majors
continue to increasingly focus on their exclusive, high-budget tier. This trend illustrates
that the Major studios are more “financial managers” rather than solely production
studios, or, more specifically distribution, IP, and financial managers. Thus, beyond
blockbusters the focus is on distribution networks and co-productions, rather than
independently owned subsidiary studios.
13. 20 most profitable studios at the Box Office for 2008 (High Point for
Subsidiaries)30
1

Warner Bros.

18.4%

Major

2

Paramount

16.4%

Major

3

Sony / Columbia

13.2%

Major

4

Universal

11.0%

Major

5

20th Century Fox

10.5%

Major

6

Buena Vista

10.5%

Major

7

Lionsgate

4.5%

Mini-Major

2.4%

Mini-Major (Later purchased by Lionsgate)

2.2%

Subsidiary (Fox)

Summit
8
Entertainment

9

30

Fox Searchlight

Data from Boxofficemojo.com
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10

MGM/UA

1.7%

20% Sony and 20% Comcast

11

Focus Features

1.4%

Subsidiary (Universal)

12

Overture Films

1.1%

Indie (Starz)

13

Miramax

0.8%

Subsidiary (Disney)

0.8%

Subsidiary (Paramount)

Paramount
14
Vantage

15

Picturehouse

0.7%

Subsidiary (New Line → Warner Bros)

16

Rogue Pictures

0.7%

Subsidiary (Focus Features → Universal)

17

New Line

0.6%

Subsidiary (Warner Bros)

0.5%

Indie

Samuel Goldwyn

0.4%

Indie

Sony Classics

0.4%

Subsidiary (Sony/Columbia)

Weinstein
18
Company

19

20

While the decline of subsidiaries likely relates to greater focus on blockbusters
and franchises, it also has to do with a move away from direct control to structural
control by the Majors. As such, in-house subsidiaries are increasingly giving way to the
Major Studios injecting their role as “financial managers” to the indie market through coproductions. This allows for the flexibility of industry control, but also allows the Majors to
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engage in indie competition without the overhead. This is especially important with the
increasing globalization of film and the larger pool of small, local producers around the
world. With this the Majors have been increasing their co-production financing,
especially for large Studios in foreign markets, which operate as international “minimajors.” This flexibility lets the studios purchase IP when necessary, develop partnership
with local major studios, control transnational distribution, and compete only with one
another on global blockbusters. It also helps explain the apparent decline of mini-majors,
as they are now internationally dispersed and usually the leading film studio of their
respective countries.
On top of spreading out costs of productions, co-producing a film develops
personal relationships with studios, and many times has been the precursor to mergers
or acquisitions.31 As the figure below shows, these relationships tend to stick around,
rather than only forming as contractual relationships that end when a film is complete.
The growth of indie-major co-productions had their start in the 1950s, but at that time
was largely the result of weakness of the Majors. By contrast, today these relationships
are generally predicated on the strength of the Majors as well as their global reach. The
flexible management of focusing on finance and distribution allows the assurance of
profits, the spread of risk, as well as the ability to meet the widening of the Majors’
control to the global market.

31

For example, the production company Amblin Entertainment had developed a close
relationship with Universal Studios commonly co-producing films and distribution deals. Universal
even eventually purchased the label spinoff from Amblin, DreamWorks Animation. Amblin
continues distribution deals with Universal, and even has its headquarters on the Universal
Studios lot.
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14. Junior Partners and Major Studios

Figure from Bank et al. (September 13, 2013)
By moving away from mid-tier productions, the Majors have left open a market
that mini- and regional major studios attempt to fill. These are larger productions that
either have a domestic or regional focus. Contrary to the historic interests in minimizing
Hollywood dominance in domestic markets, many of the second-tier studios around the
world have embraced their subordinate placement next to the Majors, seeing an opening
for medium-budget productions. While Lionsgate is largely the sole remaining domestic
mini-major, one can categorize dominant studios around the world in a new category of
global mini-majors. These are regional major media companies such as Constantin Film(
Germany), Vivendi (France), Village Roadshow (Australia). While these are large studios
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and leading distributors in their own markets, their films rarely move beyond the
domestic market.32 Rather, large international releases tend to be in partnership with one
of the Major studios. This helps assure international market access33 and advertising, as
well as help any allocation of studio or investor partners, actors, or sourcing material.
While this itself has increased the leverage of the Majors when operating in international
markets, the central importance of maintaining a global oligopoly continues to be the
MPAA and support from Washington.
MPAA Cartel and the State
I have demonstrated in the previous sections how Mass Media Conglomerates
have dominated film production by increasingly consolidating their ownership and control
of the most lucrative assets in the industry. Thus far I have emphasized the degree to
which the Mass Media Conglomerates have used their market power to subordinate and
limit competitors. These conglomerates have simultaneously expanded their political
power and influence in the U.S. and globally. The incorporation of the Major Studios into
Mass Media Conglomerates has exponentiated the political leverage and influence of
the MPAA, which has broadened its focus from film issues to general media concerns,

“On average, EU films were released in cinemas in 2.6 countries whereas US films were
theatrically released in 9.7 countries,” with 63% of EU films being released in only one country,
and 79% being only released in two or fewer (Grece, 2016, pp. 17). This is likewise true for
Streaming Video On Demand (SVOD) services. While Netflix and other major streaming services
are international, SVOD services in Europe are largely relegated to the domestic market,
opposed to servicing the entire EU market or beyond.
32

33

Those that do seek international releases commonly need to rely on distribution services of the
majors. This includes some larger indie studios that do have their own distribution services but
are limited to domestic markets. The cost is usually around 18%, with 8% being the actual cost of
distribution, including advertisement services, with around 10% being profits for the majors. Some
of the larger indie studios, especially with films that are likely to drive strong international revenue,
can negotiate this as low as 10%, with only 2% profit to the Majors’ distribution company, but this
is less common (Epstein, 2012, pp. 114). The decline of “mini-major” studios, which commonly
offered a competitive distribution service, has actually made indies more reliant on the Majors for
wider distribution. This growing reliance has additionally affected the financing of indie films
(based on projected profits), and thus brought production and financing more into the hands of
the Majors (Epstein, 2012, pp. 174).
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especially in regard to copyright law. As a result, while sector monopolization,
blockbuster financialization, and development of production partners have various
effects on film and media production and politics, the effects of corporate consolidation
and industry collusion have a much more direct impact. This growth in structural power
around MMCs and the corresponding instrumental power of the MPAA thus reinforce
one another in its political influence.
Since its inception, the MPAA had a focus on developing strong relationships
with political power brokers in Washington, D.C. The first president of the MPAA, Will
Hays, is best known for Hollywood censorship and was nominally chosen for his
moralistic reputation to clean up Hollywood scandals.34 But as the former Postmaster
General as well as Chairman of the Republican National Committee, Hays had strong
political relations in the nation’s capital that helped develop the lobbying potential of the
new association. Hays' replacement in 1945 was Eric Johnston, president of the US
Chamber of Commerce, another lobbying group. Johnston, likewise, was politically
connected, especially with Eisenhower (Valenti, 2008, pp. 271), but the political
involvement of the MPAA increased dramatically under the presidency of Jack Valenti,
who took over in 1966. While the MPAA was already politically engaged with
Washington, it was Valenti who largely developed the role and focus of the MPAA that is
still evident today. This was closer partnership with Washington in order to develop a

34

The most noteworthy being the alleged rape and murder in 1921 of Virginia Rappe by famous
actor Roscoe Arbuckle, known as Fatty Arbuckle. With other scandals occurring around the same
time, many in the public began criticizing Hollywood as debaucherous and a danger of spreading
this to popular culture. While a fanciful concern by today’s standards, the corporate management
of this morality continues to today. Interestingly, during the decline of the oligopoly from the
1950s-1970s (“New Hollywood” as defined by Biskind, 1999) the MPAA were more supportive of
artistic experimentation, rather than moral conservatism. The conservatism, however, largely
returned (though not to the degree of the Hays Code) as the oligopoly reshored its strength, with
a mix of self-censorship and public support for moral concerns.
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stronger reach and access to international markets, which required far more leverage
than dominating the domestic market.
The interest in expanding political connections to the executive can help explain
the choice of Jack Valenti, due to his professional and personal connection as special
assistant to Lyndon B. Johnson. This closer relationship between Hollywood and the
White House continued into the Nixon presidency, assisted by the exponential growth for
the cost of presidential campaigns and the need to find wealthy donors. Lyndon B.
Johnson may have even wanted “one of his people” in Hollywood because of their
possible donations for campaigns (Bruck, 2004, pp. 231). ”Many of the corporations that
made these illegal contributions were in industries dependent on government
regulation—like the defense industry, the airlines, and oil companies. In the past, the
motion picture industry would not have fit the pattern; but in the Nixon administration it
did” (Bruck, 2004, pp. 315).
The political developments under Valenti were clearly a response to the decline
of profit for the Majors, as well as preparation for more corporate-friendly policies from
Washington. Thus, as opposed to keeping the government out of the industry, Valenti
moved the MPAA close to the state. For the MPAA itself, this meant a move to increase
political unity, capacity and organizational effectiveness, alongside the long-standing
economic role of the association in increasing its members’ market power. This allowed
for a stronger political lobbying network, not just in the collective efforts of the MPAA, but
also for the individual political actions of the Studios. While Valenti was a means for
direct connection to LBJ, which continued under subsequent presidents, it was the
presidency of Ronald Reagan that led to the major shift of the film industry and general
economy.
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Reagan’s presidency is commonly seen as ushering in the era of neoliberalism,
by addressing structural changes in the economy via ideological and institutional
changes. These resulted in the interlocking changes to many industries, which for film
allowed the empowerment of the Majors through Mass Media Conglomerates.
Compounding these systematic changes was the development of closer political
relations by industry groups, such as the MPAA. Indeed, while this accelerated in the
previous several administrations it was Reagan again that marked a particular
advancement. Reagan was close to both the MPAA’s Valenti and MCA’s Law
Wasserman,35 whom he knew when Reagan headed the Screen Actors Guild. The SAG
was also Reagan’s foray into the institutional and political side of the industry, as well as
developing important personal connections.36 As president of the SAG, Reagan
appeared to have a special relationship with Wasserman and the MCA, with special
waivers and suspicious real estate deals, which even led to a congressional
investigation (Bruck, 2004). Following his SAG tenure, Reagan joined MCA as a partner
and received a lucrative deal as a host to General Electric Theater, further developing
his industry relations.

With these interpersonal relations, it is then unsurprising that Reagan’s
ideology happened to favor empowering these institutions and individuals. This

35

Lew Wasserman was a notable active president of MCA Inc. who had a strong role in
reshaping the organization and operational structure of the film industry. Prior to incorporating the
Universal Studios, the MCA under Wasserman was a talent agency that held a lot of power
through exclusive actor talent. Utilizing this actor power, Wasserman developed many institutional
connections with studios, producers, and broadcasters. With the purchase of Universal Studios
by MCA Wasserman’s activism expanded within the industry, developing an unofficial leadership
position among the Major film studios. Wasserman was also instrumental in advancing political
relations via personal connections and party fundraising, and was essential in accelerating the
political activism of the MPAA and placement of Jack Valenti (Bruck, 2004).
These connections potentially also include the Mafia, at least indirectly via Lew Wasserman’s
Chicago connections (Russo, 2007).
36
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coalesced around the neoliberal assumption that lack of regulation is the best way to
facilitate free competition. Whether this was actually believed is hard to tell, but this
policy orientation helped to entrench an oligopolistic structure within the U.S. economy
that has expanded and persisted over time, allowing Mass Media Conglomerates to
expand their ownership and control of a wide range of profitable industries and assets.
Rather than contravene concentrated market shares, antitrust law was reshaped to allow
mergers and acquisitions if these were thought to be compatible with “price competition,”
a lesser bar to overcome for corporations making their case for merging with or acquiring
other firms. The previous standard used to prevent mergers and acquisitions was
excessive market concentration. The new standard allowed greater market
concentration as long as it was concluded that such market concentration would not
adversely affect consumer prices. This shift not only weakened antitrust law, but
combined with weaker antitrust enforcement, actively encouraged dominant firms to
increase their market concentration and market power. Neoliberal ideology was utilized
to justify these practices. Illustrative of this is the appointment of William Baxter,
Reagan’s assistant attorney general in charge of antitrust, who changed the vocabulary
of antitrust to one of free market deregulation based on the Chicago school (Holt, 2011,
pp. 11), and that of Mark Fowler who was put in charge of the FCC, also creating a
neoliberal interpretation for the administration's role.
While the film industry has not reached the outright monopolization of Thomas
Edison’s Motion Picture Patent Company, the anti-trust deregulation, as well as the
Mass Media Conglomerate structure, has produced an equivalent, if not more nefarious,
effect in the economy and politics. The growing size and interrelation with other
industries only further increases the reach and importance of corporate associations
such as the MPAA. With still few members, shared interests, and growing economic
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reach, the cartel-like activity of the MPAA has grown. As MPAA president Jack Valenti

put it, “...they were smart enough to know that they needed to work together in
the best interests of their kingdom” (Valenti, 2008, pp. 285). The following chapter
will follow this into the international sphere, where cartel-like activity had seen even less
mitigation. This examination of international states and consumers forms the foundation
of a dispersed coalition of mega power-brokers, led by the MPAA, that will be further
examined in budget subsidization (chapter 4) and copyright extensions (Chapter 5).

3. MPAA in International Markets and responses

Despite antitrust limitations at home following the 1948 Paramount Decree the
MPAA and Major Studios were tacitly allowed to continue cartel and anti-competitive
behavior internationally that only expanded under neoliberalism. This chapter will start
with a short history of the internationalization of Hollywood as well as responses to it.
Historically, nation-states outside of the U.S. used various means of economic
protectionism in an attempt to prevent the domination of their domestic economies by
the Majors. However, as economic liberalism became embedded in neoliberal
institutions such as the WTO, strategies of economic protectionism became less viable.
This led many nation-states to use cultural protections in an attempt to safeguard their
domestic film industries from threats posed by foreign competition. The economic and
cultural strategies used by nation-states to counter the Major Studios’ internationalization
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were responses to an international oligarchy of corporate power that has grown
considerably in the neoliberal period.

15. Box Office Size by Region

The Major Studios succeeded in countering the international backlash to their
global expansion, which relied on support from Washington and the steady expansion of
neoliberal policies. Today most regions focus on attracting production by the Majors, and
in turn the Majors now receive more revenue from foreign markets than the domestic
one (see Box Office Size by Region above). While the domestic market is still the single
largest market for the Majors’ revenue, all foreign markets combined provide more
revenue today, and, more importantly, still have opportunity for growth. While some
foreign markets are more dominated by the Majors, such as Latin America and others
present future potential (primarily Asia), it was the European market that really shaped
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the MPAA and the Majors’ international strategy. This is in part simply due to the
connectivity of the economies, but also due to the relations between the European states
and their respective film industries (See graphs below for Box Office share of Majors in
leading markets). The European states’ attempts to integrate with the U.S. market
following WWII clashed with their economic vulnerability to dominant U.S. firms. The
adaptive barriers and tariffs put in place to limit the Majors actually allowed the MPAA to
learn to use international/systemic rules and norms, in tandem with state support, to
generate benefits to specific corporations. This state-systemic strategy of the oligopoly
will be incredibly important when examining the more complex modern iterations of
these same issues in the following chapters.
16. Major Studios share of Box Office, Latin America
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17.Major Studios share of Box Office, Asia

18. Major Studios share of Box Office, Europe

History of International Film Monopolization
At the dawn of the industry, the first film inventions and innovations were largely
between the United States and France. While the US was a technological leader in
many other industries, in this very early period it did not have the dominant position that
we associate with the film industry today. Early on, European producers “...held a large
share of the US market, which at times reached 60 per cent” (Bakker, 2003, pp. 187). It
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was actually the fear developed from these heavy film imports, both on economic and
nationalist grounds, that helped lead to the first American film cartel under Thomas
Edison, described in chapter one--an American film monopoly would fare better in the
international market. This expediency also led to the reliance by the cartel on politics and
law, such as film standards, patents, and protectionism, which helped reduce American
imports of European film and pump up domestic production. While World War One is
commonly seen as the shock to European producers that put American film on top, as
the domestic industry grew around Edison’s film trust, protectionism and tariffs were
already being slowly loosened in America. Tariffs declined from $207 per 1,000 feet of
film in 1909 (shortly after the creation of the MPPC) to $97 in 1913 (shortly before its
end). By 1922 and the creation of what would become the MPAA,37 tariffs on film to the
US were $57, and protectionism was being replaced with internationalism by the new
Film Oligopoly.
In combination with the destruction of WWI, there was a steep decline of
European production, resulting in the trade relationship flipping as American film began
to dominate the European Market early in the century. As Epstein (2006, pp. 86) reveals,
”By 1926, American films accounted for nearly three quarters of the box office of Europe,
and European ticket sales provided Hollywood with at least one third of its revenue.”
Foreign markets had become 30-50% of a studio’s profits. Even following the Great
Depression and a decline to around 20%, this foreign revenue rebounded already by the
late 1930s. By this time, Hollywood produced 75-80% of all film in the world (Balio, 1995,
pp. 32). Aware that this was not simply a result of war and market incumbency,
European film companies did attempt to compete with what was already by then a
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Initially called the Motion Picture Producers and Distributors of America (MPPDA).
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transatlantic oligopoly. This was done by pushing for their own film consolidation with
“...mergers, joint ventures, co-productions and distribution deals” (Bakker, 2003, pp.
253). However, this counter-association failed to produce any real counterbalance to the
American studios. This is in part due to disruptions from the Second World War and in
part due to the disjointed smaller markets of Europe38 not letting European Majors get off
the ground. However, a primary factor was the early association and cohesion of the
Studios in the U.S., along with both tacit and direct support from Washington.

The Motion Picture Export Association
While the Paramount Decree of 1948 and other antitrust regulation put strains
on the domestic dominance by the Hollywood majors, World War Two resulted in
another marked decline in European film production compared to the American market.
This, along with the liberal trading system put in place after the war, allowed for greater
market access and foreign revenue for the Majors. This occurred in markets which were
“conveniently” out of reach of the Paramount Decree, which was limited to domestic
operations. As foreign markets became increasingly essential, not only for revenue, but
for the oligopolistic structure itself, the post-war environment marked a full transition for
the MPAA in focusing on foreign market access and dismantling barriers to trade. For
this, The Motion Picture Export Association (MPEA) was created in 1945 as the
international arm of the MPAA. Much like Edison’s MPPC, the MPEA functioned as a
traditional cartel, but outside of US antitrust legislation. It acted as a single international
distributor for all the Major Studios and MPAA members, allocating profits based on a
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It is only in recent decades with the European Union that there has been concentrated political
power and finances to organize fully European Major Film Studios. However, as will be seen in
this chapter and the next, this came far too late, as what mechanisms there are largely support
the American Oligopoly.
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formula of box office receipts. Furthermore, it utilized block booking, the practice of
requiring theaters to purchase blocks of films as opposed to individual films, which was
another anticompetitive behavior curtailed by the Decree. For Washington, this
development and acquiescence represent a consistent relationship with corporate
collusion, which, banned domestically, was accepted and even supported in foreign
markets to gain American dominance (Epstein, 2006, pp. 96).
As early as 1918, the Major American studios were able to collude openly in
foreign markets by utilizing the Webb-Pomerene Act, which explicitly allowed US
corporations to ignore select antitrust regulation abroad. As such, not only could the
early MPAA operate as a unified exporter for its members, it could also use that
concentrated economic power as political leverage. As Bakker reveals (2003, pp. 254):
When in the late 1920s, France wanted to adopt strict and limited quotas
for the number of films that could be imported, the Hollywood studios stopped
supplying the French market for four months, after which the legislation was
modified. The Hollywood studios were able to do this because together they held
such a large market share that cinema owners and distributors could not do
without American films. The latter groups lobbied heavily with their government to
limit protectionist legislation. In similar fashion, the Hollywood studios withheld
supply from the Italian market in the late 1930s, and from the British, French,
Dutch, Danish and several other European markets in the years following the
Second World War.

Especially following WWII, for many European distributors and theaters it was
cheaper to import American films than try to compete with them as producers, allotting
the MPAA this political leverage. For others, such as Germany and Japan, there was
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little choice but opening one’s market to American films during post-war occupation (Lev,
2003). Much like the cartelization above, the support for opening markets to the
oligopoly existed prior to WWII and the subsequent “American-led” free trade system of
Bretton Woods. Already in the 1920s the U.S. Department of Commerce had set up a
Motion Picture Division to support the industry in trade deals, providing political support
rather than letting an international market operate. As Bakker argues (2003, pp. 245),
this political assurance likely reduced any anxiety and, as a result, demand for
protectionism from the American Studios in that period. While European protectionism
would itself continue, it would continuously fail to counteract the entrenchment that
Hollywood oligopoly had already achieved, along with support from Washington to direct
that strength outwards.
In the post-war environment Hollywood market shares in both Europe and Latin
America was generally large and dominant. However, it was the political relationship with
Great Britain that was by far the most important.39 The British market alone brought
profits from $70-80 million per year, while all of Central and South America were only
$15 million (Schatz, 1999, pp. 156). Although this was an important foreign market for
the Majors, no single market had the capacity to alter the leverage the MPPA had to
enact its brand of unilateral and independent diplomacy on the state. Hollywood films
were important to the success of British exhibition, so when, for example, an “ad valorem
tax of 75 percent was placed on all future film imports” the MPEA implemented a boycott
of the British market, successfully lifting the tax with another arrangement limiting profit
repatriation (Schatz, 1999, pp. 299). However, due to both the shared English language
and political difference between London and Washington, Britain was one of the first
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Again, besides Canada because it is considered part of the domestic market.
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markets to transition to actively supporting the oligopoly by integration and coproductions, rather than outright trade protection. This gave a foothold for the Majors to
the general European market, but also helped develop the Majors’ position as
international co-producers and production managers, rather than simply film exporters.

19. Number of Theaters globally and share of American Films, 1949(Schatz, 1999, pp. 303)

In the wake of the Decree and its effect on domestic market shares, by the late
1950s and early 1960s the increasing focus on foreign markets coincided and
intermeshed with “...Hollywood majors transforming their business practices to one more
of management in supervising productions, securing funds, arranging contracts, and
marketing, as opposed to only producing feature films. This transformation toward
becoming managerial entities marked the primary shift of the major studios away from
being labor intensive—i.e., characterized by large staff on payrolls—toward becoming
capital intensive with fewer and fewer employees overseeing larger and larger
investments” (Monaco, 2003, pp. 12). This flexibility on the part of the Majors facilitated
the transition to neoliberalism, in part by incorporating international distribution into the
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oligopolistic competition. The MPEA was instrumental to this, by being a distribution
cartel, handling distribution for all Hollywood Majors in countries rebuilding from the war
(Schatz, 1999, pp. 302). As a result, the utilization of the oligopoly as a cartel to remove
or subvert international barriers, had the effect of early neoliberalization in the industry,
as they moved toward finance, flexibility, and political partnerships.
20. Play-time of U.S. Films by Country (Silver, 2007, pp.4)

Internationalization and Domestic Politics
Although the MPEA would soon become known as “the Little State Department”
(Schatz, 1999, pp. 289), and would engage unilaterally in foreign negotiations, this
internationalism also helped contribute to Hollywood’s partnership with American politics
as well. As Schatz argues, “...ironically enough, that many of the same federal agencies
that Hollywood was battling at home would look to the movie industry as an ally
overseas.” (Schatz, 1999, pp. 288). These included the Commerce Department assisting
in developing a strong American position in foreign trade, the Justice Department
relaxing its antitrust position specifically for expanding exports, and the State
department. Hollywood became especially important for the latter as the Cold War
brought more desire for the spread of American values. International dominance of
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Hollywood was a core propaganda tool, which brought state support and assistance for
its transnationalization, as well as developing political relationships (Schatz, 1999).
Nonetheless, the most anti-competitive use of the MPEA--as unified distributor
for the Majors--ended in 1957, as antitrust regulation was finally extended. But, the
MPEA was not dissolved. Rather, it was restructured away from direct distribution
activity to one focusing on politics, as the international branch of the MPAA. In 1994 it
was renamed to the more benign sounding ‘Motion Picture Association’ (MPA). It is
worth nothing here, that while the cartel function of the MPEA was eliminated, much of
the international collusion, still banned domestically, continued for the Majors. Blind and
block booking, ownership of foreign exhibition, and shared distribution were among
these practices. Perhaps most notable was the creation of United International Pictures,
an international distribution arm for Paramount and Universal, which was the largest
international film distributor at its creation. UIP controlled up to 1/3 of Hollywood's
overseas market, and would come to “...dominate some European markets by as much
as 85 percent” (Cook, 2000, pp. 305), as well as take on a distribution role for MiniMajors such as MGM and United Artists in 1981.
In tandem with involvement with Washington politics, the international role of the
MPAA (and MPA/MPEA) expanded greatly with the appointment of Jack Valenti in 1966.
At the beginning of Valenti's tenure foreign revenues for the Majors were at $1.5 Billion;
at the end in 2004 foreign revenues were $45 Billion. This went from 24% of total
revenues to 41% (Valenti, 2008, pp. 301). Like the MPEA, this brought an
internationalization of the role of the MPAA, as its members become dependent on
outside markets, of which it did not initially have the same political relationship as with
Washington. To make up for that deficit the MPAA expanded its economic and political
leverage on foreign governments, along with partnering with pressure from Washington,
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with which it had closer relations. The end-game of these relations would be to develop
a coalition of actors, including governments, production partners, and politicians, to
shape and open other markets in which the Majors have yet to access and dominate.
Thus, international and domestic political power was just as essential as the product
itself to develop a dependent international market. As a result, just as done with indie
studios and producers during the Studio Era, international exhibitors and foreign studios
looking for financial access would end up depending on Hollywood, giving economic and
political leverage to the American firms.
It was under Valenti’s tenure that the internationalization of the Majors and the
MPAA reached beyond the traditional transatlantic markets. Although China was
excluded, Asia was already being seen as the film market with most potential growth. As
such, the “little state department” that was the MPA was expanding its reach as it
deepened its leverage. When negotiating with India over repatriating Rupee profits out of
the country, Valenti even undermined a parallel negotiation occurring from the Nixon
administration so the Oligopoly could secure access (Valenti, 2008, Pg 286). Despite
some such conflict, Washington was generally supportive of independent action by the
group. Using the Special 301 mechanism, enforced by Washington (expanded upon
below), Valenti was able to pursue negotiations with the president of Korea, in tandem
with the US trade representative under the Reagan administration. The threat by the
MPAA to pursue Special 301 punishment through Washington brought Korea to open up
its film market, expanding Hollywood revenues from $9 million to $177 million in only six
years (Valenti, 2008, pg 378). What is shown for this is that the MPAA and Major studios
use unilateral diplomacy, partnership with Washington and other entities for greater
pressure, and reliance on Washington to help establish a system to strengthen corporate
unilateralism.
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This corporate power was facilitated by the post-war system designed to
liberalize trade among allies, known as Bretton Woods. The manner of economic
protectionism shifted from simply external barriers, such as tariffs, to more complex
protections. Many European states that signed agreements during the Bretton Woods
period (1945-1973) to reduce tariffs began limiting the repatriation of profits by foreign
companies, such as the Major studios. This form of protectionism was less contradictory
to the liberal order, and was intended to assure that profits gained by the early
multinational corporations would not result in flight of capital. It was also to encourage
local productions and jobs even if the industry became heavily dominated by the
American Studios, by compelling the Studios to finance productions where their capital
was stuck anyway. Trapped revenue expanded international production by the Majors
that blurred nationality, which was especially true as coproductions were increasingly
common with local studios, especially in the UK. Contrary to limiting the power of the
Studios and the MPAA, this increased their leverage as more entities became
dependent on relations with the Oligopoly.
This internationalization of production will have further implications as national
film subsidies come into play, as the Majors’ internationalized productions could qualify
as “European” in many cases. In the meantime, the leverage this afforded to the
Oligopoly extended their industry diplomacy. States that did put taxes on foreign films,
such as the (UK) or that limited profit repatriation too much (France) found themselves
faced with further boycotts by the MPEA. The withholding of American films could
already harm numerous actors dependent on their importation, such as theaters, smaller
studios, and even consumers who desired the “hip” American film. Increasingly the
Majors could also threaten to withhold investment as well, harming local producers,
studios, and labor. This success and growth of actors with ties and dependent on the
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Majors, set the ground for an internationally political Motion Picture Association (MPA),
as successor to MPEA, as well as being an independent negotiator with foreign
governments.

The Film Oligopoly under Neoliberalism
Once again, it is the transition into the neoliberal period that marks the modern
structure of the industry, in which we see the same collusive strategy, but with adapted
tactics. The cartel-like activity and political involvement of the MPAA continues, but with
an increasingly larger industry at its back, as described in the previous chapter.
Commensurate consolidation and monopolization in other industries also means easier
inter-industry partnership to influence the system and governments. New institutions,
such as the World Trade Organization and Free Trade Agreements, likewise mean more
avenues for such associations to operate. All in all, the neoliberal system gave not only a
structural benefit to the large and monopolized multinational corporations, but extended
their institutional influence as well. In contrast, the free market hegemony of
neoliberalism pushed states worried about Hollywood domination from an economic and
profit repatriation concern, to one of cultural protection. Over time this too was overcome
by neoliberalism as most states now focus on how to integrate local film production with
the Major Studios, rather than attempt to limit them at all. The eventual failure of such
concerns and protections betrays the fact that both economic and cultural issues need to
be factored into the political construct of power, of which the Majors, as leading media
purveyors, have been increasing for many decades.
National strategies of economic and cultural protectionism have failed against an
increasingly concentrated corporate oligopoly supported and empowered by
international economic institutions. As I discussed in chapter 2, the Majors expanded
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their ownership of the highest valued assets in the global firm industry, which allowed
them to increase their leverage against potential rivals. This included the growing focus
on blockbusters and franchises that were directly tied to the inclusion of financial
liberalization and Intellectual Property protection into international rules and norms. The
largest shift can be seen in the replacement of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) with the World Trade Organization (WTO)-- a process that overlapped
significantly with the restructuring of the Major Studios into Mass Media Conglomerates
(1986-1994). The culmination with the WTO marked a clear shift from a focus on
decreasing tariffs and external barriers, to incorporating domestic laws, such as
corporate protection, financial liberalization, and, perhaps most importantly for the Major
Studios, the creation of Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPS. TRIPS set
a minimum protection of Intellectual Property for WTO members, 50 years for copyright
and 20 for patent, as well as delineating what is to be protected and how. For the
oligopoly, this also set a strong norm for market openness and copyright protection,
which could then be extended outside of the WTO (such as in trade agreements or
bilateral trade deals, with even stricter requirements than TRIPS).
In the case of the WTO, corporate interests fused with the agendas of the
governments of developed countries in the global North, who sought to advance the
interests of their most technologically advanced and globally dominant industries. Into
the 1980s, the US was facing domestic criticism of what was becoming a perpetual trade
deficit. To turn this around without reducing trade, Intellectual Property was shaped into
a trade issue, largely by the lobbying of corporate interests. Because developed states
had an advantage in privileging market protection for Intellectual Property Rights, the
U.S., the E.U. and Japan pushed for these protections within the WTO and within
regional and bilateral trade and investment agreements (Cox, 2019). This shift in
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privileging Intellectual Property Rights was driven by dominant multinational
corporations, whose profit margins were increasingly tied to a greater dependency on
ownership of Intellectual Property Rights. These corporations worked with their home
governments to expand global protection of IPR through the Uruguay Round of GATT
and through the WTO. As Sell argues the new WTO rules, including TRIPS, were unique
to the previous GATT agreement, in that they applied “to the rights of private individuals
rather than to goods” (Sell, 2003, pp.13). Corporations and corporate lobbying networks
and associations lobbied for TRIPS and other forms of expanded market protection,
which included the MPAA on behalf its oligopolistic members. The major trade
association formed for this purpose was the Intellectual Property Committee (IPC), made
up of competing corporations from IP industries such as pharmaceuticals, media, and
computer technology (Sell, 2003, pp.96). This was assisted by other associations such
as the International Intellectual Property Alliance (IIPA), itself comprised of seven trade
associations in copyright industries, including the MPAA.
By providing a trade-based solution to the decline of competitiveness and
increasing deficits, this large group of corporations and executives were able to align
their own interests with the interests of powerful states such as the U.S., the E.U. and
Japan, with the U.S. government being especially aggressive in pursuing the interests of
its film oligopoly in expanding protection of IPR in foreign markets that were most
important for profitability. This corporate-state effort to redefine and emphasize the
importance of IPR in global and regional trade agreements helps further shift the
concept of Intellectual Property itself to an inherent right in capitalism and a requirement
for innovation or even the welfare of developed states (May, 2000). This is opposed to
previous conceptions of IP as contributing to monopoly control of products, which has a
negative effect on free trade, and facilitates corporate protectionism after an innovation
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is already created (Boldrin & Levine, 2008). Instead, the TRIPS agreement extended the
scope, length, and coverage of IP laws internationally. In the end, the TRIPS provisions
within the WTO were an exceptional win for developed countries and the multinational
corporations involved. For the Major Studios, this was largely a means to an end, rather
than an end-in-itself. The rules and norms in place would be used as a baseline to be
extended in other bargaining tactics by developed countries, as well as within regional
trade and investment agreements (chapter 5). These investment protections of
intellectual property would then set a new norm that would be used against states whose
markets were “lagging behind” in promoting corporate friendly practices. There is no
better illustration of this practice than the unilateral power afforded the MPAA and
others, through the US Special 301 trade mechanism

Special 301 - Expanding State Partnership
With the interest of IP and copyright ostensibly tied to the well-being of the
American economy, the US had chosen to not only rely on WTO enforcement on TRIP
rules, but to utilize unilateral pressure, influence, and even the threat of sanctions in the
form of “Special 301” Report. "The “Special 301” Report is an annual review of the state
of Intellectual Property Rights protection and enforcement in trading partners around
world..." (“2012 Special 301 Report”). As claimed by the report itself, this "reflects the
Administration’s resolve to encourage and maintain adequate and effective IPR
protection and enforcement worldwide" (2012 Special 301 Report). In practice, Special
301 has been used as direct and indirect pressure for states to enforce Intellectual
Property norms as defined by Washington rather than the WTO. Due to corporate input
in determining offending states, this amendment of the Trade Act institutionalized the
input and influence of the private sector in U.S. trade relations, and has been described
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by the MPAA as an effective tool in dealing with trade barriers and piracy (Lee, 2008;
Shiu 2006).
In the Special 301 report the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has the
option to place countries in one of three lists after investigations which include private
petitions. The highest category is "Priority Foreign Country," which is reserved for
countries that have "the most onerous and egregious acts, policies, and practices which
have the greatest adverse impact (actual or potential) on the relevant U.S. products" and
have not engaged in negotiations with the U.S. or made significant progress (2005
Special 301 Report). The second category is "Priority Watch List" which is for countries
whose lack of enforcement is a major concern to the U.S. and copyright holders. The
least severe category is "Watch List," which is designated for countries not as bad as
Priority Watch List, but that pose a concern and are "subject to increased bilateral
attention" (Shiu, 2006). Countries that do not alter their IP laws or enforcement, or
actively work at correcting them within a specified time frame will be moved up the list
and eventually be faced with tariffs, quotas, other trade sanctions (Shiu, 2006, pp.622).
Corporations most dependent on ownership of IPR invariably take the lead in
lobbying for Special 301 reports. This means that PhRMA, a trade association for
leading pharmaceutical corporations, and the International Intellectual Property Alliance
(IIPA), focused on Copyright, have emerged as important players in this lobbying
network. The IIPA itself is an interesting brand of trade association that largely functions
as a “peak association” (Brady, 1943), which is a federation of trade associations and
includes the MPAA as one of its members (See List). The overlapping operations of
such lobbying groups has a large impact on the bounding power of corporate influence,
especially for the more active and cohesive associations within the IIPA, such as the
MPAA. For Intellectual Property, the overlapping interests has resulted in an
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"increasingly powerful lobby" group comprised of the IIPA, the Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers Association, the Chemical Association, National Agricultural Chemicals
Association, and other IPR industries and associations (Sell, 2003, pp.76). As the
Special 301 Report has been "remarkably responsive" to MPAA and other private actor's
suggestions, the MPAA and other like-minded industries have continued to expand their
influence on the government on trade issues (Lee, 2008).
International Intellectual Property Alliance members:
●

Association of American Publishers (AAP)

●

Business Software Alliance (BSA)

●

Entertainment Software Association (ESA)

●

Independent Film & Television Alliance (IFTA)

●

Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA)

●

National Music Publishers' Association (NMPA)

●

Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA)
While many states end up on Special 301 due to weak capacity to enforce IP

laws,40 the MPAA focuses on states that are soft on digital piracy in order to protect
online privacy or to avoid censoring websites. As such, Washington has worked closely
with the MPAA and related associations to add states to the Watch List when these
states are deemed to have under-policed violations of copyright laws in favor of other
domestic priorities. Notably, many European Union members have faced such pressures
from Washington. Among them, Spain and Italy have been consistently placed on the
Watch List in the past over online copyright protection. Infamous among Digital Rights
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Developing states tend to run afoul on counterfeiting, while more developed states run afoul on
online piracy and pharmaceuticals, commonly over balancing digital privacy and medical costs,
respectively.
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groups, Spain notably enacted the “Sinde Law” in 2011, which expanded powers to force
websites to take down infringing material, along with website blocking and shutdowns
(Sutton, 2012). It has since been revealed that this law was a direct result of US
pressure through Special 301 (Enigmax, 2012). Spain was specifically placed on the
Watch List due to lack of criminal penalties for online file sharing (USTR, 2010) and in
2011 the USTR was being lobbied by the IIPA to escalate Spain to Priority Watch List,
the year the law was enacted. By capitulating and reshaping laws to Washington and
IIPA demands, countries like Spain participate in shaping international norms. Future
actions by the IIPA and like entities, can utilize the interaction and outcome to pressure
other states to follow this norm.41
This expansion of IP and pro-corporate norms can likewise be seen in the growth
of multilateral, regional and bilateral trade and investment agreements, which have
increased exponentially under neoliberalism. During the period from 1990-2010, there
have been as many as 400 trade agreements and over 3000 bilateral investment
agreements negotiated by states. Most of these agreements have privileged strong
enforcement of investment provisions favored by powerful states and corporate
interests. Countries of larger size and market power have been able to extract
concessions from developing countries on IP protections, with multinational corporations
often playing a prominent role in the negotiations.

41

As will be seen in chapter 5, these norms developed internationally are also used as a
foundation to reshape American policies and laws, such as American freedom of speech laws
that have been especially stubborn for copyright groups looking for censorship and website
blocking.
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Perhaps most notable was the access to negotiation progress for Trade Agreements, which
has since become infamous and for many a sign of not only undue corporate power in
government, but a direct displacement of democratic input and transparency. Reportedly the
strenuous requirements for congressmen to access recent trade negotiation progress and
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The infamous Trans Pacific Partnership,

42for

example, had taken much of its

content from the United States–Korea Free Trade Agreement (Fergusson, McMinimy,
and Williams, 2015). Included in this was the minimum copyright protection for 70 years,
far above the minimums set by the TRIPS in the WTO. Despite the U.S. leaving the
agreement, the copyright minimum remained among the existing members. This brings
the 70 year minimum, which was already the EU requirement, into many growing
economies in Eastern Asia, setting a legal norm that can then both be expanded
regionally, as well as push this minimum in the future closer to the U.S. copyright limit of
95-120 years (based on publication or authorship).
In regional, bilateral and multilateral trade agreements that include the U.S., the
U.S. Special Trade Representative works closely with corporations in negotiating the
details of these agreements. Corporate interests have been institutionalized in the
bargaining process with the creation of Industry Trade Advisory Committees in 1974.
These operate as a mixed public-private “peak association” that blurs the line of
corporate and national interests, as well as personal relations that help drive the
revolving door of corporate and state bureaucratic careers. Today ITACs are divided into
14 industrial topic areas, each of which is composed of representatives from leading
corporations or interest groups, such as trade associations.

43For

example, the

Intellectual Property Rights ITAC currently has representatives from The Disney

proposals, such as TPP and TTIP, was within a secluded and guarded room with no means to
record information [save a sheet of paper]. Members of the European Parliament faced the same
limitation with TTIP. However, CEOs of leading corporations, who were partner to the negotiation,
received a login and password, and could access the negotiation process from anywhere--a far
cry from what the political representatives faced. While these occurrences produced outcry from
those concerned with transparency and corruption, the concerns unfortunately failed to produce a
broader examination to the genesis of such corporate institutionalization in the state.
43

Broken up into district committees, representatives from Disney, the Entertainment Software
Association, and the International Intellectual Property Alliance, are members to ITAC 13 on
Intellectual Property Rights.
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Company and the IIPA as members.44 Thus, when relevant IPR issues are under
negotiation there can be direct and clear input, or “advisement” to negotiators. While this
has a clear benefit, the problems are just as clear. Catering to the most powerful actors
in any particular industry will account for the largest impact the trade deal will have,
which typically excludes input from consumer or environmental groups (Simmons), while
also crowding out smaller competitors in the industry unless they are members of a
larger association that has representation. On the other hand, for large multinationals,
such as the Mass Media Conglomerates, institutions such as the ITACs provide
numerous and growing influence and power in the process. The Major Studios, who
already have the IIPA45 and Disney on the Committee, also have shared interests with
most others. Pharmaceuticals46 and computer technology generally have a large number
of seats, and AT&T, the new owner of Warner Bros., is a member of the Digital Economy
ITAC.

Integration into the Global Film Structure
As neoliberalism normalized rules of the system and supported unilateral
corporate power, the balance between integrating into Hollywood’s global system and
limiting their access to domestic markets swung heavily toward the former for many
countries. Especially later into the 1990s and 2000s, this replaced much residual
protectionism for domestic film with actively attempting to attract the production from the

44

Membership to ITACs change over time. Other Majors Studios have been members as has the
MPAA itself.
45

Entertainment Software Association is also a member, along with IIPA. That this association is
also a member of the IIPA as well reveals the large amount of overlap.
46

Pfizer is currently one of the members of the Intellectual Property Rights ITAC, with Disney and
the IIPA.
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Major Studios, which increasingly shot in multiple locations around the world. What
limited protectionism was left for Western markets was largely around concerns for
culture and language. This was especially true for Canada, which required cultural
exceptions for negotiating NAFTA. For Washington and the MPAA, limiting market
access for Hollywood over cultural concerns were viewed as nothing more than hidden
protectionism.
In practice, however, cultural protections were much more limited than historical
trade barriers for film, and by the new millennium cultural media protection was a
stronger complement to neoliberalism than a contradiction. This is due to the fact that
support for film production shifted from protecting against film imports to integration with
transnational film production. For many European subsidy programs, culture and
language is indeed an important consideration when choosing films to support. However,
as neoliberalism and integration into the global film market took the fore, integration with
the Major Hollywood Studios’ production and distribution streams have become the
primary concern. In this sense, most economic subsidies became active support for the
major studios, with only residual protection and a fraction of subsidy funds for culturally
significant or artistically important works. Major economic film production would largely
be done alongside and in partnership with the global oligopoly.
This modern shift from supporting domestic film to integrating into Hollywood
oligopoly has much to do with how Western European countries adopted neoliberal
policy, compared with the U.S. Where American deregulation in neoliberalism was
focused on reducing antitrust regulation, Europe was privatizing and breaking up stateowned media that had been, in part, used to limit foreign media dominance (Hernan
Galperin). Thus, not only were external economic barriers being reduced, but the internal
legal change from neoliberalism was being applied in different ways. In this environment,

100

many European states removed two layers of economic safeguards in their adoption to
neoliberalism: external barriers and state-run and supported media. It is thus in this
environment that dominance of the American oligopoly was accepted, and European
states looked to attract blockbuster production and fill in regional and mid-tier film gaps
left over.
A major issue for the EU is that continent-wide deregulation did not form a
comparable-sized European media structure. As a result, a scattered and divided market
existed alongside the privatization and lowering of external barriers. The assumption that
a “European Culture” would form in place of economic interventionism proved naive, and
transnational European film centered around French and English film markets (Galperin,
1999, pp.635). The latter of which, as the British market, was again, the most open to
Hollywood integration and ultimately used as a stepping stone to the European market.
This heavily defaulted the largest European contention to American cultural dominance
to France, which continues to export the highest number of European films to other
continents alongside British (English speaking) films, but still far lower than the
Hollywood competitors.
This largely leaves a double-role for European production, which is similar to the
function of Mini-Major studios. While American Mini-Majors have largely disappeared,
with the exception of Lionsgate, the role of independent, mid-tier production and
partnering with Major studios for funds, production, and distribution, has largely moved
to the global level. Thus, many major European producers, along with supportive
governments and subsidies, operate as Mini-Majors of the new global film system.
Locally these studios fill in domestic, or at most regional, production for particular
languages. However, these do not go much farther than shared languages, such as
French films in Belgium, or German films in Austria. As such, even inside the EU as a
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whole, it is beneficial to partner with American studios for widest release: Between 2005
and 2014 64% of films released in EU cinemas were produced in an EU member
country, but these only accounted for 27% of EU cinema admissions (See chart). It was
U.S. films that took 70% of cinema tickets in the EU, despite being 16% of total film
releases.
21. Theatrical Releases versus Film Admissions in EU, 2005-2013 (Grece, 2016)

Outside of Europe, these releases are even more limited. EU productions only
had 97 million admissions in non-EU markets in 2017, with the majority coming from the
quickly growing market of China and Hollywood’s domestic market in North America
(Kanzler and Simone, 2019). While large in absolute numbers, this is comparable to film
admissions of only the German market of 94 million ticket sales in 2016 (Blaney, 2017),
and much smaller than Major Studio releases in North America at 1.32 billion (MPAA,
2016), which, again, make up about half of Major Studio revenue. Still dwarfed by
Hollywood releases in all markets, EU films have seen their highest foreign market sales
increase in China, likely impacted by the China-US trade war. China has become the
largest foreign market for EU films by ticket sales, but are still behind even North
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America in terms of revenue (Roxborough, 2019), limited along with American films
behind the Chinese quota system.

Conclusion
These moderate goals of second-tier film distribution, not only globally but in
European markets as well, reveals the very clear development of a global system of film
studios revolving around the Majors, as well as the accepted relegation of most major
foreign competitors to a new international Mini-Major status. The initial protectionism
from European markets were not enough to contend with a growing and increasingly
global Hollywood, especially as Europe repaired itself from the shock of the world wars.
By the time most industries recovered in Europe, American film imports were very much
the norm and expected by consumers. This development, combined with the eventual
pressures for neoliberal deregulation and free markets, made the choice between
competition or integration with globalized Hollywood a clear choice for the latter by
regional studios.
Very importantly, this period of neoliberalism also marked a strong increase of
unilateralism from transnational corporations like the Major Studios and their association,
the MPAA. The economic influence and collusion allotted to corporations, which even
during the New Deal period of strong anti-trust was growing, has only expanded under
neoliberalism. The Mass Media Conglomerates of the MPAA have become larger, but
have also continued to add political support to their foreign activities. Naturally this was
stronger from Washington, including via mechanisms like Special 301 or consultations in
ITACs, but support has increasingly come from other world governments as integration
and attracting Blockbuster production from the Majors became a major political goal.
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4. Corporations, Associations and the State:
The International Subsidy System

Today there is the normalization and expectation that film production
undertaken by multinational media corporations based in Hollywood (and
hereafter referred to as the Majors or Studios) will be subsidized by some level of
government--local, national, or foreign. Subsidization of production costs--literally
paying for a portion of the filming costs--is so pervasive today that most studios,
and especially the multinational Majors that dominate the global industry, require
it when choosing a location. Even the countries that have a history of film and
cultural protectionism have adopted this strategy to attract Blockbuster
productions for the sake of jobs and investment from the Majors. While this
follows standard trends in market concentration in many industries, film
production is especially notable due to its flexibility in production. That film
productions are temporary, commonly shot on location, and consequently mobile,
means production Studios do not need to permanently maintain crew, studios,
and equipment in all locations they shoot. As a result, Studios have maximized
their flexibility in shooting on varied and diverse locations, both within the U.S.
and abroad. This results in Studios maximizing choices regarding where to shoot
films. Thanks to this and their political, market, and financial power, the film
industry has long established a pervasive and international system of countries
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competing for film investment through subsidies. I will refer to this as The
International Subsidization System.
Film subsidization has a long history, but since the 2000s this International
Subsidization System reformed itself as a core component of Hollywood
production. Under the common neoliberal defense to gain “jobs and
competitiveness,” numerous provinces, states, and countries have joined in
subsidizing film production in order to attract this very mobile industry. For film
and other industries this has generated a “race to the bottom” where competition
no longer exists simply on natural qualities (such as the most appropriate
shooting location for film or studio infrastructure), or even regulation competition
(such as wage and safety provisions), but has swung in favor of supply side
factors so that the choice of production location is heavily determined by direct
cash transfers provided to the requisite film or media corporation. Naturally this
has resulted in an advanced form of race to the bottom, where, in combination
with downward pressure for wages, unionization, and regulation, states are
participating in financing production with no direct return on investment. The
Majors claim that subsidization will bring employment, local production spending,
and production infrastructure that is often advertised as contributing to a selfsustaining local industry. However, as will be seen, with the number of
governments participating in film subsidization, the returns on government
investment have mostly proved elusive.
There has been much debate over the efficacy of corporate subsidization
before the particularities of film subsidization are considered. Thom (2016, pp. 1)
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shows that “...some evaluations find positive (Wu, 2008; Zhang, 2015) or mixed
effects (Langer, 2001; Wilder & Rubin, 1996), others provide no evidence of
positive long-term impacts (Peters & Fisher, 2004; Prillaman & Meier, 2014;
Taylor, 2012).” Others argue that subsidization has little effect on location choice
for production (Lynch, 1996) and is thus simply paying for production that already
exists. At best, positive outcomes from incentives and subsidies tend to be
fleeting, either as the market catches up to the adjustment (Thom, 2016), or as
competing programs crowd out initial gains of early adopters (Thom and An,
2017). The mobility and temporality of these projects, as well as the expanse of
the subsidization scheme, means film subsidization should be one of the least
useful industries to subsidize. Despite this, or perhaps because of this fact, the
leading industry lobby, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), has
actively supported the cultivation of this system due to the direct benefits such
subsidization provides to their corporate members. As such, in 2011 film
subsidies took up nearly 2% of total subsidies within the US. While seemingly
small, when compared to the largest subsidized industry of auto manufacturing at
$5 billion, in 2012 the cost per employee was $12,465 for Film Production while
“only” $6,745 for Auto Manufacturing.47

47

See Story, Fehr, and Watkins (2016) for subsidy amounts and U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics
and U.S. Census Bureau (2015) for employment numbers.
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Runaway production
This direct subsidization of industries is uniquely high in film due to the
mobility of production. While film production may conjure up images of artificial
sets and warehouses, location shooting has long been central to the industry and
was a major reason for choosing Hollywood as a primary location due to the
varied ecology of California. Because the end product could easily be distributed
across the country, there was little necessity to stay in New York, the original film
capital. In fact, to be a film production company and distributor, ownership of a
physical studio is not always necessary, such as United Artists, which was a
production house “Studio” with no actual studio. Rather than directly own a studio
backlot, the company would produce films and rent studios as needed. Without
this overhead, producers are easily able to choose between locations and
studios based on their needs. This particularly flexible and mobile aspect of film
production led to its own industry term of “runaway production.” While good from
a studio’s point of view, the derogatory nature of “runaway” was developed from
the perspective of critics who saw production, investment, and jobs unjustly
leaving Los Angeles. More generally, this attests to the inherent flightiness of
such temporary and mobile projects, which grew under neoliberal capitalism as
flexible production became normalized.
This project-based and temporary nature of film has a large impact on
transforming run-away production into an industry-wide norm (Thom and An,
2017), but the nature of film production also plays a major role. Because of clear
segmentation of production, one film can easily be done in multiple locations.
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This includes not only the actual filming, but also with pre- and post-production,
which has even fewer locational requirements. With computer graphics and the
use of green screens, many of the artists and film workers do not even need to
be in the same location. This manner of production has itself helped solidify the
labor delineation within the film industry, between “above-the-line” and “belowthe-line” labor. The former includes the higher paid jobs, such as producer,
writer, director and actors, while the latter refers to more physical jobs such as
technicians, grips, set artists, and stagehands.
In relation to the supply chain hierarchy, these labor categories can be
considered “higher value-added” and “lower value-added,” but also relates the
mobility of production. Much of the creative, above-the-line work can be done
anywhere, and the few who need to be on location, such as directors or leading
actors, can be flown to location. Below-the-line labor is more replaceable and
not transported with production. As a result, runaway production tends to benefit
above-the-line workers who travel with production, while below-the-line become
more dependent on the mobile production attraction. In the end, this has helped
solidify labor groups, including unions, in working with the MPAA and other
associations to expand film subsidies, usually for their short-term benefits, but
ultimately for the longer term and larger benefit to non-replaceable talent--such
as famous actors and names used for advertisement--but especially for the
leading Major Studios.
Runaway productions greatly helped the Major Studios combat costs and
labor power concentrating in Hollywood. Even during the peak of the Studio Era,
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where film and theater concentration was at its highest, there were infamous
clashes with unions representing numerous sectors of Hollywood production. The
focal point of these Union-Studio battles was in the 1940s (Spaner, 2012). This
was the Black Friday battle, which started with picket lines led by the Conference
of Studio Unions, which shut down productions at Major Studios, such as Warner
Bros. While many were injured in the fight, many more were arrested and fired.
Despite initial concessions on wages, the Major Studios still retained much
concentrated power and state support; ultimately the Conference of Studio
Unions was disbanded and incorporated into the much more malleable
International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees. As the Majors retained their
monopolistic hold on all sectors of film distribution, production, and exhibition,
they had more ability to placate or end any strong unions. However, as that
power faded in the decades following the Paramount Decree, the 1948 antitrust
suit that ended film studios from owning and monopolizing theaters, the Majors
increasingly focused on international markets. This was done both to recoup their
revenue beyond the growing competition of indie studios, but also to lower
production costs and their dependence on Hollywood labor.
It is thus with the Paramount Decree that Runaway production became an
institution for the Majors, as well as a tool for retaining control after losing theater
investments (Scott, 2002; Christopherson and Storper, 1986). With the loss of
assured exhibition for all films, the so-called “Fordist” production of the Studio era
necessarily ended. No longer would production be churned out like a factory, with
overlapping sets, actors, and plots. Without control over exhibition, the large,
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integrated, factory-like studios became a larger liability for the Majors. The
Decree, as a result, helped bring about what Christopherson and Storper (1986)
call Flexible Specialization. This term refers to the creation of a specific and
particular product, as opposed to mass production of general products, with the
means to quickly change or refocus effort and equipment, usually done through a
network of smaller producers. Film was especially conducive to this manner of
production, especially as the mass production of the Studio Era gave way to an
increasing reliance on mobile production.48 Much like other transnationalized
industries, the Majors could use studios, labor, and locations around the world in
a replaceable fashion, thus developing the network of smaller producers needed
for Flexible Specialization. Not owning studios or permanent employees in these
varied locations allows the Majors to quickly shift location and change
productions, while the ownership of Intellectual Property and ability to finance
Blockbusters allows the generation of specific and unique products. It was then
up to the disposable locations to attract these productions through skills,
infrastructure, and subsidization. The start of this Subsidization System had its
strongest expression in runaway production leaving Hollywood for the Canadian
West Coast, still relatively nearby.

48

It was likely that the monopolized production and exhibition of the Studio Era itself was
resulting in the particular style of product and consumption. However, as broadcast television was
increasingly competing with theaters the days of mass production for film were likely already
numbered. The spectacle of the big screen, along with selling points such as “cinerama,”
“cinemascope,” and early on the use of sound, would no longer be enough to get customers out
of the house once they had a television. As a result, specialization of film itself was increasingly
necessary to draw a crowd that was becoming content with cheaper television production,
resulting in increased budgets and greater need to reduce costs. See Crafton (1999) for a history
of the early role of technical innovation in film and Seabury (1926) for a history of Major Studio
control prior to runaway production.
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International Subsidies: Canada and Europe
As Davis and Kaye (2002) reveal, Canadian theaters have always been
dominated by the larger market to the South, to a degree that the Canadian
market has been integrated enough to be considered as part of the “domestic
market” by the MPAA. Canadian films generally make up 5-10% of the
“Domestic” revenue box office, of which Hollywood films “account for
approximately 90 percent” (Davis and Kaye, 2002). By the 21st century, Foreign
(American) productions in Canada even made up 85% of Canadian film exports
(Davis and Kaye, 2002; CFTPA 2008). While Montreal and Toronto hold their
own in film production, both in foreign and domestic productions, it is Vancouver
on the less populated West Coast that receives half of production spending
(Davis and Kaye, 2002). While this is in part due to geography and proximity to
Hollywood, the politics of International Runaway Production along with the
subsequent Subsidization System, is the largest factor.
Prior to the 1990s, Canada, much like other states, was wary of Hollywood
and thus focused their film subsidization schemes on protecting culture and
promoting domestic art. In the 1960s much of Canadian film production came
from the more populated East Coast, resulting in British Columbia on the West
lagging behind both in media consumption and production, resulting in an
underdeveloped cultural industry. As such, as Hollywood increasingly looked
toward foreign productions as a means to lower budget costs and circumvent
local unions, British Columbia saw the opportunity largely in terms of “regional
industrial development” and a means to “a way to attract immigrants, capital
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investment, and tourists” (Gasher, 2002). As such, unlike other programs that
were at least initially directed toward domestic production and culture, the British
Columbia subsidy scheme was specifically designed to target mobile Hollywood
productions and develop a local industry out of that relationship (Gasher, 2002).
As much of the Canadian media consumption in British Columbia came from the
East Coast the likelihood of developing a fully independent local industry was
already low and thus the larger and closer Studios of Hollywood had more to
offer.
Initially as Vancouver began to take larger shares of film production in
Canada, national subsidies continued to focus on developing and protecting
cultural industries, with much of these funds going to the more developed media
industry on the East Coast. These cultural protections continued into the 1990s,
including cultural exceptions being a large part of Canadian goals during NAFTA
negotiations. Much of Europe was facing similar conflicts with Hollywood, both
over cultural concerns as well as keeping subsidies to domestic studios rather
than Hollywood. However, it was the active and direct solicitation of Hollywood
Majors by British Columbia's subsidization scheme that shaped how
governments would attract runaway production in the future. By the late 1990s
state-to-state competition for Hollywood productions began to take shape. This is
concurrent with Canadian national film subsidies shifting from focusing on
cultural to economic indicators, tacitly opening up these funds to foreign
productions. EU film subsidies also began to downplay cultural concerns to the
advancement of immediate and short-term concerns, as did individual US states
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who began to rely on subsidization to compete for jobs and growth in their local
industries. By the 21st century, an entrenched International Subsidization
Scheme had been developed, based entirely on neoliberal logic of open markets,
transnational production, and supply-side support, to the disproportionate benefit
of the Multinationals of the MPAA.
Europe
The European film industries followed a fairly similar experience to
Canada. Though not included in the “Domestic Market” as Canada is, Western
Europe saw early dominance from Hollywood. However, while European
subsidies would sometimes reach Hollywood productions, the goal in attraction of
runaway production, as pioneered by British Colombia, only reached Europe
once the International Subsidy system was already in full swing. Many Western
European states initially had a more robust domestic film industry to protect, with
more independence compared to Canada. As a result, there had consistently
been stronger political support to attempt to rebuild a competitive industry. This
was especially true following WWII, when Hollywood was very much dominant
across the Atlantic. In perhaps an early demonstration of the transnationalism
that neoliberalism would soon bring, the mixture of protectionism, subsidies of
European industries, and reliance and dependence on American products and
firms, actually helped lead to Europe eventually joining the Subsidy System.
The fragility of the economies in Europe following the war left many
industries with the precarious situation of needing immediate goods while also
needing to rebuild competitive industries. For film, even for countries like France
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as an inventor of the medium and especially concerned with culture and
language, this meant a relatively wide opening for American films for European
consumers, whose demand could not yet be met domestically. With this
vulnerability and dependence, there were few ways for these states to combat
the power of Hollywood. These included direct protection of domestic film
production that conflicted with the post-war trade system; subsidization of
domestic film, initially around cultural products; limitations on the repatriation of
profits by foreign producers, to force local investment in production; and
integration of local production into the Hollywood system, to attempt to move up
the hierarchy rather than exit it.
This interaction of means of production, which ended up feeding the
industry hierarchy rather than opposing it, can best be seen in the operations of
the British film industry and development, which has always been more closely
integrated with the American industry. While London participated in similar
means to revamp their film industry following the war, they also were more
accepting of integrating their industry into the larger and more global American
multinationals. As early as the 1950s, Britain set up a subsidy scheme known as
“Eady Pool of Funds.” This was a tax on movies, which would then be given as a
rebate to film productions that were considered “British” (Lev, 2003. p. 153).
However, due to American financing and runaway production many of the
subsidies went to American productions or co-productions with American
financing (the latter has become an increasingly important and growing trend in
today’s system). The “Eady Pool "was of decisive importance in persuading U.S.
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producers to shift operations from Hollywood to London" (Bernstein, 1960,
Quoted in Lev, 2003, pp. 153). Even the measures stopping Hollywood from
repatriating profits back to America ended up supporting transnational
productions, as the capital stuck in European countries was used to fund
productions there, helping to blur their nationality and thus their access to these
early subsidies.
As Britain saw economic success with its willingness to integrate into
Hollywood’s international system, as well as supporting the Hollywood system
politically and economically, other states began to open up to such competition
as well. “France and Italy had similar, but less generous, subsidy programs.
Though the original intent had been to support national film producers, Great
Britain, Italy, and France were willing to subsidize Hollywood film companies as
well in order to stimulate film industry investment and employment” (Lev, 2003,
pp. 153). As these production markets increasingly become infiltrated by
Hollywood, by 1960 40% of “...movies financed by Hollywood majors were shot
overseas” (Monaco, 2003, pp. 14). Most of this was in the UK with two-thirds of
their films having Hollywood financing. However, Italy and France, known for
strong cultural protectionism, were integrated into the production as well, with 3
out of every 10 French productions having Hollywood financing (Monaco, 2003).
In 1962, Hollywood got $5 million in subsidies from Britain, Italy, and France
alone (Monaco, 2003, pp. 12).
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Expansion of Subsidies: American States
Despite Europe inadvertently subsidizing some Hollywood productions,
the early adopters of the model to attract runaway productions were still British
Columbia, with American states following soon after--a process which helped to
further consolidate the International Subsidization System. This exponential
expansion can be seen in the chart below. This immediate adoption of subsidies
by other states was likely a result of relative success in attracting Major
productions for the early subsidizers, such as British Colombia. However, the
early successes were heavily due to the lack of competition from other locations.
As other governments developed their own subsidies to attract production, these
benefits eroded while the expectation to fund production continued. Even existing
film centers, such as California and New York, adopted subsidizing local
productions, and themselves have allocated some of the largest funds to stop
production from leaving. Others, such as Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana, like
many of the newer countries to the International Subsidy System, were
attempting to create a new local film industry, ostensibly one that would
eventually be self-sustaining, presumably on the assumption that their own
subsidies would be able to sustain localized benefits despite rising competition.
22. Number of Incentive Programs and Funds49
Year

49

Number of U.S. States with Film

Incentive Amounts

Incentive Programs

Offered

See McDonald (2011) for 1999- 2011 figures and Bishop-Henchman (2016) for the 2012 figure.
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1999 &

4

$2 million

2000

4

$3 million

2001

4

$1 million

2002

5

$1 million

2003

5

$2 million

2004

9

$68 million

2005

15

$129 million

2006

24

$369 million

2007

33

$489 million

2008

35

$807 million

2009

40

$1.247 billion

2010

40

$1.396 billion

2011

37

$1.299 billion

2012

40

$1.4 billion

earlier
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Louisiana was one of the first states to adopt film subsidies to develop a
local production industry. Having an already established a cultural and tourism
industry, as well as a temperate climate to allow shooting year-round, Louisiana
became a sensible choice for film production. But their entry into subsidy
competition was as much about attempting to attract existing production away
from other locations, as it was of creating new production. This was followed by a
New Mexico scheme, which became part of the first wave of developing a
competitive subsidization among US states (Thom, 2016). Although these
schemes had the intent, much as the British Columbia scheme pioneered, to
focus on economic benefits opposed to the classic subsidies for culture, they had
not reached the financial extent and broad participation that made up a fully
competitive system until the 2000s (See amount offered between 2003 and
2004). As Tannenwald (2010, pp. 3) reveals:
Until 2002 state film subsidies were limited in scope. A few states
offered film producers small credits against income taxes, deductions from
taxable income for losses incurred in production, or loan guarantees.
Other subsidies were confined to the provision of public services at no
cost (for example, police details, ready access to public lands, assistance
in identifying locations, and expedited permitting), or exemption from sales
tax on purchases of goods from local vendors and from hotel and lodging
taxes for employees working on an in-state movie shoot. These subsidies
may or may not have been the best possible use of funds, but they were
low-cost and therefore relatively harmless.
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Preston, in elaborating further on this first, more limited phase of
subsidization during the 1990s and early 2000s and specifically using Louisiana
as a case study, wrote that “For the first ten years of its existence [starting in
1992], Louisiana’s program underperformed (Grand 2006, 792-793), and any film
production that had been lured away from Los Angeles or New York typically
went to Vancouver, British Columbia” (Preston, 2013). By the late 1990s
competitive subsidization began to be seen as essential for maintaining a decent
film industry, driving many other states to compete with their own subsidies. By
1997, the Canadian government began remodeling their national film subsidies
around their perceived economic interest, taking their cues from the early
success of British Columbia and Vancouver. Likewise, Hawaii (in 1997), Missouri
(in 1999) and Oklahoma (in 2001) developed their own systems, and Louisiana
and New Mexico once again followed the Canadian model and substantially
expanded their subsidies in 2002 (Thom and An, 2017).
While the number of competing subsidies expanded across North
America, and later internationally, the subsidies expanded also in amount of
funds and in how they were offered. Away from the indirect subsidies described
by Tannenwald for early schemes, subsidies have since developed into direct
cash transfers. The varied and indirect subsidies include those for housing,
finding skilled workers, or even location scouting, but the more sought-after and
costly subsidies have been tax credits. These subsidies can be divided between
transferable tax credits and refundable tax credits (Thom, 2016). Transferable tax
credits are tax waivers offered to a production company for a set amount, usually
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a percentage of production costs, which can then be sold to another party for a
discount on the waiver amount. Thus, the purchaser receives a discount on their
potential tax payment, while the producers receive immediate cash to offset
production costs. While transferable credits offered immediate cash, refundable
credits offer a direct transfer of cash to the producer for the full amount of the
credit (McDonald, 2011). These aggressive and large subsidies have, according
to Thom, had modest impacts. Employment was most affected by transferable
credits, while wages were most affected by refundable credits, but for both
affects the benefits were short-term. To view the extent of the long-term
problems, dependence, and entrenchment of the corporate oligopoly it will help
to examine some case studies of US states, followed by an analysis of the global
subsidy system. Here I will examine three of the larger domestic subsidy
schemes--one to retain and recoup production (California), one that failed and
ended (Florida), and one with strong and continuous expansion (Georgia).

Florida
Florida is an interesting case in examining its subsidy program due to the
extent, length, and relative large-scale size of their program, which was later
discontinued. Florida was one of the possible locations for the first movie moguls,
as Jacksonville was scouted along with Hollywood due to its climate. Florida also
possesses relatively strong production in Orlando and Miami, both as an on-site
location for production as well as a location for Spanish-language television. As a
Southern and “right to work” state, Florida also has weak unions, which
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according to neoliberal proponents (including the MPAA itself) should make it a
frontrunner for a successful development of film infrastructure. As such,
compared to many of the other participants in production attraction and
subsidization, Florida should have been one of the stronger candidates for
successful development of a strong local film industry. The fact it did not have
success will help illustrate both the inherent problems and limitations of
subsidies, as well as the contradictions in a competitive subsidy system, whereby
permanent subsidies become necessary.
Florida started its initial film incentive program in 1993, following soon
after the Louisiana program. And, much like Louisiana, this early Florida program
was missing the direct cash transfers described above, only offering the smaller
incentives that were common at the time. This still had the goal of attracting
mobile film production, but had a much smaller impact, both in budget and effect.
Initially this incentive program was developed under the Florida Entertainment
Commission, but it was reshaped into a specific office, The Office of Film and
Entertainment (OFE) in 1999, within The Department of Economic Opportunity
(Wilcox and Krassner, 2014). The transition into the OFE occurred with the
general normalization of expanding subsidies, along with the inclusion of direct
cash subsidies, again following along other expanding models in North America.
Despite Florida still getting a relatively early start, already at its founding in 1999,
the OFE had received a budget expected to grow year upon year, which would
be necessary to compete with a sizable number of subsidy programs.

121

As with other subsidy schemes, to legitimize the program as not simply
corporate welfare but as jumpstarting local industry, the original legislation
authorizing the program had a mix of language emphasizing the creation of
production infrastructure and attracting production from other regions. It is
interesting to note that the OFE website today has a much stronger emphasis on
attracting production from other regions, rather than generating new production in
Florida. Like other schemes, the proponents of this excessive spending also
emphasize the indirect multiplier of film tourism, an easy target for the economy
of Florida. Once again the influence of the Major studios and the MPAA is
evident in the drafting and implementation of the film subsidization programs.
The MPAA is a member of local film associations, in particular Film Florida,
which, like lobbying projects in other states, publishes the purported economic
benefits of subsidies, with a special emphasis on tourism, due to the indirect and
thus unfalsifiable connection--more tourism becomes an anticipated outgrowth of
locating film production in the host state. News organizations and lobbying
groups reference these MPAA reports when providing data pertaining to the
efficacy of subsidies.
As the budgets for competitive subsidies ballooned in the first decade of
the 2000s, by 2010 the Florida Legislature passed The Entertainment Industry
Economic Development Act, which allocated $242 million to the OFE to
incentivize and attract film production to Florida. This budget was designed to
cover a five-year period, after which it could be supplemented with more
subsidization. This, however, led to failure and the eventual dissolution of the
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subsidy budget for two reasons. One, although high in total, spread over 5 years,
this would have been relatively small compared to the leading subsidizing states,
such as Georgia and California. As such, Florida was likely hedging its location
and natural attraction, but having a smaller than average budget within a race to
the bottom would likely have been unsuccessful, given the pattern of other halfsupported programs in South Dakota and Indiana, which did little in the way of
generating an independently sustainable local industry (Thom, 2016).
However, the program in Florida was not terminated due to tepid
responses to a smaller than average budget, or after the number of programs
diluted the success of early adopters. Rather the end to the program came
relatively quickly as the money dried up due to the lack of a spending cap per
project--an outcome which reveals the propensity toward corruption and lack of
accountability inherent to such programs (Thom and An, 2017). Without a cap,
the cash ran out “nearly immediately” due to the money being made available on
a first-come-first-serve basis (Walser, 2016). Cash was given out to any
production that qualified, rather than based on an analysis of cost and benefits to
measure whether or not such spending produced lasting infrastructure or
recurring production. In subsequent years supplemental additions were given to
the budget, but without a fundamental change these too were quickly depleted in
the same manner. By 2013 no supplements were added, and the Florida subsidy
system was out of funds.
The limited effects and quick depletion of film subsidy programs in Florida
have been criticized for a loss of jobs and production in the state. Interest groups,
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including “Enterprise Florida,” the state’s economic development arm that
incentivizes companies, and “Visit Florida,” the state’s tourism marketing arm,
had advocated recreating a subsidy system to retain possible production, utilizing
the rhetoric of defending Florida jobs (Irwin, Oct 20, 2017). Two leading groups in
this effort are Film Florida and COMPASS Florida. Film Florida is a lobbying
group, representing numerous groups including film schools, local producers or
associations, and even Universal Studios. Film Florida is very much the local
component to the MPAA, and acts to promote local legitimacy for the
maintenance and expansion of a film subsidy system in the state. Like in other
states, Film Florida has been a participant in commissioning favorable reports
with which to lobby politicians and provide the public with positive figures
pertaining to the film subsidy program. Film Florida also works in partnership with
the OFE, but has also pushed for taking over the subsidy fund as a public-private
partnership, citing lack of marketing skills by state agencies (Film Florida, 2013).
COMPASS Florida is likewise representative of related film unions as well as
small businesses.
To keep up with the ever-increasing subsidies among competing states
(especially neighboring Georgia), the suggestion was for $1 billion in subsidies
(Hanks, January 29, 2014). As of now, the trade and labor organizations have
put forward a more modest proposal for a “Florida Motion Picture Capital
Corporation.” Rather than offer subsidies through cash transfers, the “Capital
Corporation” would operate as a “more traditional investment mode” and
theoretically make money, though where initial funds would come from is unclear
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(Irwin, October 20, 2017). However, in step with criticisms of corporate welfare,
greater emphasis is placed on allocating resources based on “...which projects
create the greatest number of high-wage jobs…” (Taddeo, 2018). In the
meantime, local municipalities have started to get in on subsidies with MiamiDade creating a $100,000 local subsidy program (Hanks, July 19, 2017). Miami
has emerged as a focal point for the Florida film subsidy system, as South
Florida had received 78% of program funds by 2013 (Hanks, January 29, 2014).

Georgia
As some states see little hope in competing with innumerable locations
and massive subsidies (North Dakota) or have otherwise ended their subsidy
system with failure (Florida), Georgia is commonly held up by proponents of the
system as an example of success, with a relatively strong production industry in
an unlikely state, concentrated around the capital of Atlanta. In recent years
Georgia has found itself in competition for the leading destination of production
for the highest grossing films, along with California, New York, and international
(and strongly subsidized) locations of Canada and the UK. However,
unsurprisingly, it finds itself with one of the highest budgets for its subsidy
program, trailing only New York. Having spent multiple billions over the life of its
program, Georgia can attribute its “success” to entering this inevitable “next tier”
of cash transfers. Thus, while Georgia may compete with residual strength (but
still large subsidies) of California, and the giant subsidies of New York, it does so
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without caps to spending, without emphasis on independent productions and new
projects that California emphasizes, and without a focus on local labor.
With loose requirements from producers and some of the highest and
most friendly incentives, Georgia is able to match the leading domestic locations
of California and New York, and then surpass them through cheaper labor and
locations (especially compared to New York, which can partially explain their high
budget). Georgia is also commonly seen as being the leading competitor for
“southern” locations, beating out Louisiana, and likely one of the reasons for
Florida to drop out of the subsidy race. The movie Live By Night is a great
example, being set in Ybor City, Florida, yet being shot in Brunswick, Georgia
thanks to the 30% tax credit offered (Irwin, October 20, 2017). Other Floridabased directors have discussed moving future productions to neighboring states
such as Georgia and Alabama, either from a necessity to compete in a low
production cost environment or to also generate further pressure toward an
expanded incentive program (Boedeker, November 30, 2014).
While the success of Georgia is heavily a result of attracting existing
production, it also reveals other problems with such schemes. Georgia has faced
a shortage of film crews (McWhirter and Schwartzel, 2015). Despite offering no
subsidy cap on salary, as well as offering incentives to non-resident workers,
specifically to attract production as opposed to generating it, the state has found
it difficult to retain such mobile labor and investments. Due to these limitations,
the large Georgia program has been in the crosshairs of the same organizations
that helped end the Florida program, including libertarian Koch groups. Georgia
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has, instead, doubled-down, increasing their budget, thanks to overstated claims
of economic benefits from the program, usually from reports again commissioned
by MPAA and local partners. These reports have been utilized to prolong and
expand such programs by greatly overstating their benefits for the state using an
outdated and fairly arbitrary multiplier to calculate program impacts. The
multiplier effect (the compounding effect of incentive money being put into the
local economy) itself becomes overstated by using a very optimistic assumption
of how much money from film production stays in Georgia. In fact, much of the
subsidized costs are not permanent nor are they limited to local labor. “Georgia’s
30% credit is not only more generous than that of most states, including
California’s; it also allows producers to count salaries of directors and actors in
addition to below-the-line crew as part of their qualified expenses, as long as the
payment is for work performed within the state” (Johnson, 2015).
23. Studio Advertising in Georgia:

24. Georgia conditions for benefits:
● 20 percent base transferable tax credit
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● 10 percent Georgia Entertainment Promotion (GEP) uplift can be earned
by including an embedded Georgia logo on approved projects and a link to
ExploreGeorgia.org/Film on the promotional website
● $500,000 minimum spend to qualify
● No limits or caps on Georgia spend, no sunset clause
● Both resident and non-resident workers’ payrolls and FICA, SUI, FUI
qualify
● No salary cap on individuals paid by 1099, personal service contract or
loan out. Payments made to a loan out company will require six percent
Georgia income tax withheld
● Production expenditures must be made in Georgia to qualify from a
Georgia vendor
● Travel and insurance qualify if purchased through a Georgia agency or
company
● Original music scoring eligible for projects produced in Georgia qualify
● Post-production of Georgia filmed movies and television projects qualify if
post done in Georgia
● Development costs, promotion, marketing, license fees and story right
fees do not qualify

California
Unlike Florida and Georgia, California has been much more reactionary in
response to the subsidy system. For much longer local producers and unions
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have been complaining of investment flight and the loss of jobs and wages. The
earlier experience for Californian film workers, along with L.A. being the “home”
location of the Majors, makes it an especially important case study. California
may have not been the originator of the subsidy system (Canada and Louisiana)
but it was an early exercise for the MPAA to learn how to increase dependency
within the industry, generate industry control on the supply-side as well as
through labor flexibility, and to use the Hollywood location to reinforce the Majors’
position in the industry hierarchy. “The industry trade group quarterbacked the
campaign to stop ‘runaway production.’ The MPAA rounded up a broad coalition,
including chambers of commerce, labor groups, and cities up and down the state.
Offering a bonus for productions outside Los Angeles helped win over Northern
California lawmakers, who have traditionally opposed tax giveaways to a
Southern California industry” (Maddaus, 2014).
The Majors are not only the major utilizers of mobile productions and
subsidies, but also a leading voice in expanding those subsidies. Rather than
assisting in the development and expansion of local film production industries in
California, the systemic nature of subsidies, all supported by the MPAA, end up
canceling each other out and largely operates to further the transnationalization
objectives of the Major Studios. As seen in the following figure, labeled
“Employment by State,” California, and in particular L.A., continues to be the
largest production center for film. As with all subsidy schemes, it has been
suggested that one-third of the subsidized productions would have remained in
California anyway, weakening the case for subsidization as a necessary
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contribution for retaining film industry investment and jobs in the state (BishopHenchman, 2016).
25. Employment by state50:

50

Weatherford (2016)
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Although California has long been experiencing the process of “runaway”
film production, the state had been relatively slow in participating in the subsidy
system. This was likely due to the already existing local infrastructure and supply
networks for the industry. Because of the obvious narrow benefits of such types
of subsidies, the need to legitimize both infrastructure and temporariness seen in
other states did not quite work in California. It is only with the entrenchment of
the subsidy system in other states, did California become a full-blown participant
in the International Subsidization system in late 2009, which has expanded in
recent years as California has become one of the leading domestic state
subsidizers.
It was in 2009 that the political and economic power of the Majors in
California bore institutional fruit, with the creation of a $100 million “Tax Credit
Program 1.0” under the California Film Commission. This budget cap was
expanded in 2015 to $330 million (with program 2.0), making California one of
the leading participants in competitive subsidies. Like the suggested “Film
Corporation” in Florida, Program 2.0 has a large focus on project selection based
on jobs, and with a more diverse project allocation, with 40% devoted to TV
Series, Pilots, and Television Movies; 35% to Non-independent Films (read:
Majors); 20% to Relocating TV Series; and 5% to Independent Films. The strong
emphasis on TV series (60%) means production that provides more stable and
permanent jobs, but also is connected to the majors and owners of the
distribution-channels for such production (Maddaus, 2014). The fact that 20% of
funds are specifically allocated to relocation of TV series also reveals the growing
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focus on relocation for such programs, rather than the creation of production that
would not otherwise have existed.
McDonald (2011) argues for a national subsidy system, as the state
subsidy systems, which again are some of the leading subsidizers in the world,
do not create new production, and rather result in a race-to-the-bottom
subsidization of existing production. While this would help reduce the race to the
bottom domestically, the Majors would still have options to exploit the
international system, and location choice would continue to operate on merit
second and cash transfers first. The largest to lose out would be local indie
producers and labor, unless they themselves are mobile. Such a national system
would benefit Hollywood and California, and disrupt existing dispersed production
infrastructure, such as from Georgia, while the Majors would continue to benefit
as the international subsidy competition would continue.
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26. Largest Box Office Revenue Film Production locations51

International
Some countries such as France, whether due to cultural protectionism or
relative size of the market, had been able to build domestic industries semi-

51

(McDonald, 2016)
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independent of the Majors, even if they do participate in subsidies. Germany,
however, is an especially interesting case, as it has a relatively strong industry,
decent international reach from its movies, and a history of film and cultural
protection comparable to France, if not quite as strong. Despite this, Germany
developed a reputation of having its subsidy system, which had initially been
developed to strengthen the domestic industry, exploited, especially by the
Majors of Hollywood. With subsidies as high as 55% from federal and state
(Länder) sources (Jansen, 2005) foreign producers accessed these “domestic”
subsidies through co-production deals with domestic entities, much as was done
earlier in Britain. While Germany has since cracked down on these “in name
only” co-productions, the financing deals that helped the majors integrate and
penetrate the European production markets, have become increasingly
commonplace and continue to be a key component of the International Subsidy
System.
Lara Croft: Tomb Raider provides an excellent example of utilizing multiple
locations, pre-sales, subsidies, and partners to reduce risk on a strong budget.
With a budget of $94 million, according to Epstein (2005) the main production
company, Paramount (Viacom), only paid $7 million, leaving $84 million from
other contributors, including state subsidies. Germany is a prime example of
subsidy abuse by transnational corporations, as the conditions in its Film Funds
did not reflect the social utility of either jobs for locals, protecting local culture, or
developing a domestic film industry. Germany also had some of the largest
subsidies: 250 Million Euros in 2005. Instead “German law simply requires that
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the film be produced by a German company that owns its copyright and shares in
its future profits” (Epstein, 2005). Paramount’s German partners were KFP
Produktions GmbH & Co. KG, whose only credits on IMDB are Tomb Raider and
licensing of Tomb Raider footage, and Tele München Fernseh
Produktionsgesellschaft (TMG), which moved into domestic TV production after
these film subsidy loopholes were cut.
The notoriety and ability for abuse of German subsidies were quickly
integrated into the general operations of Hollywood. As Lindsey (2006) notes,
“No wonder then that this source of funding was commonly referred to in the
boardrooms of LA as “stupid German money” (quoted in Cooke, 2007). As the
Subsidy System was still developing in the early 2000s, the German exploitation
was especially notable. This brought the German Chancellor's Grand Coalition to
make “pulling the plug” on these funds one of their first actions in November
2005. While some funds were cut with an ostensible goal toward “New German
Cinema” rather than Hollywood productions through German entities, this
process coincided with the entrenchment of commercially driven market
subsidies. As such, while ostensibly new subsidy programs would focus on
arthouse films and around director visions, they were designed for German and
European films to compete commercially on an international scale (Cooke,
2007). With the EU being a driver toward commercial subsidization, and
Germany retaining both national and state subsidy programs, this reliance on
market-driven subsidies (as opposed to a cultural and art criteria) leads to a
contradiction that does little to halt the race-to-the-bottom effect of subsidies. As
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Europe focuses on local commercial films they can still partner with the larger
productions from Hollywood as the Majors focus more on globally targeted
blockbusters.
As a result of Germany’s unique position relative to its smaller neighbors,
Germany has plans to expand its already large and numerous subsidy programs
(Deutsche Welle, 2017). However, with the clear strength of Hollywood Majors
and the international entrenchment of subsidy systems, this increase of subsidies
is without the traditional focus of cultural concerns. As such, the results have
been to entrench the oligopolistic position of the Majors by contributing to a twotiered system with two characteristics: 1) European filmmakers are subsidized to
compete on the “medium” level film market, as Hollywood increasingly focuses
on the global blockbusters. This allows leading European producers to break
through the idiosyncratic local market and increasingly compete internationally,
essentially creating a second-tier mini-major status. 2) Continue to participate in
attracting large investments from Hollywood blockbusters, thus sustaining the
system and accepting a 2nd tier position in the oligopolistic hierarchy.

Consolidation of a Global System
As states began to openly compete for what was a finite amount of
production spending and mobile projects, the efficacy and utilization of such
schemes began to become questioned. While the debate is largely dispersed
between cost of subsidies on the one hand and short-term versus long-term
gains on the other, what is clear is that the Subsidization normalization during
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this period coalesced with the reconsolidation of the Film Industry into Mass
Media Conglomerates and, as a result, a dramatic increase in both the political
and the economic power of the MPAA cartel, which had a strong role in
developing this system. Even within general neoliberal pressures to increase
competitiveness and open markets, the dependency generated by the Majors
and the MPAA put film in a unique position. As such, of the total $80 billion of
direct subsidizations to corporations from Washington and US states in 2011,
$1.455 billion was for the film industry, making it one of the most subsidized
industries. As mentioned, per job/employee film subsidization has been about
50% higher than the better known and heavily subsidized auto industry.
Looking at U.S. state subsidies Thom and An (2017) argue that the
strongest reason for starting a subsidization program revolves around poor
economic conditions as well as high unemployment. This is based around the
intention to provide employment relief, even if the jobs are temporary, as well as
help diversify the economy. Developing infrastructure for an eventual selfsustaining and attractive production market is commonly cited to defend
subsidization schemes, both on the basis that they are only necessary
temporarily but also provide long-term growth (Thom and An, 2017; Davis and
Kaye, 2010). On a more short-term analysis is an examination of the Economic
Multiplier effect of bringing in investment and labor. Even if temporary the
defense lies in utilization of local hotels, restaurants, supplies, and workers, who,
even if short-term and below-the-line, themselves feed into the local economy.
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Some proponents even go so far as to claim the cost of the subsidies can
be below the increased tax revenue from attracted investments, but perhaps one
of the more interesting cited benefits of subsidies, and one pushed by the MPAA,
especially for areas unlikely to develop a substantial local industry, is the
promotion of “film tourism.” Also called “cultural tourism,” this is an attempt to
expand the extent of economic multiplier of subsidies. Especially for locations
that are already attractive for tourism, and for the same reasons attractive for
location shooting, this type of analysis makes an easy target to hold up as a
benefit of subsidized production. Louisiana, one of the states aggressively
offering production subsidization, is a good example of this. A 2015 report funded
by the MPAA and local association, Louisiana Film and Entertainment
Association (LFEA), offered the bold claim that film and television tourism (thanks
to production credits) generated up to $1.238 billion in personal income (HR&A,
2015). This is in comparison to the same report’s estimation that the credit
brought $1.039 billion of production spending, and a total of $10 billion in tourist
spending. This claim comes from comparisons with Lord of the Rings tourism in
New Zealand, however with an emphasis on such local TV productions as Duck
Dynasty and Swamp People.
Beyond the grandiose claim of benefits is the important aspects of the
creation of such reports and their purpose. The MPAA partners with numerous
local associations and small producers (such as the LFEA in Louisiana) for both
a local and broad-based coalition to lobbying local politicians. These reports,
which are naturally exaggerated to the benefits of not only film production but
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also direct subsidization (and squarely contradict many academic conclusions),
are developed in numerous markets, both domestic and international. While this
can be seen as direct lobbying, or at worst regulatory capture and corruption in
many cases, it also has a larger systemic benefit for the majors when examined
holistically. First is the clear race-to-the-bottom pressure to attract blockbuster
production. Second is the building of political relationships with local actors
helping to support such subsidization. Many local producers and labor groups,
such as unions, support the Majors by working with the association in lobbying
politicians, such as seen in the Louisiana report. The power relationship, beyond
immediate dependence on Hollywood spending, is that these groups insist on
reinforcing the structure of their dependence, as the MPAA develops such
relationships in numerous competing locations. When these groups lobby local
politicians, the coalition is legitimized by local interests, supported by the big
money promotion by the Majors, and influenced by and reinforcing the norm of
film subsidies as an economic solution. As Thom and An (2017) argue, politicians
need to appear to be “doing something,” making this system of dependence and
competition among governments, unions, and local independent producers a
boon for the multinational and mobile MPAA studios.
When examined holistically a group of workers, unions, producers, local
associations, and politicians support the interests of the major multinationals due
to their own perceived dependence. These four levels of actors--workers, local
producers, politicians, and the Majors--all assist in reinforcing one another
through their own developed ecosystem. Local filmmakers get access to funds

139

with and without working with larger studios. Film industry workers are forced to
rely on temporary job projects or to face the need to migrate with the mobile
projects to locations with stronger subsidies. Politicians receive funds for
government subsidization and can then claim that they “did something” to help
local industry. The Majors continue to use these political and economic coalitions
to deliver the largest subsidies.

Local Incentives to a Neoliberal Subsidy System
The International Subsidy System at its core is a result of intermixing state
and government interests with that of major corporations. In the need to attract
investment, lower unemployment, and raise competitiveness, subsidization has
become a central measure to participate in the system. While a Canadian
province may have pioneered this particular manner of economic competition,
the origin of the system itself returns to the home state of the MPAA. The support
in the United States for concentrating industries and strengthening corporations
was heavily tied to the growing trade deficit as well as increased competition
from growing economies around the world. For a time these newly empowered
and transnationalized corporations retained American economic leadership in the
neoliberal environment, but after thirty years we have the absurd result today of
costly and artificial competitiveness.
As a result, the systemic race-to-the-bottom and the empowerment of
leading corporations has a spiraling effect. Existing expectations, such as open
markets and low regulation, increases dependence on attracting these
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corporations, which itself generates leverage to expand their profit-making
expectations, such as protecting intellectual property rights alongside
subsidization. As this dependence on transnational corporations grows, more
actors see the necessity of competing in the system rather than restructuring it.
In other words, as neoliberal capitalism has both centralized corporate power and
opened up labor and regulatory competition in international markets, impacted
actors have seen a decline in the means to combat the negative structural effects
of capitalism in helping to reproduce their own precarity and disposability. Unions
and labor organizations are likely the strongest example of this as many have
flipped from criticizing corporate subsidies to supporting them as an attempt to
ensure job access. Initially unions were some of the first to challenge the legality
of subsidies. Film workers in California, who were the ones to coin to the term
runaway production, viewed subsidies in British Columbia as stealing production
from Hollywood (Preston, 2013). Labor organizations even tried to use Special
301 provision to categorize subsidies as anti-free trade:
Industry workers have long been opposed to runaway production,
considering it a form of outsourcing directly attacking their trades, crafts,
jobs, and careers—or, more profoundly, their way of life. Coalitions of
industry workers trying to end the negative consequences of runaway
productions have had two viable options to consider in combating runaway
production: (1) petitioning the United States Trade Representative (USTR)
to determine the legality of foreign film incentives; or (2) lobbying for film
incentives at the state, local, and federal levels. On September 4, 2007, a

141

group called the Film and Television Action Committee (FTAC), a coalition
composed of unions, municipalities and individuals whose livelihood and
economic security depend on the film and television production industry,
filed a petition with the USTR under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974.
In its petition, FTAC argued that subsidies offered by Canada to lure
production and filming of U.S.-produced television shows and motion
pictures were “inconsistent with Canada’s obligations under the [World
Trade Organization] Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures. McDonald (2011, pp.106).

The protections, laws, and rules that have become important tools for
MNCs, including the US Special 301, ultimately failed in protecting union wages,
benefits and jobs. The growth of dependence on attracting transnationals has
contributed to a system that further entrenches corporate oligarchic power. As
coalitions supporting the International Subsidy System have expanded to include
labor, consumers and other constituents, most governments and politicians have
taken the route of participation in the system. Through this participation there is
little chance of reforming the clear contradictions in competing subsidies, as
many of these states end up reinforcing the hierarchy and control of the Major
Studios.
Even if interest groups or associations disagree, they tend to defer to the
more powerful group, which in most cases in film is naturally the MPAA or one or
more of its members, giving the MPAA more influence in lobbying governments.
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The EU has played a leading part in driving market logic and pushing for
neoliberal policies. Specifically, the early EU adopted American lobbying
techniques to develop cohesive corporate-EU representation with the WTO
(Schaffer, 2006). With the neoliberalization of the WTO itself, this corporate
relationship and lobbying was naturally strengthened around more complex trade
relations, much like the North American lobbying system (Young and Peterson,
2006). As corporate-state relationships became closer, and subsidization
became required for the industry, the International Subsidy System has become
global, as chart Leading Subsidies shows:

27. Leading International Subsidies52
Estonia

Up to 30% cash rebate for film productions.

Hungary

25% tax incentive on eligible expenses

Lithuania

Cash rebate of up to 20% of the budget

Macedonia

20% cash rebate on Macedonian production costs

Czech Republic

20% rebate on qualifying Czech spending; 66% rebate on
international costs paid to foreign above-the-line cast and
crew who pay withholding tax in the Czech Republic

Croatia

20% rebate on qualifying Croatian expenditure

Serbia

20% rebate on qualifying Serbian expenditure

52

(Buder, 2016)
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Poland

Only Grants

Ireland

32% tax credit on local Irish expenditures

UK

25% cash rebate and up to 80% tax relief

Belgium

The Belgian Tax Shelter allows the finance of up to 45% of
Belgian-eligible expenses.

France

30% tax rebate on qualifying expenditures in France

Malta

25% cash rebate of eligible expenditure with an additional 2%
if the production features Malta culturally

Italy

25% tax relief on qualifying expenditures

Austria

Cash rebate of 20% eligible production costs

Germany

In recent years, Germany has significantly slashed its federal
film funding, from $95 million to the current $68 million. The
DFFF offers a grant that covers 20% of German production
costs with a maximum grant limit of $4.5 million (and $11
million in exceptional cases). Germany also has 17 regional
film commissions to help with production logistics and funds.

Iceland

25% cash rebate on all eligible expenses

Norway

25% cash rebate on all eligible expenses
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Singapore

In 2004, the Singapore Tourism Board introduced the "Film in
Singapore Scheme," which promotes production in the
country by subsidizing up to 50% of qualifying expenses
incurred in Singapore, including local talent, production staff,
and production services. Additionally, there are various grants
available through the MDAS, including a "Production
Assistance" grant that supports up to 40% of qualifying
expenses.

Malaysia

30% cash rebate in qualifying local expenditure

Fiji

Film Fiji offers a whopping 47% tax rebate on production
spend in the country.

Australia

Producer Offset (40% rebate on productions shot in
Australia); PDV Offset (30% rebate on post-production work
conducted in Australia, regardless of where the production
was shot)

New Zealand

The New Zealand Screen Production Grant offers a 20% cash
rebate to qualifying expenditures; you can also qualify for an
additional 5% uplift if your project meets requirements proving
it will boost the country's economy

Canada

Depending on the province, producers can access combined
federal and provincial tax credits ranging from 32% to 70% of
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eligible labor, as well as tax incentives on local qualifying
spend ranging from 20% to 30%.
Colombia

Two-tier cash rebate system provides 40% for film services
(including services related to post-production, artistic, and
technical services), and another 20% for film logistical
services (including services provided for transport,
accommodation, and food)

Trinidad & Tobago Cash rebates up to 55% for expenditures on qualifying local
labor and 35% on other local expenditures
Puerto Rico

40% production tax credit on all payments to Puerto Rico
resident companies and individuals

Dominican

25% transferable tax credit on all eligible expenditures

Republic

including pre-production, production, and post-production

Panama

15% cash rebate

Abu Dhabi

30% cash rebate on production spend; no sales tax

South Africa

20% tax credit (production), 25% tax credit (post-production)

While Subsidy programs were clearly designed with local incentives in
mind, the contradictions that come out of a competitive subsidization process are
apparent in the growth of the power and privilege of a Mass Media
Conglomerate. The chart above lists only the highest offers of film production
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subsidies around the world, and therefore does not cover the entire scope of the
subsidization system. For the Major Studios of the MPAA, the international
subsidy system is both an effect and reinforcement of the global film oligopoly.
With an international system of rules against classical protectionism, states have
naturally moved into supporting the supply-side of production incentives, which is
encouraged by rules codified within the WTO and within regional trade
agreements. While one may expect subsidies to be the next anti-free trade topic
for the WTO and trade agreements, that they reinforce the corporate power that
participated in their development makes that unlikely.
Rather, the Mass Media Conglomerate is focused on using international
trade negotiations to promote a continuous expansion of Intellectual Property
Rights and Copyright protection. Unless the system is greatly restructured, states
will continue to choose between subsidizing leading industries, or seeing them
flee, especially for those industries that are most mobile. For the Major studios,
who receive the bulk of subsidies, are the most globally mobile, and have
international access to partnerships and distribution, this system helps reinforce
both their economic and political leverage, but also allows them to build a larger
coalition of labor and smaller studios who in turn expand their systemic influence.
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5. The New Media Oligopoly
In this final chapter I will start by examining the current situation of the Major
Studios, as well as their likely trajectory in the near future. In this, we will see further
concentration (primarily in Disney), acquisitions of the intermediate Majors, and the
decline of Paramount/Viacom due to not engaging with the modern market. I will then
analyze how this has affected the MPAA and the larger industry of media. Both due to
new technology and greater monopolization, major competitors in film and media have
only come from capital-rich, massive corporations, all of which have near monopolies in
semi-related sectors or industries. From here I will examine the current political strategy
of the MPAA. With the admission of Netflix to the association, an acceptance of digital
streaming as a primary distribution sector, and the continued focus on international
markets, the MPAA has developed and participated with a network of nominally
domestic associations in key countries to set international norms related to film, such as
copyright and its enforcement. Finally, I will examine solutions to limit both the corporate
power and the state relationship and reliance on leading businesses, which will
necessarily go beyond reinforcing antitrust legislation.
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28. Domestic Box Office Share by Major Studio

Disney and Fox
29. Box Office Share by Year (Boxofficemojo)

As can be seen from the chart above, Disney has been a clear winner at the box
office in recent years. As the largest Studio and the closest to a traditional Mass Media

149

Conglomerate, Disney has double-downed on acquisition of studios and IP in recent
years with Pixar, Marvel, and LucasFilm, which could have been seen as near minimajors if not for their selective genre focuses. However, the largest change in the MPAA
and oligopoly is due to Disney’s acquisition of a Major Studio: 21st Century Fox. Fox
was one of the participants with Hulu and had sustained a strong, if stagnant, market
share at the Box office. The spin-off of its television and news channels to sell the filmed
entertainment portion to Disney shows the decline in synergy between film and
traditional broadcast (including cable and satellite) in the near future. Disney itself has
been focusing more on streaming and subscriptions with the launch of Disney+, which
releases its family-oriented, Disney-branded media. More importantly to the oligopoly,
however, has been the acquisition of Hulu via Fox. As one of the founders of the
streaming platform (along with Fox and NBC Universal) Disney had acquired a majority
share with the acquisition of Fox and is in the process of purchasing the remaining
shares to use Hulu to release non-family oriented media.
With the purchase of Fox, Hulu, and the development of Disney+, the company is
poised to be one of the leading streaming companies along with its leadership at the box
office. This leaves Disney as the most traditionally structured Mass Media
Conglomerate, but also reveals the tendency toward monopolization, especially as other
monopolized sectors enter into the market, both from new entrants such as Amazon and
Netflix, but also purchasers of leading competitors Warner Bros. (AT&T) and NBC
Universal (Comcast). Thus, while the Disney purchases look like a monopolization within
the media oligopoly, it is also a necessary response to a market of media-technology, as
major tech firms attempt to synergize and “wall-in” their own platforms and products.
Again, Disney has done this most traditionally as far as Mass Media Conglomerates go,
by studio purchases and controlling distribution/exhibition. The remaining MPAA
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members have looked to other means of competition, or have seen their decline in
recent years.

Warner and Universal
30. Box Office Share by Year (Boxofficemojo)

While Warner Bros. may have seen a decline in market share over the past 10
years, it started from an exceptionally high-level position. In past years, the studio has
released some of the most profitable franchises, Harry Potter, as well as Lord of the
Rings, and its own super heroes in Batman and Superman. However, more recently the
studio has struggled, especially in competing against Disney’s successful Marvel films,
with its less successful comic book IP. On top of this, Warner is especially active in
working on co-productions with smaller, foreign studios, which is becoming increasingly
utilized for internationally produced and distributed films. Likewise, Universal does not
have the strongest IP lineup. Compared to Disney’s focus on younger children, Universal
has focused mostly on the profitable PG to PG-13 range, with leading IP being Fast and
the Furious. While Universal has some of the strongest historic IP franchises, in modern
times it has quite few as well. Despicable Me and the Bourne series are the most
profitable, and it has successfully revamped Jurassic Park, but, like Warner, Universal
Pictures has faced difficulty in generating its own film franchise comparable to Disney’s
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acquisitions. The attempt to revive the oldest film franchise, Universal’s classic
monsters, has largely resulted in failure with numerous “first attempts' ' with The
Wolfman, Dracula Untold, and The Mummy all being lukewarm at the Box Office.
However, what makes these studios especially notable is their acquisition by
telecommunications companies. Comcast’s purchase of NBC Universal occurred in
2009, with AT&T following in more recent years with the purchase of Time Warner in one
of the largest media acquisitions in history. Most notable, however, is why
communication companies view media producers and studios as synergetic to their core
industry. Unlike Disney, integrating existing studios into its media distribution system,
these companies do not directly own distribution or streaming services, on which their
studios can release exclusively. Rather, the connection between Internet Service
Providers and media producers is the relatively new importance of media streaming and
Videos On Demand (VOD), which provides new sector monopolization via platforms and
exclusive content. Already a very monopolized industry on its own, ISP and telecoms
could provide more opportunity, not only for product synergy, but for exploiting platforms
and narrowing consumption options. This was likely an interest in combining internet
access with subscription media platforms with the decline of Net Neutrality. While the
lack of enforcement of Net Neutrality has not reached the worst fears of critiques, who
saw a balkanization of not only subscription platforms, but the internet as a whole, there
has been some growing tendencies of ISP corporations attaching telecom services with
media subscriptions. This has ranged from basic media subscriptions with internet or
phone services to utilizing “zero-rating” systems, whereby only certain content will not
count against data caps, which is especially important for smart phone service and an
important expansion with AT&T’s entry to the industry.
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Declining studios
31. Box Office Share by Year (Boxofficemojo)

While Sony’s Columbia has overall higher market shares in recent years, like
Paramount it has experienced some market decline over a longer period. This is partly
due to relatively weaker film franchises, compared to the more successful majors, but is
also partly due to the structure of the company. Compared to other Mass Media
Conglomerates, the synergy between the main branch of the company and film and
media is not as direct. Sony was originally positioning itself to connect VHS technology
to content producers, which was reshaping the industry at the time of Sony’s purchase of
Columbia. While this may have had some importance in later optical technologies, such
as DVDs, the synergy was never as strong as what we see with today’s tech companies,
who already own massive servers and digital distribution. In fact, Matsushita (now
Panasonic) followed Sony’s lead into film and purchased Universal’s parent company,
MCA, in 1990, but only kept it five years before selling it off. Rumors of Sony selling off
Columbia have been common in recent years.
Where there has been some success in developing a streaming platform to
compete with Hulu, Netflix, and now Disney+ was in Sony’s hardware background with
the latter iterations of the Playstation systems. The newer generations of the system,
along with other consoles, such as Microsoft Xbox and Nintendo Wii, have attempted to
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become general living room consoles for all media, with streaming and purchasing
services, much like how Apple limits its products to its Apple Store. However, this has
numerous competitors even outside the video game market, including Amazon Fire TV,
Google Chromecast, Apple TV, Roku (spun off from Netflix), all of which offer access to
streaming services via television. While Columbia still has strong market share, despite
a decline, and Sony continues to be a global conglomerate, the company remains
relatively weak due to lack of franchises and lack of cooperation with other Majors.

32. Box Office Share by Year (Boxofficemojo)

Of the Majors, Paramount and parent company Viacom have been struggling the
most. Their market share has significantly been declining, with several years being
below Lionsgate, which is usually considered a mini-major and not a member of the
MPAA. Much of this is due to the stagnant focus on existing television networks and
lagging behind to online distribution. Many place the blame on aging founder Sumner
Redstone, who still has majority control of the business. Although separated from CBS,
Redstone has avoided moving exclusive content online and away from their television
distribution networks, which, in the past, was an essential distribution stream and
revenue generator. As a result, Viacom had not joined Hulu, and while CBS (also
controlled by Redstone, though technically a distinct company) released its own
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streaming in 2014, there was little interest. Finally, CBS All Access received a bump in
subscribers by releasing the Star Trek Discovery series, a Viacom IP, exclusively on
their platform. This pushed the subscribers to 2 million, far lower than subscribers for
Hulu and Netflix, and likely just for Star Trek as there is little other exclusive content.

33. Box Office Share by Year (Boxofficemojo)

As Fox studios joins Disney, and two of the members see decline, Lionsgate has
increased its position to having essentially become the sole domestic mini-major. It
qualifies as a mini-major due to having a substantial market share, but without having
the resources and distribution networks of the Majors. Lionsgate was able to reach a
comparable market share by adhering to the major strategy of buying out growing
competition. In 2012 Lionsgate purchased Summit Entertainment, which itself was
receiving the highest revenue in the domestic market with rising franchises such as The
Twilight series and later The Hunger Games. In exhibition, Lionsgate did co-own the film
cable channel Epix, along with Viacom and MGM, but later sold its share. Lionsgate still
owns Starz. Inc, a network of cable channels, but still lags far behind the extensive
networks the Majors own. As it stands, Lionsgate is the sole remaining mini-major, with
global releases despite a lack of distribution ownership.
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Changes to Industry Competition
The MPPA and Major Studios are currently in a period of reform to deal with a
changing technological landscape that is bringing more overlap with other actors and
industries. Streaming services have heightened competition, not only in parallel service
in Netflix (the most recent addition to the MPAA), but also with tech giants such as
Google (Youtube) and Amazon, who easily match the financial prowess of the Majors.
This technological disruption to the oligopoly has many similar qualities that predicated
industry liberalization in the 1980s. At the time, new media corporations and non-media
tech firms were overlapping with film through cable and VHS. The solution was
liberalization and greater concentration around distribution and exhibition. The same
strategy is now appearing, but on a much greater scale. The largest of the studios are
merging into larger Mass Media Conglomerates, with two being incorporated into leading
telecommunication corporations, Comcast and AT&T. The recent addition of Netflix to
the MPAA means the association is larger, but potentially means the threshold to be a
Major Studio has increased to include larger technology conglomerates.
Although filmed entertainment had long been subject to a long stream of product
iterations, from toys to video games and theme parks, Video on Demand (VoD) and
Streaming services have been among the largest disruptions in the film industry. In
many ways, the digital exhibition of film has replicated many of the fears VHS caused for
the Majors: studios fear ease of piracy, dispersion of product control, and increased
substitution of entertainment products. More so than even VHS, streaming has even
reshaped how production and releases are done, even affecting other exhibition sectors.
This has affected the film style as cinematography designed for the big screen may not
translate to home systems, or, more drastic yet, computers and smartphones. These
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style and distribution changes have increased further as dedicated streaming services,
such as Netflix, have started their own productions of both TV shows and feature-length
films. It is the latter point that is driving most change in the MPAA.

Hulu and Netflix
While the growth of Disney and movement of other Studios into
telecommunications presents its own complex effects on the market, one of the clearest
examples of collusion between the Studios was Hulu. Founded as Netflix was moving to
digital streaming, Hulu comprised the most successful of the Major Studios: Fox, Disney,
Universal, and later joined by Warner. These four Majors have brought Hulu to be the
3rd largest platform after Amazon and Netflix. Hulu has been able to bypass what should
be seen as clear collusion of a cartel, based on the expectation that Hulu will still have to
bid competitively for content against Netflix and Amazon. Hulu, however, has been
losing money, despite the fact that these four Majors are pouring in money, and much of
their content, which was on Netflix, has been moving exclusively to Hulu. This means, as
much of the leading content is from the majors, the costly investments from Hulu to
compete with other streaming services, come from and goes to the Major Studios
(Spangler). This has been pushing Netflix to produce originals and get other exclusives,
thus becoming a Major producer itself.
The multiple and complex network of sectors, tie-ins, and platforms can appear
to give credence to the argument that deregulation of such industries was not only
necessary, but that the complexity would make any attempt at antitrust regulation overly
difficult, if not impossible. However, the solution in allowing the Majors to compete via
Hulu was based on a contrived structure, which has been a common issue with
associationalist solutions. Allowing some degree of consolidation, collusion, or outright
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monopoly has consistently been used to solve larger, structural problems. In some ways
these have been used to avoid the more difficult systemic and structural changes and
adjustments, but the larger issue is that these short-term solutions have been utilized by
those in power to increase these contradictions. As such, Hulu may be clear collusion
among these four studios, but the novelty of streaming had allowed Netflix itself to be a
clear monopoly not even 10 years ago; vice versa, allowing monopolistic Netflix to
produce its own content, something that would not have been allowed under the
Paramount Decree or Fin-Syn, had become necessary not only due to content from the
majors being hoarded by their own platforms, but also because earlier industry
liberalizations had already allowed exhibitors to produce content.
As such, while it was clear that Netflix needed competition so as to not eventually
abuse its monopoly, the industry necessarily turns to other quasi-monopolies, or cartel
via Hulu, as the only means to counter the perceived monopoly of Netflix. This conforms
to the standard assumption of oligopolistic competition, but it ignores the monopolistic
ties each leader has within other sectors. Netflix itself is the least inter-sectional, and
thus the most vulnerable. Its continued success depends largely on the incumbent
power of having been a streaming service monopoly for a short period. In addition to the
challenges posed by Netflix, one should expect more competition and changes for the
Majors as a result of competition from other monopolizers in complementary industries
(again, Amazon and potentially Google and Apple). As such, these challenges from
emerging exhibition platforms is what is likely driving the new round of conglomeration-into telecom and Internet industries. As a result, the willingness to participate in the Hulu
cartel is indicative of successful adjustment to increase collusion, sector synergy and
control, and taking advantage of monopolization. In this, the four Hulu partners had been
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able to grow their market share, while Sony and Viacom have been facing more difficulty
in their weaker adoption to this new sector.
Instead of creating competition, the encroaching competition coming from other
sector monopolies leads to more concentration. It is monopolization to deal with
competition. A primary issue is that existing loose antitrust enforcement leads to what
should be seen as unfair practices: an incumbent monopoly once the technology is
established, and two tech giants (Google’s Youtube and Amazon) that can leverage
other sectors--ecommerce and a host of computing services and systems (google
search, google operating system, google chrome, etc.). The fusion of the power of Mass
Media Conglomerates with the power of conglomerates that dominate online platforms
has provided opportunities for further consolidation in an attempt to synergize the control
and delivery of content. That the power of already existing monopolies expands within
this system is an inevitable byproduct of weak to non-existent antitrust laws in an era of
neoliberalism. Antitrust regulators will approve merger after merger as long as there is
no clear evidence that consumer prices will be dramatically affected. This leads to
further consolidation across platforms as Mass Media Conglomerates and powerful
digital corporations use their corporate power to compete with other oligopolies for the
highest value acquisitions.

New Competitors
The new exhibition sector of digital streaming, being led by technology giants, is
rightfully being treated by the Majors as a major threat to their dominance. However,
what should be more competition in filmed entertainment is counterintuitively what is
driving greater concentration in the broader communications Industry. In part this is
because an international media firm can benefit greatly from a centralized streaming
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platform, especially for regions missing distribution branches, but also the financial cost
of mergers and acquisitions can be offset by stable and larger market shares. It is thanks
to the existing normalization of monopolies, as well as their need for international
“competitiveness,” that concentration has been seen as an answer to economic changes
and uncertainty, rather than more market competition. It is thus important to emphasize
that even should these subsequent mergers not have occurred, the growth of
competition in digital media was still constituted by what are largely monopolies in their
core industries: Google, Amazon, and for a time Netflix. Thus, even as some members
may leave or others join the MPAA, some manner of oligopoly tends to remain--now as
even larger conglomerates.
The clearest parallel with current consolidation is the comparison between
Netflix and HBO in the 1980s. With the addition of cable and home video to existing
exhibition of theaters and broadcast, it is common to suggest that the complexity and
widening of the market is what helped lead to deregulation of antitrust, opposed to their
enforcement against HBO (Prince, 2008). Rather, the rise of HBO, and the monopoly it
initially held on cable, allowing for, as the studios felt, unfair power in price negotiations
for film, was one of the driving reasons for the Majors and the MPAA to push for antitrust
deregulation. The cable exhibition sector that disrupted the Studio relationship with
theater releases was “fixed” by the oligopoly integrating all exhibition into Mass Media
Conglomerates. Today’s competition of digital streaming and entries of tech giants, with
monopolies of their own, is likewise being fixed through integration into Media-Tech
Conglomerates.
The success of Netflix also largely replicates HBO’s early success as being the
first major supplier of a new technological service. Starting as a mail-order DVD
subscription service, Netflix included a streaming option as internet speeds and
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bandwidth costs improved. Already popular with its DVD service, Netflix was the sole
major streaming service with the exception of Hulu, which took time to popularize.
Founded in collaboration with three of the six Major Studios, Hulu was not only an
alternative streaming service, but allowed the Majors to deal with Netflix collectively. As
a result, content from the Majors that had initially been on Netflix was being pulled for
exclusivity as the contacts expired. Because of this associationalism to counter Netflix,
Netflix had to move into producing and funding its own original content. Due to its strong
incumbency of subscribers and growth of exclusive production, Netflix has increasingly
taken the shape of a Major studio, focused on monopolizing distribution and exhibition
and financing exclusive production.
By contrast, Amazon and Google entered the streaming sector from their own
monopolized industries. Google’s Youtube is clearly the most distinct, primarily
composed of independent and amateur videos. In recent years, however, it has pushed
for professionalization by creating a threshold of subscribers and views to monetize
content, supporting the development of Youtube networks, adding the option to rent
theatrical films, and developing a subscription service with its own exclusive content
called Youtube Premium. While still the most distinct streaming service based on
content, Youtube by far has the largest user base. On top of that, the threat from
Youtube and Google comes heavily from the potential to leverage their existing
monopolized sectors into their streaming service. Google has a variety of potential
influences from Android to Chrome, but the offer of Youtube Premium itself is based in
part on original and produced content, but also on removing ads on all Youtube amateur
and independent videos.
Amazon has taken a similar, if not harsher step, with Amazon Video and the
subscription service, Amazon Prime. Tying in their core sector of ecommerce and
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shipping, along with multiple other sectors and products the company has since entered,
the inclusion of video streaming through Prime leverages Amazon’s platform much
farther than the streaming services of Youtube and Netflix. Being a technology
conglomerate and online store, Amazon has a lot of synergy to enter the streaming
market, especially as it already maintains a massive amount of servers for its other
services. However, the use of a corporate-wide subscription service, much in the same
vein as Google user services and the “walled gardens” of Apple’s operating systems,
drives competition not solely based on quality of service or price, but based on number
of tie-ins and how monopolized they are for best leverage. On the one hand, this unfair,
or at least unreplicable, practice requires a comparable response to maintain
competitiveness as Disney, At&T’s Warner Bros., and Comcast’s Universal have done.
On the other side, the barrier to entry generated due to the concentration of the oligopoly
makes the most likely entrants those who can leverage a corporation roughly equal to
the size of the MPAA members themselves. This is especially true when looking at the
initial response of the Major Studios to Netflix with the creation of Hulu.

34. Video On Demand Users By Platform:
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35. Spending on Production and Acquisition of New Content:

Changes to Cooperation
How the MPAA membership itself is reshaping is illustrative of how the media
oligopoly will look in the near future. Netflix had been a long-time adversary of the
Studios, but has been accepted as a member of the MPAA in 2019. At the same time
the most successful of the Majors have been consolidating and merging with
telecommunications. The addition of the digital streaming service, along with the
intermixing with other tech industries, implies the Mass Media Conglomerates will be
integrating new sectors of competition and entrenchment, likely ending as a form of
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Tech-Media Conglomerate. By contrast, the Studios that have failed to adapt to this new
consolidation and associations have been seeing a decline in their market share.
However, this turns out, what this makes clear is that the trajectory of consolidation is
not slowing down as the Oligopoly may become both more consolidated in membership,
while also becoming larger and more interconnected associations.
This move will clearly make it harder to correct any anti-competitive practices,
such as market shares or sector monopolies, while also increasing the tendencies
toward justifying monopolies as “necessary” to compete in an even more consolidated
marketplace. As such, labor interest, local industry, national culture, and even the blatant
corporate payoffs in subsidies, will become more and more entrenched into the
international system. Copyright and Net Neutrality issues will be increasingly likely to
reflect the corporate position, especially as telecoms becomes intertwined with
production and exhibition. On top of this, any deepening of the oligopoly will correspond
with a widening, especially as the untapped markets are also the quickest growing.
While much of Asia still offers room for the oligopoly, China is by far the largest and most
important. China is also one of the last adversarial governments to protect its market
from the Major studios, which will likely exacerbate conflicts within the international
market, international law, and even directly into international relations.
As international markets both provide more than half of the Majors’ revenue and
have the largest room for growth, much of the MPAA’s activity has been in developing
an international system of associations to influence individual governments and set a
global norm. This was done by partnering with local film interests (many of which have
production relations with the Major Studios) to create national film associations in over
35 countries (see “FACT” Anti-piracy Network List, below). Much like the MPAA in
America, these trade associations lobby their respective governments for the interest of

164

their members, usually over copyright and its enforcement. What is unique, however, is
that these organizations comprise domestic film studios and the MPAA, commonly with
the Majors being the leading or majority of members.
From this growth of corporate influence, overlapping associations, and
broadening of social and political influences, comes four important revelations: 1) the
development and growing importance of Intellectual Property is a means to create
scarcity out of knowledge, which is naturally abundant. This is the foundational goal of
the organizations in question, especially as most are developed around combating
piracy, especially online. 2) Setting an international legal norm to retain dominated
markets while positioning their entry into growing markets--in particular China. 3)
Strengthening not only ties with politicians and other state apparatuses, but generating a
partnership of shared interest to drive multiple states to defend the international norm
globally. 4) And control of an internationally dispersed industry. As examined in previous
chapters, with the expansion of exhibition, new distribution markets, growth of
producers, and greater connectivity with other industries, the flexible monopolization
within neoliberalism needs a new means of centralization. As a result, more than valueadded or a means to combat piracy, the strengthening of Intellectual Property will filter
control by compounding the power of those corporate actors who lead in finance,
exhibition, and cultural dominance.
36. “FACT” Anti-Piracy Network
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

FACT (UK):
AFACT (Australia)
NZFACT (New Zealand)
INFACT (“Irish National”)
CYFACT (Cyprus):
IFACT (Hong Kong)
TFACT (Taiwan)
MFACT (Malaysia)
SAFACT (South Africa):
MOTION PICTURE ASSOCIATION – CANADA
NY FEDERATION AGAINST COPYRIGHT THEFT
Copyright Collective of Canada
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●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●

Verein Fur Antipiraterie der Film-und Videobrache
Federazione Anti-Pirateria Audiovisiva (Italy)
Federacion Para La Proteccion De La Propiedad Intelectual (Spain)
Assoc Mexicana de Cine y Musica AC (Mexico)
Russian Anti-Piracy Organization (Russia)
Foundation of Audiovisual Works Protecti (Poland)
Society for Protection of Copyright Inf (Germany)
Korea Content & Technology Alliance (Korea)
MOTION PICTURE ASOCIATION AMERICA LATINA (Brazil) (N/A Controlling Entity)
Schweizerische Vereinigung zur Bekämpfung der Piraterie (SAFE) (Switzerland)
Belgian Anti-piracy Federation (Belgium)
Association for the Protection of Movies and Music (Brazil)
Motion Picture Association – China (MPA-China)
Danish Anti-Piracy Group (AntiPiratGruppen) (Denmark)
Association for the Fight Against Audiovisual Piracyv(Association de Lutte Contre la
Piraterie Audiovisuelle - ALPA) (France)
Society for the Prosecution of Copyright Infringement (Gesellschaft zur Verfolgung von
Urheberrechtsverletzungen - GVU) (Germany)
Motion Picture Distributors Association (India) Pvt. Ltd. (MPDA) (India)
Japan & International Motion Picture Copyright Association (JIMCA) (Japan)
Foundation for the Protection of Copyright for the Entertainment Industry Bescherming
Rechten Entertainment Industrie Nederland (BREIN) (Netherlands)
Motion Picture Association – International (MPA-I) (Singapore)
Swedish Antipiracy Bureau (Svenka Antipiratbyrån -APB) (Sweden)
Motion Picture Association – Thailand
Ukrainian Anti-Piracy Organization (Ukraine)

This network of associations had its origin with the British “Federation Against
Copyright Theft” (FACT)-- the original and better known of the FACT organizations. This
British FACT organization was founded in 1983, at a time that the MPAA and Major
Studios were still in the process of regaining their position and international access. By
contrast, many of the later FACT and MPAA associations were developed at the modern
peak of the Majors. At the foundation of FACT, Britain was already uniquely integrated to
Hollywood’s international production and distribution. As such, this original FACT was
able to operate as a stepping stone to a secured market into the rest of Europe. It is thus
organizations such as FACT that helped set and export neoliberal norms to foreign
markets which are then used as legal expectations for new markets. Once formed as a
norm, it is easier to expand these rules and laws as a precedent to more stubborn
countries where the film cartel does not yet have a strong foothold. As this had only
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increased in time and expanded under neoliberalism, it is no surprise that it has such
associations have proliferated under groups like the MPAA.
In most countries where the MPAA is active, this enforcement is done through a
variety of means such as political lobbying, lawsuits, having agents work alongside
police and going beyond the legal structure by partnering with Internet Service Providers
(ISP) monopolies to combat piracy directly. To avoid public backlash, such activities are
imported as a norm in places they are already in place, such as the UK. The MPAA also
hides its participation by attempting to appear “domestic” through groups like FACT,
which means including at least one domestic studio as cover. The Australian version of
the association, AFACT, is the worst offender in this regard with members being the
MPAA and only one Australian Studio. FACT, the original, was composed of the MPAA
members and several domestic media firms (See Fact Members as of 2015), likely due
to the more difficult position of generating legal norms, rather than importing them.
Nonetheless, while this had the advantage of legitimacy (especially for future FACT
operations) and attaining powerful domestic allies in the industry, FACT was still created
at the behest of the MPAA, which supplied half of the FACT budget (Russon, May 24,
2016). It is thus these two English market organizations, FACT and AFACT, that lead
and normalize a broader network of anti-piracy trade organizations (McDonald, 2015,
pp.83), and have as a result been the most visible and public of the network.

167

37. FACT Members as of 2015

Perhaps the most publicly notorious examples of the MPAA and FACT actions
(and impetus for website censorship and the eventual “graduated response system”) has
been their participation in not only monitoring IP offenders via hefty lawsuits, but also the
participation with police operations. FACT officers have reportedly been able to not only
participate in interrogation of those arrested who are suspected of recording films in the
theater, but apparently lead the interrogation with police there to arrest, confiscate
electronic equipment, and officiate the interrogation (Andy, 2013). As one suspect put it:
“I was detained for 3 hrs 12 minutes, out of that I was questioned for
approximately 40 minutes. One police officer and two FACT officers conducted
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the interview. The police officer sat back and let FACT do all the questioning, so
FACT were running the show,” the man reports. (Andy, 2013).
These FACT officers are “expected to liaise with law enforcement, they will also be
expected to take part in briefings, seizure of evidence and prosecution support” (Andy,
2013). The FACT officers themselves, operating much like and with police, have even
been known to show up at suspected infringers’ homes for questioning.
This cooperation and partnership with police had developed over time into this
quasi-police organization from the private group. As in other states where the MPAA has
political influence, these tacit relations have eventually become officiated with new
bureaucracies and issues around which they participate. One example of this is the
interlacing of police and FACT development into the creation of Police Intellectual
Property Crime Unit (PIPCU) in London, which was developed in partnership with
numerous other private trade associations, such as BPI (British Phonographic Industry)
and IFPI (International Federation of the Phonographic Industry) (both of which have
MPAA members), as well as another trade association conglomerates--the Alliance for
Intellectual Property, of which the MPAA is a member. The PIPCU, in the enforcement of
intellectual property participates in seizing or suspending websites and arresting
operators. Targeted sites are referred to the new police organization by “entertainment
industry groups,” including FACT and BPI (Ernesto, 2014). BPI and MPAA are also the
most common actors for blocking of website requests in the UK for servers outside of
PIPCU reach. Additionally, there have been numerous complaints that PIPCU site
blocking has been done without due process, revealing both the importance laid at
copyright protection by the state, as well as the numerous levels of state involvement for
the international system (Ibid.).
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While this corporate-state enforcement and policing are not necessarily unique or
novel, the embedded nature, creation of new policing bodies, and leadership by the
private sector MNCs helps to contribute to a new development in what Adrian Johns
calls “Intellectual Property Defense Industry” (Johns, 2009). This is the use of new
technology and devices to protect the increasingly important status of intellectual
property. The Intellectual Property Defense Industry utilizes existing military and policing
techniques as well as “...ex-officers, surveillance techniques, [and] encryption—to form a
distinct enterprise with branches in digital, pharmaceutical, agricultural, and other
domains” including copyright (Johns 2009, pp.499). For the FACT network of
International Trade Associations, and increasing move from the private IP defense
industry to the public-private IP defense alliance, this represents but one movement
toward political dominance beyond the market (market share) and neoliberalism (state
subsidization) dominance. This control, integration, and then norm development is part
and parcel of the wider international issue related to not only an international oligopoly,
but in the question of enforcement against consumers and citizens. Aggressive methods
in both monitoring and punishing piracy have thus become an international norm,
sometimes in dealing with current or potential customers, such as the absurd event of
police raiding the home of and seizing the Winnie the Pooh laptop of a 9 year-old over
the downloading of a pop album (Etherington, 2012). This was done at the behest of
Copyright Information and Anti-Piracy Centre, a Finnish IP trade organization, which
along with IFPI (which has RIAA/MPAA members) helped get a notable piracy site, the
Pirate Bay, banned in Finland.
FACT, along with related IP groups, such as MPAA, BPI, and IFPI have also
been instrumental in creating the site blocking structure of the UK. Although the UK has
a stronger history, in comparison with the US, of censorship, the direction of censorship
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for the purpose of removing access based on copyright and other IP laws is heavily done
through such entertainment trade associations. One noteworthy and recent example is
the EU Court of Justice upholding the legality of member states being allowed to ban
access to the website The Pirate Bay (Court of Justice of the EU, 2017). This was in
response to a Dutch court ruling against the legality of banning the Pirate Bay. This was
against MPAA affiliate BREIN (Foundation for the Protection of Copyright for the
Entertainment Industry), who then brought it above Dutch law to the EU court. While the
ability to have a transnational apparatus to counter state law is unique to the European
Union, it is a common strategy of MPAA, and a central purpose to develop the numerous
organizations and partnerships.

Solutions
As this trajectory of corporate power will likely become more complex and
intertwined into new areas and industries, solutions to the problem of concentrated
power will not simply be able to return to the antitrust laws and regulation that worked
under the New Deal. Much of the means for the Majors and the MPAA to successfully
lobby Washington to repeal the New Deal regulations had been based on how outdated
these regulations had become. Constructed when theaters were the only exhibition
sector of film, the Paramount Decree had not been properly adapted to the modern
economy, with hyper-globalization, and new exhibition technologies emerging well
beyond the capacity of existing regulatory frameworks. The need to update such
regulations ran against both a growth in corporate lobbying and a greater reliance for
Washington in promoting competitive American industries, especially as the permanency
of the trade deficit became increasingly apparent.
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Break up
The clearest and most direct necessity to combat the varied and dispersed
effects of such a consolidated industry would be to actualize antitrust laws. The issue
around this is that while the Majors together constitute a clear oligopoly, with nearly 90%
of box office market share in many countries, as six studios compete with one another,
this still constitutes a “competitive” market according to contemporary antitrust norms.
The primary issue is thus the varied forms of vertical monopolization and reach into
other sectors. For the Studios this would simply be updating the Paramount Decree
separating theater ownership from film producers to include all exhibition, including
online streaming. This would mean other entrants to the market, such as Amazon and
Netflix, would also not be able to produce content for their platforms. However, to fully
actualize such antitrust regulation in today’s digital environment, the limitations of
existing regulation need to be mitigated. This will require prohibiting the monopolization
of any sector as well as limiting the monopoly power and leverage of any one sector by
utilizing tie-ins.53 As such, a host of tech giants, including Amazon and Google, would
need to be dismantled.
For the studios this would mean dismantling the Mass Media Conglomerates, but
also all elements of Mass Media. Not only does international distribution need to be
delinked, limiting international releases to domestic distributors purchasing rights in that
country, but all distribution needs to be delinked from production. This will limit the ability
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Thurman Arnold, one of the architects of antitrust regulation under FDR, had warned that the
regulation did not go far enough to limit what he called “bottlenecks” that did not constitute
monopolization, but could still be leveraged into other sectors. For the Studios, while exhibition
was removed, distribution and production were still tied together, allowing them to regain their
hold through internationalizing markets, production, and ultimately operating a flexible and
financialized corporation.
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to assure markets for blockbusters through bloated budgets and large advertisement
campaigns, and will result in a more competitive production market.
Associations
Trade associations themselves, as shown, perform a variety of roles beyond the
simple collective representation. More problematic is the ability to join and partner with
other numerous associations, including those that nearly represent an entire industry,
such as the IIPA. These “peak” associations have allowed influence into the system not
only in the common interest of its various members, but are themselves influenced by
power dynamics from within the organization. Thus, expanding antitrust legislation, not
only to the cartel-like activities of trade associations, but to associations of any kind will
be essential to solve asymmetries of power. As stated, part of the entrenched power is
that solutions will naturally cause problems that lead to more associational fixes. Should
any corporate associations be allowed, they should necessarily be open to any business
within the industry, thus diluting with membership beyond the shared interest and goals
that a small number of corporate actors could organize around.
The united representation of corporations is even more problematic when
compared to the lack of such institutions for other sectors of the economy, such as labor
and consumers. For decades union membership and power has been declining. While
corporations have merged, oligopolies have become the norm, and associations have
expanded their membership, activities, and reach. The clear method to equalize power
would be for stronger labor unions, in conjunction with eliminating the corporate unions,
both as oligopolistic “megacorporations” and in the form of trade associations. With only
11% of employees in a union, the film industry has much room for improvement. Even
so, where there are unions it is important that unions are fully independent of the
corporations. As shown in chapter 3 and 4, due to the mobility and transnationalism of
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film production, unions, especially for the above-the-line jobs, support subsidies and
otherwise strengthening the oligopoly, so as to have access to their productions.
Corporate State and Intellectual Property
The most difficult task will be untangling the political and economic reliance many
countries have on specific industries and “national champion” corporations. Especially
for the United States, concerns of its perpetual trade deficit has given impetus to
expanding antitrust liberalization and providing political and economic support for
corporations that are still competitive globally. Outside of lobbying and personal relations
in Washington, there is a proclaimed national interest in supporting transnational
corporations that has been exacerbated since the 1980s under neoliberalism. Especially
for film this conflation of national and corporate interest had been shaped by free trade
and open markets (as opposed to “embedded liberalism” prior to neoliberalism)54 and
the reliance on Intellectual Property Rights for high value-added industries.55 As such,
the reliance on transnational corporations, the Major Studios, the MPAA and even the
FACT associations can be seen as expressions of the “economic interest” of the U.S.,
much of it currently oriented toward China, which is one of the largest and fastest
growing film markets, but which is also protected and weak in enforcing Intellectual
Property Rights.
Despite some regional film production centers, the Hollywood Majors continue to
be the only global distributors. Most major domestic producers fail to move far beyond
their home market, and Bollywood and Nollywood are the only regional exceptions.
While many large Asian markets, such as Japan and South Korea, follow similar in-
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See John Ruggie and Dani Rodrik.
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See Sell (2003)
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between paths, possessing strong indie producers that have some reach in select
foreign markets, but ultimately focus on the domestic market supplanting MPAA market
share. The growth of the China market is the primary reason that Asia is not only the
fastest growing film market, but is now the largest (See chart below). As the largest
single foreign market as of 2016 at $6.6 billion, China makes up nearly half of the entire
Asian market of $14.9 billion (2016 MPAA Theatrical Statistics).
38. Box Office Size by Region

Also, outside of the range of other specific contenders such as Nigeria and India,
this makes Asia in general, and China in particular, as the obvious long-term targets for
Major Studio’s global market growth. Nonetheless, China, as the second largest
economy and also second largest film market, has the potential to develop the next ollywood, either around Hong Kong or Beijing (or both). The regime, however, appears
to be aware of this, with concerns that are economic and cultural, with a limit on
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American films entering Chinese theater at 34. On top of this, China has limited the
percentage share that Majors are able to push onto theaters in China, and even then
has allowed theaters to manipulate their numbers to pay out less to foreign studios, with
the government even subsidizing theaters whose box office receipts are majority from
domestic films (Dresden, 2017).
While this has been limiting the access and control of the Majors in the most
important growing market, the larger issue has been centered around IP rights and
tacitly accepted piracy within China. It has consistently been pushed by the MPAA that
Chinese piracy is a large contributor to the US trade deficit, and that film is a leading
trade commodity for the US, with four times higher exports than imports for the industry
(Johnson, 2018). While this appears to be a relatively small issue, mostly affecting those
directly within the industry, this, like all the other issues directed by the MPAA, has
massive, long-term consequences. Corporations have increased their pressure
campaigns and leverage to access the China market on their terms, both through
attempting to use existing WTO channels to force Chinese compliance with IPR
protections and the more recent support (among several corporate interest blocs) of the
Trump Administration’s more aggressive use of tariffs as leverage for the protection of
intellectual property rights and liberalization of direct foreign investment in China
(Lawson, 2018).
As such, the tariffs levied by the US against China, have, much as the principle
of Special 301 itself, been unilateral punishments, over largely unresolved trade issues,
such as subsidies and intellectual property--themselves rife with asymmetry and
hypocrisy. As this work has shown, the Mass Media Conglomerates attained their global
power partly through a global subsidy system that has provided a platform for their
ongoing economic and political dominance, now joined by an even more integrated
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alliance of digital monopoly powerbrokers. The fact that these corporations want the
Chinese government to allow this system to be extended to China is an indication of how
global competition for market share easily overlaps with imperial rivalry. Therefore, the
urgency of rolling back this entrenched system of corporate power has become more
apparent as such unchecked power easily leads to imperialist conflict that may result in
even graver consequences. As such, the transnational corporations demanding
maximalist intellectual property protection from China, which means that that China is
expected to follow rules ignored by the West, cannot be dismissed from the very
corporate economic structure that led to globalization, neoliberalism, and the general
widening and deepening of industrial consolidation, including film and media that affects
so many elements of peoples’ daily lives.
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